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the PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP:

RACE AND DEMOCRACY

IN

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND
BRAZIL

MAY 2000
AN HONY PETER SPANAKOS, BA.,
PRINCETON
1

M.A.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

PhD.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor

I

in

UNIVERSITY

he spread

ol

democracy

Latin American politics

is

Howard

Wiarda

.1.

one of the most important and impressive
occurrences

in the last

two decades.

I

lowever, scholars may, and do.

question the degree to which democratization
has truly occurred and been
institutionalized.

Domimcans and

I

his dissertation

examines the quality of citizenship

for Afro-

Afro-Brazil ians, groups that have been traditionally
considered

marginalized, with the belief that an analysis of the
quality of citizenship for these

peoples will

I

make

visible the depth

of democratization

in these

two countries.

he dissertation examines the citizenship of Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-

Brazilians by using two distinct models of citizenship: the

first is

a Liberal

focuses on individual rights and negative freedoms that are
protected by a

second

is

a Republican

model which emphasizes positive

model which
state; the

rights, political activity

and

community. Combining empirical research and observations, secondary sources and
statistics

(when

available), the dissertation finds that neither Liberal nor Republican

viii

versions of citizenship
are adequately
institutiona.ized for
Af,
Afro-Dominicans
and Af roBrazilians.

In an attempt to

examine what

and Afro-Brazthans.
the dissertation
finds
privatization

Plants.

deepened by

is

^

of citizenship does
exist

sort

P-* on

three fronts:

orchestrated in private
space; second, citizenship

is

identity, rather than

first,

and

KGOs and organs of civil

on a micro-political

level, in

some

areas.

IX

that this

power

is ,ar

g e,y extra-

agendas and decisions are
often
considered an exclusive
status,

an inclusive and
universal

identity: third, services
traditionally associated
with the state
es,

and

and the adoption of
neo-libera, economic

institutional and,
despite democratization,
political

•dated to one's socio-economic

Afro-Don, inieans

that citizenship is
'privatized'

pofitiea, culture

-

for

society are

now

political

have become cut as the

state

taking the place of the
state
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PART

I

theoretical perspectives
Democratic government has shifted
from the “exception”
America.

In the last

two decades every country

exception of Cuba, has shifted
officials are

to,

in

Latin America, with the single

and maintained, a system

chosen through elections. Suffrage

independent than they have ever
been, and,

in

is

to the “rule” in Latin

in

which

universal, the

many

all

government

media are much more

countries, although not

all,

the

military has returned to the
barracks and has not been an active
participant in the political

arena.

I

between

he dominance of electoral
government and competition for
elites

democracy.

It

and

political positions

political party organizations
represents a very important

also allows scholarly attention
to

move

its

move towards

focus the transition from

authoritarian government to the
institutionalization of democratic citizenship.

Democracies are most clearly defined by
demographically and culturally, but

in

terms of how democratic

and responsibilities are considered
fundamental

An

examination

into citizenship

their citizenship, not just

to citizenship,

is

citizenship,

what

rights

and how are these ensured.

allows one to see the everyday politics which are

juxtaposed to the “democratization” of political parties
seen through electoral

politics

and

competition between political parties.

1

he

first

chapter of this book, “Citizenship, Race and

Dominican Republic and
the context of the

salient issues of

Brazil,

I

in the

focuses on outlining theoretical terms and issues within

Dominican Republic and

what

Denw—dzation

Brazil.

I

he chapter begins by outlining the

consider a crisis of citizenship

in

Latin America, and then

examines two dominant concepts
of citizenship, which
'Republican
rights,

”'

The fonner

and a limited and

is

neutral state.

freedoms, active participation

community which

fundamentally based

The

in political

I

label “Liberal”

in negative

latter is a font,

and communal

and

freedoms, individual

of citizenship based

activity,

and a

receives loyalty and other
’emotive' responses from

in positive

political

its

citizens.

I

will

then briefly place citizenship in
the context of Latin America,
and assert that neither
Libera! nor Republican citizenship
pervade in the
that democratization has

Dominican Republic and

Brazil, and

been concomitant with a
“privatization” of citizenship, which

undermines both Liberal and Republican
notions.
In order to

1

will look at

Brazilians.

I

examine the

two groups

true depth

that are often considered marginal.

will first distinguish Latin

European concepts of race, and then
racial identities in the

It

and breadth of democracy

I

American

will

should be noted that these terms do not correspond

within political theory.

two

countries.

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

patterns of race relations from

examine

Dominican Republic and

in the

the role

US

and meaning of race and

Brazil.

to a particular political party, but to traditions

and

CHAPTER

1

mZENSHIP, RACE AND
DEMOCRACY
IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
ANI) BRAZIL
This chapter sets ou, the
theoretical framework
and models which wi„ he
used
,hlS

b00k

11

'

bC8inS With 3 brief
examination of the importance
of citizenship

in

1

America

in this

sechons which

most recent period of
democratization. This
wall outline the

“

° f CitiZenShiP

The notion of citizenship

in lhC

in Latin

tW ° C0untries com

America. The

ot race relations, from the

1

such as Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians.

first

last

two sections

examine the meaning

more “rigid” system of Anglo and
Dutch-American

Crisis of Citizenship in Latin

appeals to

will

to

of

of these will distinguish a “Latin
American” pattern

how

under study by combining empirical
observations,

Any

examined

P^ ^ analysis of citizenship among a

he second section will focus
specifically on

The

will then be

'

examine the depth of democratization.
The
"race

two

0f =°n.empora^ Latin
American democracies. The
hierarchical „a,u,re

traditionally marginalized
group,

•'

will be followed by

most relevant aspects of
both Liberal and Republican

visions of citizenship,
respectively.

Within ' he

in Latin

race

is

conceive'* =- *he

statistical data,

countries.

two countries

and discursive

analysis.

America

recent observer of contemporary
Latin

American

politics will notice constant

citizenship "(ciudadanici, cidadania)
and the rights of citizens (der echos de los

eSSe ntially contested concept." The
meaning attached to race is hardly fixed, and as recent
race H
theory has suggested, race is socially
constructed, ,'hus, since race does 'not refer to a clear
set
o categories or characteristics which
hold true over different historical periods and in
different cultural
contexts, it is important to ground studies
of race in the society which has constructed the significance

w yrk
work

m
•

.

of the

1

.

CiudadanOS direitos dos cidadaos).
These terms
’

traditional

domain of explicit

are used in reference not
only to the

legal rights, but also to
health care, penal codes,

environmental policy proposals. The
often excessive use of citizenship
as a
referent and/or rallying point
the

seems

to suggest a recognition

and even

political

of the correlation between

deepening (profundizacion/p
rofundizacao) of the process of
democratization and

a

similar growth
(amplificacion/amplificacdo) of citizenship.
I

he

fact that citizenship

shows not only
Latin

has become one of the key terms in
political discourse

the awareness of the importance
of citizenship, but the recognition that

American democracies

are enduring, in varying degrees,
a crisis of citizenship

(Bacal, 1997: 283). Citizenship seems
to be in crisis primarily because the
development

of citizenship

in

is

lagging far behind, and often contradicts,
successful democratic refonns

other areas, namely electoral politics. Informal
politics are incapable of matching up

with formal democratic guarantees and this
constitutes a serious problem for nascent

democracies. Citizenship

is

also in crisis because popular disappointment with

democracy,

if

ol relations

and deepening democratization. However, as

and

properly channeled, opens the possibility of transforming
dominant patterns

6, the possibility for

using this

moment

to generate

effects to benefit the majority of the population

politicians invoke citizenship often, there

citizenship critical enough to push

it

is

seems

will

be shown

in

chapters 4. 5

any long-lasting transformative

unlikely. Additionally, although

only limited evidence that they find

to the top

of the

political agenda.

institutionalization of democratic citizenship constitutes a crisis

whose

Thus, the lack of

severity has not

received enough attention due to other priorities during democratization, such as

concept

2

9

achieving economic
growth, slowing
(hyperinflation, aand insuring
military subservience
to civilian rule.

While there are many
angles

Crises af00t

cau*, can be analyzed from
many

2

this essay considers
three related

,

phenomena

as being fundamental
in the

creation of a crisis of
citizenship.

‘

hiCh
",

"

lmiVerSall >' a PP'-Me to

all

mited b -v the extra-institutional
power
tbe c
b rm °f c Hentelism,
caudillismo/coroneUsma
?
which
makmg ami the a PP™Pria«ion of resources
in Latin
1*

structures and network
gove^much^ofTte'deciV

ln

Atnerica

n

’

—

S^ip t^!^
which, when T|
bl

iC re ti0nShip
betWeen democra tic politics and
u
applied to the
Latin American context is
not defined in
S
tCmiS
bUt rather in exclusive
domains
of
privilege
and'
status
atus, Th
I he
perception of all members of a
political community as having
eoual
"
multiple levds
marginalization
?“
that
separates
s%amttlh!!sewh
those who have power from
those who do not. This separation
is rarelv
random, and is often based on
individual and group identifica.ion-soda
cultural
clI!turaU
economic, religious or otherwise.

izerisnip,

T*

^

'“‘f

’

5

1

appamfs
pp. ratus, which

P
^ L"
Vn modernity
°",f
has meant
of

olitical

,

agents (citizens) with a central political
Between the Great

the State.

Depression/World War 11 and the Debt
Crisis of the early 1980s, Latin
American
economies were heavily statist,
promoting Import Substitution Industrialization
pi ograms winch increased
the role of the State
in

mg

the last tw o decades, neo-liberal

incorporating popular sectors.

economics have been hegemonic, and

this

Of the many

arguments to explain this crisis of citizenship
in Latin America, I will mention
only a few
tizenship tended lo be only imposed
and effectively maintained during
dictator™ and populist Limes
and as a result citizenship was conceived
within and authoritarian and limited context
(Reis 1007)"

teXT Li

i$

e

irpassive (Turner
00 0
elite pressures
nrp«
f
el.tt
for
expansion
'

Ln

uni e

’

to specific elite

™

~

'

ed

P “
The Tt'
the history

of political space.

" fr

bd ° W "

of citizenship
th

1

°m

‘"™gh
in

the

West

"public

«

is

and 20* century pressures

groups, while power remained

in

s

I

Br.an

a^ 'cZ^

limited, citizenship

associated with popular and
to

open

political

space were

private spaces (Brea, 1983).
3) Although the

°f C U
15*.' pin th
West 15 seetl as a continuous and linear evolution
;'
of rights corresponding with
,ncre?
ncreasmjy p.uralistic and democratic governments
(Marshall: 1963), the history of Latin America"
republics demonstrates recurrent problems
with establishing a "democratic tradition" or culture,
as
emocratic regimes were often short-lived, and
coups, military rule and dictatorships impeded
the
opportunity ot a slow and deep cultivation of a
politics of citizenship (Wiarda: 1997).
4) The history' of
s avery and social exclusion
was so intense in many areas of Latin America, that discussions
of citizenship
served often as window-dressing for European
visitors, intended to cover up profound historical
differences
wmch the simple promulgation of laws could not address.
5) Many argue that there is a fundamental conflict
between democratic politics and capitalist economics,
and that the cleavage between the horizontal claims
0 t0rmer and thC VertlCal ones
the olher make democratization a problematic enterprise
(Robinson:
BAX'
'

’

in the area

of-cial

distribution,

THeSe Pr ° blemS ° nnS,itU
tional^ing a democratic
form of citizenship

are practical

and

and explicitly
in

political.

which citizenship

citizenship

may be

is

However,

i,

shouid be noted that there

is a,

leas,

one other

involved: an identity crisis.
While a sympathetic portrait of

universal

among

political elites

and mobilize,,

dial all Political actors,
or theorists, are referring
to the

•erm "citizenship.” Although
Shelter notes

that

"by

its

same

thing

i,

is

by no means cleaar

when

they invoke the

very nature as an essentially

contested concept, citizenship
entails a discussion of, and
a struggle over what

meaning

One

crisis

is..." (Shelter, 1993:
130’), there

tend to be two principle visions
of citizenship.

identifies citizenship with the
legal guarantees

refers to political activity

its

of individual

and participation within a bounded

rights,

political

while the other

community

(Stewart, 1995: 63).

While Benjamin Constant differentiated
between the
the ancients (Constant,

1

liberty

of the moderns and

988), political theory has categorized these two
visions of

citizenship as being heirs to the Liberal
and Republican traditions respectively (Beiner.

1995; Mulhall and Swift, 1998; Taylor,
1989; Horton, 1994; Walzc., 1999; Avineri and
de-Sahlit, 1996).

Liberal Citizenship emphasizes the importance
of individual rights and

negative liberty, while Republicans understand
citizenship in terms of community

membership, active participation
the literature

in politics,

on democratization has spent

political theory, debates

little

time linking

its

theoretical

models

to

between procedural ists and substantivists invoke many of themes

Similarly, Van Gunsteren "citizenship
make of it"’ (Van Gunsteren 998:
).
,

and positive notions of freedom. Although

1

is

not an eternal essence but a cultural

1

1

4

artifact.

It is

what people

Which emerge from the
Liberal -Republican debate.
Distinctions between procedural^,

who

favor a minimal and
parsimonious notion of democracy,
and substantivists.

who

prefer a maximalist
understanding of democracy,
are based in the Liberal a
and Republican
traditions,

which

will be outlined in the
next section.

T his chapter will be neither
a literature review of the

two

traditions,

nor an

attempt to delimit the factions
within each tradition, nor even
an analysis of the debate

produced by scholarly encounters
between advocates and

above

traditions.

Instead.

substantivist claims

citizenship.

I

will

1

will outline the

which can he traced

produce “ideal types”

critics

of one or both of the

most important elements of procedural*.
and

to Liberal

that will

and Republican conceptions of

obviously obscure dissent within

schools and runs the risk of
oversimplifying the positions presented.
However, the
presentation of the traditions here
theoretical value

is

not intended as a

of Liberalism or Republicanism;

means of critical

analysis of the

rather, ideal types serve to evaluate
the

quality of democracy and the relevance
of democratic citizenship in the

Dominican

Republic and Brazil.

Liberalism, Polyarchy and Rights
...the role of the

The

people

Liberal tradition

is

fin a

democracy]

the

make

to

produce a government 4

autonomy of the

choices and express preferences. The “self’

community, and therefore

.

based on individual rights and tolerance. This has

typically been understood as the recognition of the

her freedom to

is

is

autonomous

in its

is

individual and his or

seen to be prior to

decision-making. The rights of the

ind, vidua,, part, cu,
arly his or her

govemmen,.

,o choose, is a
fundamental concern of

Libera, government
shou.d ensure the protection
of tndividua, rights, bu,

ntust not tramp, e

on the

rights

The most obvious
sanctity

freedom

of a minority

distinction

constraining (Sched,er.

government, a

is that

Diamond and Planner.

critical issue in Liberal

which makes no major

order to protect those of
a majority.

in

of the Liberal

of the sovereignty of the
individual,

ethical claims

,

state,

it

is

beyond

limited.

its

The

democracies, depends on a

nor purports

to a singular

extensive violates people's rights”

(

1

996:

1

A

36).

expounded by Ronald Dworkin who
considers

Liberal state

is.

fairly

not-

minimal

is self-

state

of public good.

As Robert Nozick

the most extensive state
that can be justified.

is

recognition of the

999). Seif-cons, rain, on the
par, of

neutral State suggests a
minimalist vision of what politics

-the minimal state

i,

writes

Any

state

more

similarly minimalist

view

is

political acts to

A

be “legislation,

adjudication, enforcement and the
other executive functions of
government... nothing

more should be added” (Dworkin. 1996:

217).

a necessary evil that exists only
to guarantee

64),

and government,

like

Politics is

conceived

of, like the State, as

maximal individual freedom

any form of politics,

is

conceived

to

be a form of coercion.

Paraphrasing John Rawls, Mulhall and Swift
write “[political power...
exercise must,

if

it

is

to

(Jaffe. 1997:

is

coercive; so

its

be legitimate, respect the freedom and
equality of citizens” (1998:

108).

Liberalism

political science

is

perhaps the dominant paradigm in comparative

more

politics,

and even

generally, and, not surprisingly, comparative politics
has heavily

emphasized the importance of “Liberal”

criteria in its definition

4

(Schumpeter, 1950: 269).

6

of democracy. Joseph

in

Schumpeter
ntos,

notion of an elite centered
and essentially formal
democracy

s

common

point of reference

(,

950).

He

is

perhaps the

considers democracy to be
simply the -free

competition [among leaders]
for a free vote,
vote ” and
J
nml th*
the role ofc citizens
within such
•

•

i

IS

essentially limited to voting
for “leaders”
(Schumpeter,

.his

form of democracy

•ha. his is the

most

is far

realistic

less participatory

1950 271
:

and utopian than

He

),

a

system

recognizes that

others, but he believes

and possible form of
democracy given the “plausibility
of

assumptions” and the “tenability
of propositions” (Schumpeter,
1950 269 ).
:

Schumpeter's minimalist form
of democracy was revisited by
Robert Dahl
1971 / olyarchy. in

Dahl expands Schumpeter’s
notion of democracy

it,

(roc expression of citizen
preferences
p cierences.

to include the

Pnlvarrhv
naM argues, represents
olyarchy, Dahl
the minimal
i

requirements for a democratic
government,

1.

is

n political

and procedural model which.

hkc Schumpeter’s model,
emphasizes parsimony. Dahl’s minimal
requirements
polyarchy are:

1) the

freedom

to

in his

for

form and join organizations;
2) the freedom of

expression; 3) the right to vote;
4) eligibility for public office;
5) the right of political
leaders to

free

and

compete

for support; 6) the availability
of alternative sources

fair elections;

and 8) institutions which compel the
government

votes and other expression of
preference (Dahl. 1971:

institutional

to

7)

depend on

3).

Polyarchy has been and remains the dominant
model
studies since the “Third

of information;

Wave" of democratization began

in

employ^
1974

in

in

democratization

Southern Europe, as

and minimal visions of democracy have been
hegemonic. Scott Main waring

writes “Dahl’s polyarchy (1971) exemplifies
a clear formulation, with reasonably

parsimonious yet not simplistic explanations. This

(Mam waring,

is

what

we

should strive for"

1992: 329). Similarly, in his presidential address to the
American Political

7

Science Association,
Lucian Pye said “in
searching for the ntos,
prontising variables for
expiaining dynamic change
we probably could do no better
than to star, with Robert

Dahl

s

theory of polyarchy”
(Pye 1990-141
ri,
„
,
y trye,
iyzu.15). The
appeal
of polyarchy
i

is

that

it

offers

scholars a parsimonious
model which lends itself to
mass comparative analyses,
allowing
•or discussions

of democratization across
region and time which
might no, have been

possible otherwise (see

Coppedge and Reinicke,
1991; Przeworski

Those w ho tend
that

polyarchy

is

to

use polyarchy as their
standard definition of democracy
accept

a minimal model, but one
that

operationalizable, unlike

more substantive

is

nevertheless possible and

definitions.

Additional, these scholars

emphasize the importance of
procedures (proceduralists) and
(institutionalists) in democratization.

tbat

“presumes

i,

fraud,

institutions

Polyarchy represents a “procedural
minimum”

fully contested elections

combined with

etal, 1996),

with

full

in

suffrage and the absence of
massive

effective guarantees of civil
liberties, including freedom of
speech,

assembly, and association” (Collier
and Levitsky,

1

997: 434). Polyarchy also emphasizes

the tole that institutions play
in terms of ordering citizen
preferences and providing

government accountability. John Peeler,

for

example, has argued

that institutions,

particularly political parties, are
“essential” to the successful consolidation
of democracy
(Peeler, 1998: 165).

despite

its

In his analysis

of democracy

in India,

leaders of India during

to

two

that

lack o! an industrial revolution, the wide
income disparities, and the low

general levels of literacy, democracy has endured
in India.

and

Ashutosh Varshney notes

its

He

attributes this to the

independence, because they reinforced democratic

institutions,

specific institutions, the catch-all Congress Party, and
the structure of the

federal system

India (Varshney, 1998).

The most important de
mo cra t ic procedure
Polhica, panics are most
re.evan,,

iocus of sehoiars

who employ

is

,ha,

for Libera, scholars.
Ure

one

in

which

of dec, ions. This has
remained ihe paramoun,

a minima, is, notion
of democracy, a testamen,

,o

polyarchy's Schumpeterian
heritage. Elections are
the easiest means of
monitoring

cmzens

preferences, and fair and
free elections can
easily be distinguished
from the

elections that occurred
during dictatorships
and other authoritarian
regimes.

These scholars recognize

that

polyarchy

is

minimal, bu, they believe

broad enough guarantee
of rights and freedoms
so as

democracy can grow. Trying

do more than

to

this

provides

provide an environment

could jeopardize the

transition to democratic
government, as Huntington
to

to

i,

makes

stability

all,

do not forget"- 99
1

1

:

223). Nevertheless,

which

of the

clear in his discussion of
how

handle pas, human rights
violations ("do not prosecute
do no, punish, do no,

and, above

in

forgive,

when polyarchy seems

to

be

securely in place, scholars feel
comfortable making the judgement
that democracy has

been consolidated

in a

given country

.

and Linz (1999) argue that
democracy
har e accepted

Although some scholars, such as
Diamond, Hartlyn
is

consolidated

democracy as "the only game

in

when

all

relevant political actors

town,” most proceduralists would
agree

with the more parsimonious
definition of consolidation proposed
recently by Andreas

Schedler which argues

that “[t]he

term ‘democratic consolidation' should
refer

to

expectations of regime continuity—and
to nothing else’ (Schedler. 1998:
103).
Citizenship within a fairly minimalist
democracy that
institutional

Although

is

conceived

all political

and

in

essentially procedural and

terms of individual rights, particularly political

civil rights are

violation, not their exercise,

is

rights.

important within the Liberal tradition,

which concerns

it is

their

scholars. For example, a citizen need not

9

'O'" ‘° be 3 dem0Cra
' iC dtiZen
bU ' Sh0 ' ild

—
^

’

CUiZen

dWS

n0 ‘ HVe

^3d

“>-

- she be denied the right to vote

expression of preferences
privileges voting above
ol defining citizenship.

^

In

,

ofLiberalism and the focus
on the

many

other rights, particularly
in ternts

989, Robert Dahl’s
writes "the rights of
citizenship include

^

° PP ° rtUnity

sn,

the

the highest officials in
the government”

(Dahl, 1989: 220) which seem* tn
ems to echo cSchumpeter s
minimalist definition nearly
four
i

decades earlier

in

which he wrote “democracy
means only

opportunity ol refusing the

men who

are to rule

tha, the people

have the

them” (Schumpeter, 1950:
284-5).

Republicanism, Substantivists,
and Participation

4he nation of citizens does

not derive its identity front
some common
ethn.c and cultural
propeities, but rather from the
praxis of citizens
who actively exercise their civil
5
rights

The Republican tradition

government and civic
who. through
of citizens
on

in

is

one

that

is

characterized by the importance of
self-

virtue (Sandel, 1999: 11).

their active participation,
construct

Republican theory

is

the individual's independence.

quite significantly.

autonomous and

As opposed

.

The republic

is

constituted of agents

government and

society.

The freedom

an especially positive notion of
freedom, and

it

rests

This independence differs from Liberal
autonomy

to the Liberal agent

whose decision-making process

isolated from other people, groups and

commitments, based on

is

his or her

existence and value prior to society,
the Republican agent cannot be understood
outside

of society. He

norms already

oi

she

is

born into a world where relations, expectations
and cultural

lay claim to

preferences can be

made

him or her long before any conscious expressions of

(MacIntyre, 1981; Avineri and de-Shalit, 1996:3; Horton and

10

Mendus, ,994: 7-10; Sande,,
,996:

comes

firs..

,

2 ). Nicholas

Onufwri.es “[h;

.he absence of association
(republic, society), there

can be no agents” (Onuf,

1

998:

5).

an association

is

no agency and there

Republican agents also recognize
a certain civic

responsibility and virtue that
denies the citizen the
possibility of the voluntaty
withdrawal

from civic

1

life

possible within the Liberal
paradigm 6

he republican agent

is

independent

.

in that a citizen

can only be truly free when

they are not “dependent.”
This idea stems out of
Aristotle's denial of citizenship
for
slaves,

women

and laborers, because they
lived

swayed by dependent
free

(

relations (particularly

Aristotle, 1972,Arendt, 1994:
12 ).

importance of land ownership
because

community, and because

it

i,

in the

economic ones), and

ensures the long-term interests
of the citizen

gives the citizen a certain

and economic autonomy"

is

therefore were no, truly

Republican thought has long posed
the

believed to be necessary for
participation in public
"political

world of necessity, they could
be

in a

amount of economic independence

life.

J.G.A. Pocock writes that

"a prerequisite against corruption"

in

Machiavelli's

notion of virtu (Pocock. 1971:
212). Recently, Phillip Petit has
conceptualized freedom
within the Republican tradition to
be “freedom from domination”

(Petit,

1997: 4).

He

writes:

[to

be un-free involves] having to

live in a

manner

live at the

mercy of another, having

to

you vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a
position arbitrarily to impose; and this, in
particular, when eacn of you is
in a position to see that you are
dominated by the other... It is the
grievance expressed by the wife who finds herself in
a position where her
husband can beat her at will, and without any possibility of
that leaves

redress; by the

employee who dare

not raise a complaint against an employer, and

(Habermas, 1995:258)
These arguments are suggested by many thinkers such

who

is

as Machiavelli, Tocqueville Rousseau and Arendt.

vulnerable to any of a range
of abuses,

employer may choose

Obviously, this

l

is

iberals in that

it

a

much more

tries to

robust understanding of
freedom than that posed by

remove

Republican government

and minority rights than

it

is

™

some petty, some serious that the
to perpetuate.. .(Petit.
1907; 5)

social

is

and e conomic power differences

far less

concerned about the protection of
individual

about citizens asserting their
civic duty and participating

the construction of the republic

itself.

its

daily and

to the repression

of those

who

subscribed to alternate

argue that a State which recognizes
no public good cannot

nor can

institutions can

to

it

sustain their participation in

and must

elicit

command

citizen

1

political

language as

to rule

man who

is

the only

in

doing

so,

he or

This follows Aristotle’s

shares in the administration of justice

(Aristotle. 1972: 93),

and be ruled

its

5).

989: 169; Arendt, 1994).

definition ol a democratic citizen as "a

holding ot office

the loyalty of

affairs (Pinsky. 1996;

must construct the public sphere, and

she defines the public good (Taylor,

in the

Republicans

(Sandel, 1996: 6). Social

maintain civic action and consistent participation
in public

The Republican

He

its affairs

v^',

"emotive'’ responses by citizens because that

Taylor, 1996: 49; Miller, 1996; ignatieff,
1995:

and

duties.

notion of a public good. While
Liberals fear a unitary vision of -the
good”

would lead

wa>

most banal

are charged with the responsibility
of publicly engaging one and other

common

citizens,

in

Citizens are responsible for not
only the creation

and maintenance of their own
government, but for
C itizens

that limit liberty.

which has been

(Ignatieff. 1995: 56).

translated into

modem

Aristotle considered

lists other examples, which for the sake of space,
have omitted.
Barber writes that Liberalism has challenged religious and traditional authority with the consequence
of
weakening the bonds that “sustain and integrate" (Barber, 1989: 55).
1

)

800d

P-,

*

POli,iCa aC " 0n 10
'

of the highest

*

he

^

fo

™ 0f M0ra

,

action.

WHUe certain acts were

ntora, caiibe,
Aristotie believed that,
regard, ess o, goa.s or
resuhs

participation in politics
in itself was something
“good.” This notion of
poiitics

contras, to the

modern Libera,

boundaries of the

political.

distrust

Participation

is

s ,,k

of poiitics, and hence,
the limitation of the

Politics is no, a
'necessa,y evil’ but a
‘moral obligation.- as

well as an ontological
imperative-since the

romon).

is in

human

being

is

a “political animal"
{soon

fundamental, as evidenced
by Benjamin Barber's
concept of

"Strong Democracy" which
“requires unmediated
self-government by an engaged
citizenry.

requires institutions that
will involve citizens
a, both the neighborhood
and

I,

the national level in

common

action

common

talk,

common

decision-making and

political

judgment, and

(Barber, 1984: 261

Although the Republican

polmcs than has been

tradition has

been

far less influential in

the Liberal one, there are
those

who

comparative

subscribe to Republican

notions of democracy and
citizenship. Such scholars
oppose minimal versions of

democracy, arguing
institutional

that

democracy must

entail

more

than simple procedural and

frameworks. They argue that such
procedures and institutions

undermined,

if

may

not completely invalidated, by
the presence of clientelism, sharp
gaps in

socio economic disparities, cultural
norms which devalue particular groups,

argue that democracy must make
more broad and more deep claims.

Guillermo

O

be

In

a

1

etc.

They

993 essay

Donnell argues that a democratic regime—
a system of procedures— must

be distinguished from a democratic
state—a bureaucratic, legal and ideological
institution

O

.

A

regime

Donnell writes

may

“[i]t is a

be democratic

in that

an elected government

is in

power, but

mistake to conflate the state with the state apparatus,
the public sector, or the

the lormaI political

democracy of that icg.mc
rceime

will be
will
i

j

undermined

if the State is

not also

democratic.

Many

scholars

disappointing because

who

study democratization
find polyarchy to
he highly

many Third Wave democracies
meet

0Ut hy POlyarChy ye ‘
SCh0brS
’

-

the

minima, requirements

se,

“bou. labeling then, as
democratic. Richard

JOSCPh HaS CharaC ‘ eriZed
SeVera regimeS
'

Al '™ a «* “Virtual
Democracies” because they

in

maintain a democratic fagade
to legitimize governments
which are often quite
authoritarian and violent
(Joseph,

1

998). Terry

about the -fallacy of
elec.oralism” which
will

is

Lynn Karl has repeatedly warned

“the faith that the mere
holding of elections

channel political action into
peaceful contests

accorded public legitimacy”
(Karl, 1995: 73).
institutionalists, these scholars

scholars

(substantives)

among

elites, the

As opposed
insist that

winners of which are

to procedural ists

and

democracy must make

substantive claims which go
beyond simply holding elections.
Robert Fatton summarizes
this position in a recent
article

A

on democratization

in Haiti.

He

writes:

substantive conception of democracy
entails a participatory structure
of
rulers are fully accountable
to citizens

governance where

and where the

economic sphere comes under popular
control. It must include more
than
C electoral mechanisms
guaranteeing the possibility
of regime alteration

anc the institutional check
safe-guarding individual rights from the
overpowering reach of the state. It must
emphasize civil society and the
market to the same norms of democratic
accountability (Fatton
9991

213 ).

public bureaucracies. These are
unquestionably part of the state, but are not all of it. The
P imari y ’ 3 Set 0f Social relations that establishes a cem»u order, and
ultimately
"?
i
c k
S
With a centialized/ coercive guarantee,
over a given territory. Many of those relations are
formalized in a legal system issued and backed
by the state. The legal system is a constitutive dimension
of
the state and of the order that it
establishes and guarantees over a given territory.
That order is not an equal
socially impartial order; both under capitalism
and bureaucratic socialism it backs, and helps to reproduce,
systematically asymmetric power relationships”
(O’Donnell, 1999: 135).
t

V

7
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"[djemocracy
arrangements.

.

!haTcomp°^«™ ly

03

^
n m

mtklodo^th

It is
fundamentally an idea
about soei
denotes a society where
power is in the hands of*

Substantivists point
beyond elections and

?

BeCkCr

Wh ° wites
° r ° lher

insl 'tutional

S,nbution «f power
and

^0).
|

elections take place
and procedures are
institutional, to

Podbcal practices such as
Cientelism. and
of certain groups over

cultural

norms which

attach status to

members

others, as leading
to hierarchical
societies

which undermine
democracy. Schoiars as
diverse as Howard
Wiarda (.997) and Sonia
Alvarez, Hvehna
Dagn.no and A.turo Escobar
(1 998) have argued
that cultural politics
in Latin America
P'a> a veo' critical role
in limiting and/or
impeding democratization.
Robert Fatten
(,

" 9) 3nd Wi " iam R0bin *>n (1996) have argued

that the current

democratization has been vety
limited because of i*
juxtaposition

economic programs

that

have worsened income

ultimately erode democracy
J

disparities

wave of
to neo-hbera,

between

citizens and will

*

Substantivists recognize that
liberalization and. perhaps
even, limited

democratization has occurred

in

many

countries of the world in the

last

two decades. Bu,

democratization should be
understood as an interminable
process which no government
has completed, and to
which

all

should

strive.

This understanding of the
chronological

aspect of democratization
differs quite markedly from
Schedler’s idea of consolidation
as

regime continuity. Substantivists
argue instead for -deepening’'
democracy by expanding
institutional accountability,
increasing participation,
lev

emphasizing the role of civil

society,

eling inequalities in economic
distribution, shifting cultural
nonns which denigrate

members

ol certain groups (von

Mettenheim and Malloy, 1998; Cha.mers

15

et al,

1997).

Repub, ican citizenship

reflects the

maxima, claims

democracy. As O'Donnell
writes Citizenship

- m most contemporary literature)

politica,

and across

substantiate make of

floes no, stay within
the

(namowly

fleflnefl

confines of the political”
(O’Donnell, ,990: ,36).

instead citizenship
extends into political
activity,
relations within

that

societies.

community

bui,fli„

g and e q uality of

Republican citizenship can
often be seen

and civic activity of
individuals and
communities

in civi, society,

in the

where

individuals and groups
attempt to articulate
political programs, to
build community, and
,o increase

government

'marginal' populations

efficacy.

who

is

especially

are barred politica,
access

due to low economic status
and

I

Such citizenship

and

full

import

for the

more

exercise of citizenship

cultural prejudice.

he Nether-Lands: Citizenship

in

Latin America

' '

865
,i

Political culture. This
^ofltfie^rut.r^'Ir

gathered

democracies

encompasses not only

and preferences
opinion surveys, but also symbolic
representations and collective
-in other words, those
bits of ’evidence’ people
do not tm&e^xplicit
^
DC C3.ll.SO tnov
n
because
*?10
they consider them ‘normal'
and 'natural

in public

imaginations

^

Just as Aristotle's citizen of
o nepolis

Republican argument recognizes

that

what

is

e

may

not be a citizen of another, the

construed within one political community
as

the set of rights and
responsibilities understood as citizenship
Similarly, in "Justice as Fairness,”
John

founded

in the area

beliefs

in public political

and social

Rawls notes

may

not apply in another.

his political Liberalism

attitudes... [that sustain] the

is

“securely

good of all persons and

associations within a just democratic
regime” (Rawls, 1996: 194)".

Can democracies

lu

(Lechner, 1997: 170)
'

1

]

Similarly, Joseph Carens writes
“Liberalism,

it

might be

16

said,

emerged with

the

modern

state

and

and democratic citizens
be crafted outside
the communities

^«

Man> who study
n °‘

mea "

,ha ’

Latin

,n 0thCT

'

- >•- America

po.iticai institutionai
structure

autlioritarian tendencies
is iiheiy to

Wiarda l997)

America would no,
answer vety

15

impose a democratic

^

m practice be quite different

which they have

in

-^-

‘

An g| o- American

^

iS

and European (Turner.

,

oniy tha, attempts
to

over cuitures with
stro„ s

institutional born,

set out

modem

of democracy may

citizenship, based

is

on the

considered to be

project and as a point of
interstice between the
nation and

the State. Nation,
stale and citizenship
are

all

concepts whose

official histories are

associated with -Western”
discourse. Bryan Turner,
and others,

h-» Piqued the

egalisn, of traditional
concepts of citizenship,
associated with T.H. Marshall
ethnocentric, and they argue
that while
citizenship,

i,

may no. remain

1

presupposes
'

99 3 ). Whether

it”

it

is

i,

may

essentially, or exclusively, a

lhat

de

^
is

,

'

S

’

S

European and Anglo-

Palma (1991).

di

v

'

be applicable to the histoiy
of English

not even accurate within
the context of Great Britain

is

ar8Ue

u T

963 ) as

(1995: 244).

See Giuseppe

cen^

(1

as relevant in other countries.
Barry Hindes asserts that

Marshall's notion of citizenship
(Hindes,

99 ,

by the polyarchic
model

experiences ob England.
Trance and the United
States of America,

developed as pad of a

,

considered to be essentially
modern

99 3: vii, This

1

Thjs

14

;

from the expectations

'3

positively

produce hybrids and
mutations' 4 (O'Donnei,

**

The n0 ' i0n ° f Ci iZenShip

^

r

cracy ’

li: '

e

0,lKr

entered lnt0 d society that was
profoundly exclusive (1991)
“democracy”— in a pure and essential sense-exists

#* have come from

" 0t t0 say that

nap

L

“
tonTT
°
L
1

"*

ns a " d ,ntora,al
f
P ractlces

M““

Weaith

anywhere

«ed

to describe the

O'Donnell has written of "oe, waive democracy"
r iQOUl
(1994).
Caldeira and Hols, on (l99S)have
wrinen of "Disjunctive Democracy". Other
rems include

V.M

,

l

.
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American concept, however,
0f " K

Ma8na Cana

Man, and

the

US

'

'

he

is

Age ° f Re

theory, all

and

™

luti0 -’

is

in

which

which authority faced
increasing limitations on

the political

aduhs horn and naturalized

1

Cass continuously expanded

in a specific state.

While the

unti,

reached, in

citizen (ci ,oyen)

modem

was

Western

.

Dominican Republic and

US model

9'"

in the

in Latin

America,

were numerous attempts

and 20'" centuries.

1

It

attempts to open political
space were led by elites
that

measures used

in general,

and

in the

Brazil, in particular,
hardly followed the patterns

the United States,
although there

and

i,

its

16

97 1 )

The construction of citizenship

rights,

hei,

conceived to be a form of
political and legal
equality based on contract
(Turner.

1993: 5; Parsons:

on the

considered an

-gicide, the Declaration
of the Rights of

a bearer of privilege
based on status in
pre-Revo, utionaiy France,
the
citizen

is

Declaration of Independence,
Constitution and BN, of
Rights. Each are

nts "'thin a
narrative in
arbitrariness,

an important
distinction. Citizenship

of England or

to construe, citizenship
based

should be noted tha, the
majority of the

who

hardly expanded universal
legal

government-led efforts to expand the
citizen base were often
populist
to increase the control
exercised

by the federal government over
those veiy

popular sectors. Additionally, the
recurrent presence of coups and
dictatorships, military
or otherwise, often wore
Citizenship, even

However,

when

away many

it

earlier attempts at constructing
17
citizenship

expanded, however, remained

in the past

two centuries "who"

is

.

fairly restrictive.

included within the citizenry has been

quite significantly transformed,
and so have the rights that have been
extended. In the

^

“Democraduras", “Dictablandas” (see Collier
and Levitsky 1997 )
0
llable readi " 8S
°f
‘“"Actualization’ of political society can be found
and RousIei

^

18

in

Locke

Dominican

*** „

h

„

*•
qmrements
language and

»

-

many

„

tliminaling

barriers that previously
excluded different individuals

removed. However, a gap

and discursive articulation
of these

rights

members of traditionally excluded
groups, such

who

^
^
—

Wifc„

for voting. Recent
constitutions outline the
rights of citizenship
in universal

I- public spaces have been formally
theoretical

,

are disproportionately
represented

among

and

between

the

their actual protection
for

as Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-Brazilians,

the victims of police
violence.

I’aulo Sergio Pinhe.ro
writes that ‘'Brazil, like
other Latin

society based on

exists

and groups

exciusion-a democracy without
citizenship”

American

countries,

is
i

a

(Pinheiro, 1996: 18).

After historical and
empirical research on (the
possibility of) democratic
citizenship for

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians,
Republican citizenship

is

I

am

convinced

effectively institutionalized'*

sense of community that
compels citizens to participate

an effective commitment
on the part of government
citizens.

In fact, as will be argued
in chapter 6.

it

that neither the Liberal
nor the

There

in the life

from politics

opposed

politics.

is

neither the profound

„f ,h e polls nor

to protect the rights

seems

that

Brazilians suffer from profound
political anomie. While this

views of citizenship there are
two

is

critical differences.

is

there

of all of its

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

may resemble

First, libertarian

libertarian

disengagement

voluntary. Libertarians choose not
to involve themselves in politics,
as

to the situation for

Phis alienation

is

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who

due

to:

are alienated

from

discourses which negate their political agency
and

self-

See chapters 2 and 3 for a more deep
analysis.
See chapters 4 and 5 for examinations
of Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship
countries.

19

in the

two

— ~-

””

* "h

“

•

- r„„„,

„ Mr

chen.eles. Second,
libertarian citizenshtp
in the United
States, for example,
protected by guarantees
of individual rights.
Libertaria:
ians can thus
disengage from

m

is

political activity
without fear that their
personal rights or
property will be

encroached
upon. Such a luxuty
does no, exist for
Afro-Don, inicans and
Afro-Brazilians where
either the State cannot,
or will not,

make any

guarantees to ensure their
most basic

individual riuhts.

he result leads to a

1

individual, neither

bom

one

based on free choice,

sort

of “nether”

into a virtuous

self-ref, ecuon

Pitvatizatiou of C.ttzenship,”"'
a

affectivities.

I

is

I, is

use the

worth

w ord

becomes

private

assocta.es

refer to this situation
as the

even the question as

to

accepted by

whether

briefly explaining

“privatization.”

citizenship” refers to three
particular privatizations 20
-zen.,h.p

I

phenomenon which would probably
be

even be considered a form of
citizenship.

why

community member nor an

community nor someone who

and free

neither Liberals nor
Republicans. There

this tern,, and. for tha,
matter,

ci tizen. neither a

The

this

what

is

should

mean, by

“privatization of

.

because the public and

political

—

regardless of

whether one uses the Liberal or
Republicans definition of these
terms-are perceived

See chapter 6
20
101

1

for

"^

more on

this

to

theme.

COnsidered coi ncidental that

this phenomenon has coincided
with the most sweeoino
both the contemporary' world, and
the his, on of
C P nvatizatl0n generates
a privatization of behavior. New
wavs of life based on
inriiviH
d vidua ft
list strategies emerge.
They are rational and creative in adapting to
competitive relationships But
ey do not assume collective
commitments. On the contrary they weaken
the public »he« and hence the
3 eC
b0ndS and the practical kn °"' ledse
00 wl,ich »"> institutional order
“P
e.
997. 76). As will
M be
h "'h
(
shown consistently throughout this dissertation,
Afro-Dominicans and Afro
e " ded
dS
d C0MimK
•
sola,
than
collective
co ^ hTef
action. This has been
,!
exacerbated during the current

efforfiT

1

SSTi::'”
'
'

'

Lat'n^ZlL

'

i

,

1

1

cro?'™ T

'°T

^iia

^

era of neo-liberal

20

iorSf

hegemony.

be .he distant
realms of a foreign
and isolated group
p

obsenanon and
ln

—

vigilance, to speak
nothing

SenSe tha ' Ut,n

extent, privatized
in the last decade
or
,
„
to
the

two

'

Power
0Her

-

1

Pnvate and so the

iom
of participation.

^

Citizenship

is a, so -private'

governments have a„
been,

to

some

•

SerV ‘ CeS tha have
traditionally been
provided
,

,

lower classes by the
federa. government
have been uecentran^cu
decentra

governments and/or
Non-Governmental
ernmental n
Organ, zat.ons. While
•

“ m ’"

.

•

1S

“

"«*«

their activities

in

resources, no,

America

•

-

—

this has

ni*

allowed for some

»»m„ 8

with larger entities
(Walzer, 1999: 63-4).

btnally, citizenship

membership

to either local

a

is

‘privatized* in tha, the
distinction of being a
citizen, of

community of rights hearing

on

there are

birth or naturalization.

no

individuals

is

one based on private

Roberto da Mat, a has written

citizens, only sub-citizens

that

Latin

and super-citizens
(1991). There

is little

notion of rights bearing
being applicable to a
universal category s i„ ce
,
, he idea of
rights,

and citizenship

in general, is linked
to the idea

Of -bearers of equal

status' suggested

citizenship has tended to
be a

of status. Unlike the
contractarian notion

by Parsons, the

means of exclusion,

status implied by Latin

American

rather than inclusion.
Thus, those

who

bear marks of social status
might be considered super-citizens,
while the majority of poor,
semi-literate people could
vety well be classified
sub-citizens. Rights are reasonably

guaranteed,

poor.

As

if

no, overstated, for the
wealthy and are often ignored or
violated for the

a result, the poor, marginalized,
Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian

populations seek “status,” to the
extern that

i,

21

may

he available, through individual

negotiations of their
identity, such as
through conspicuous
consumption and through
‘whitening.”

Visions »f Race 21

Latin America and
Miscegenation

:

a* refmin

This examination of
-race"
entirely misleading
to

assume

in Latin

America begins with

that “race” has

the caveat that

i,

is

one particular meaning
cutting across

all

societies and historical
epochs. Recognizing this,
the analysis of race
contained in this

essay will focus on

how i,

Dominican Republic and

conceived

is

Brazil.

in Latin

America, and

The amount of literature on

particularly in the

race based

on how race has

been conceptualized within
the social imaginary of
Anglo-American or northern

Turopean contexts

framework where
minorities

is

rich

and abundant. Bu, race

is

imagined

racial identities are clearly
defined,

Dominican Republic and Brazil

these contexts within a

and prejudice against demographic

based on exclusion on ihe basis
of color. The

is

in

racial situations in the

are undoubtedly different,
even if Afro-Dominicans and

Afro Brazilians suffer similar
conditions of relative impoverishment,
and limited
educational and occupational
opportunities. However,

m Latin America without
race relations

it

seems impossible

to discuss race

the constant implicit, if not explicit,
reference to the system of

which pervades

in

Anglo-American and northern European

countries, and

most obviously the US.

The concepts of race considered
" TastorMs'

i

988-3417”"“

will be

of Whites, Mulattos, and Blacks. The racial
conditions of
"*
lwo coumri wil1 be examined i" this book.

“

Anthony Marx,

in a

comparison of race

in the

United States of America,
South

Afrtca and Brazil, makes
an interesting note
of differences between
notions of citizenship
and the racial classification
systems of the

and Brazil, respectively
(Mar, >998: I6)

German

.

Following the

German and French

US and

South Africa

traditiona, distinction

citizenship as being
biological, racial, and
exclusive

between

{Mcifl)

with the
French ethnic, cultural and
inclusive citizenship
^nteinschaft) (Brubaker.
,992) Marx
argues that while in Anglo
and Dutch colonies,
integration of blacks
within the
nation

was

no, possible

due to

‘-white nationalism”
(,998: 2). Latin

American race

relations are

closer ,0 the French model.
These distinctions are heuristic
and should no, be extended
•o the

extreme, which

is

that

Anglo and Dutch colonies were

American colonies were utopian

anti accepting.

The

rigidly racist,

distinction,

and that Latin

however, should neither

be ignored.

The

differences between cultural
and racial notions of identity
recall those

betw een Iberian and Western
European patterns of race relations
identified by Hany

Hoetink

m his

1967 work Race Relations

in the

Caribbean: Two Variants. In

it,

Hoetink

argues that Iberian colonies
developed milder forms of race relation,
-ban their European
counterparts (Hoetink. 1970: 115-6).
Race relations are rendered more mild
because
Iberian colonies demonstrated high
levels of miscegenation, defined

“w hite”

as

somewhat

browner than the Anglo and Dutch
colonies, and because light-skinned
mulattos could
identify as white, with

little

resistance from society. Hoetink writes:

the ‘somatic distance' between white
and colored is smaller in [Iberian
colonies than in Western ones]... since a
pail of those who ‘biologically’
are colored fall within the margin of
the prevailing white somatic norm
image. Thus, a continuous absorption by marriage
of coloreds into
the

economically,

Thus does not

mean

a^tebnofetttlr^ri

that mulattos

•ha, Africans in
Iberian colonies

and Dutch settlements

in the

Discourses of race
stnce racial difference

is

^™

were accepted by white

were

tiCally ’

elites

and also

without reservations or

treated better than
the Africans living
in

En,ish

Americas. However, their
situation was different.

in the

Dominican Republic and

no, an issue of
demographic minority status.

and pardos, when taken
together,
majority of the population,
and

„
in the

W

Brazil are hardly

Dominican Republic

constitute an

Manichean

overwhelming

and pret0s, when considered
together.

i„ Brazil

constitute a near maturity.
This allows for significant
flexibility in terms of
individual

negotiation of racial identity,
although, race
is

is

no, completely flexible,
since “blackness”

regarded as something less
privileged than “whtteness,”
even though

category. Thus, although
mobility
juridical rights,

it

is

is

is

possible, in critical areas,
such as the

a relative

economy and

very limited for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

Recognizing the uniqueness of
racial significations
will try to

i,

examine what

is

members of a marginalized

in the

two

countries, this essay

recognized as racial identity within
each country, and
-racial’

community

act. interact

are otlen adverse to their
exercise of citizenship.

While

and react

how

conditions tha,

there are significant differences

within the discourses of “blackness”
and Afro identity in the Dominican
Republic and
Brazil, there are considerable
similarities in terms

Blackness,

24

”

m

both countries,

is

part

of a discourse which

As Anglo-American perceptions of race
tend
The term "Indio" is a Dominican term which

refer to people

of ascription as well as ontology.
privileges: whiteness, ethnic

to be.

refers to light-skinned

of native ancestry.

24

Dominicans.

It is

not used, here, to

«

“

*

p,

•**

«<

- ««

u„

—w

aw „t

Mm

**“*
y negative meaning because
of its association
with
association of

Wwith

. culturally and

physical

Haiti.

The

actual

different group
even
.

differences are not
always
anmrpni
•
nt, d
PP
allows racist meanings
for negrUud to

,„ ese

it

i

become more

uniform and concrete.

As

ear,y as the
1930s, anthropological
studies of race in
Latin America, often
in

BraZil ’ ind Cated
'

there

—

** '

diff

between race

and Anglo- America
(Freyre, I9T4; Tanenbaum:
,946,. Prior

relations in Latin

to this there

was

iittie

systematic study of race,
outside of slave., in
Latin America. There
were some

centu. musings on race
bower er

there

in literature

were few attempts

surrounding race. Prior to

to

this, the

and philosophy, which
were

America

late

9«'
1

certain, y influential

address the political, social
and economic issues

idea of race

was

often

subsumed

into studies

of

slave., despite the fact
that many blacks and
mulattos and slaves were
born free and/or

25

«nstian, ty

,

particularly Catholicism,

;e
26

KS

is

considered a European religion,
probably due

^

con'sSbiCatf iha, K'&SjT ™«
Brazilian, fluency

in’

he »

similar reasons,

1“f

iCSi' T

legitimate religion, as

opposed

the 'oolor^

colonial

B

™*«> are no, official languages they are
" ,e CaSe ° f an Afro-Don,
inican or AfroU a "° n cult “ re a,Kl w<
?alth which would significantly
(

5

improve the individual's'status
wjthin

S°

its

m

'

f
1

:

U " ,Ve rSe of ""'Unship- (See
da Malta, 1991). For
'

,

,o

25

fai,h ''U

'

•

*

"" 8 Ven ,0

10,1

‘

‘

heSe freC Afr°Domi '’icans

and Afro-Brazilians

Ljvio Sansone
characterizes the
structure of ‘Latin
American’ racial
relations

quite accurately,
writing:

be characterized
by a high

degree of
religion and
popular

tradltl0n ln the c
°untryside

of
° f C ° l0r and a
somatic norm that
he
8 em onic
has historicallv^lcat^
0Cated negro and
"
indian
phenotypes on a scale mnr
r

culture^m^T

™ der

•

appearance’.

.

this type

.

S

manipulate ethnic idemi,

?

tlle no,ion
of 'good
haS ° f,ered spa
«o

“

mobilization. (Sansone
in Hasrabalg"

What

,s

clear front this

is that

‘

he indiVidUal Afr °D0

1

mem e " ,niC

996b 235

miscegenation has allowed
individuals

negotiate their racial
identity while group

Wh " e

"°* f°

—

1

identic, ion has been

«

be able

.0

qui ,e inflexible

to the construction
ot a

he

Bm

‘

Sh and

Marvin Harris,
Tatin

in

most

in social prejudices.

The incidence of
miscegenation has been noted
by many

111 ‘

Ihus

could becoine educated,
hold a

prestigious job, speak
French or English, and
therefore shed the tag

mired

.0

DU

for

‘

much more

fluid

Ch P0ssessi0ns

m

form of racial

the

New

scholars as being critical

identity than that

World

which took

(Freyre, 1934: Hoetink.
1970)

example writes "the most
important aspect of interracial

America from

the abolition

of slave*

is

the absence

groups" (Harris, 1967:
86). Gilberto Freyre. as
well as

commentators on Latin America,
noted

root

of neatly defined

many

the mixture of races

re,ations...in

racial

other authors and

which seemed

to indicate

an

absence of racial consciousness
and prejudice (1934; also see
Tannenbaum, 1946). While

26

—
racial

mixture certainly
did not mean
an eauali.v

f

a

Race

and

in the

who

Dominican Republic
and Brazil

1, vo!utionar
too proud of the
>' Propaganda...
sociaTsuperiOTh!^v-f f
follow the examples
C
terparts
in the French
of the HaitiansZone
finally'yt OfiO
-selves white and,
in the absence
of any injurious
nded by cons, denng
themselves such. 27

felt

•

Perhaps nowhere else

>’«

diverse or, even,
antagonistic

Meanwhile
t

the two
e Brazilian regime
cannot be accused

Nationaiity

is

Pr ° Pa§a,ed ,hr° Ugh

199,;

and

plastic

hut there

was a

the

hi

deiiberate

C

(Ho

U

wa Y

enorm ° us

as

-

it

bu >

j

be’Lnd

«*"» *» an

«*» of

is in

Brazil,

- any event,
dem ° Cra,ic

is

-

iargeiy -imagined'
and

immutable essence
(Anderson

schoiars argue that no,
oniy was nationahty
imagined

program through which the
idea of a
a people

nation, and beionging
to

(Hobsbawm, ,982; Marx

,998-

999b). The idea that
racism does not exist
in Latin America,
and particuiariv

Dominican Republic and

strategies

27

,

of rigidhV"

regimes to

*—

" were constructed and imposed onto

Wos,

evt- n

*

a

generaiiy considered
to be something
that

Hobsbawm, .992, Some

harmonious

traVifi“c^inn ^irTl’h
T*
° lberal

vacuum between

the

flexible,

18

^

°™

_lo

which attempted

e“o- H^

S

Brazii,

is

often considered to be
a result of hegemonic
Cite

to define the nation
as essentiaiiy

Ae HaMa " Re ™ ,Uti0 " 0f G

-

mestizo/mu, atto (Hanehard

d’Alaux, the French Conncu,

(Freyre, 1946: 77-8)

27

in Haiti in

845

——

—

1994; Safa, 1998).
Such ideas of
nationality, like that
suggested by t he work
ofFreyre
,hc re,ative
marginai

reSU "

more

° f,he he " ila8e

Sla

“

,hat raCe iS SUbSllmed
10

COmm ° n

raCla ' tenSi ° nS

definition

—

deC ara,i0nS ° f
DOminic
'

and idemities

o f Oominicanidad

and ethnic grounds.

“ "*

-

»

S

(Dominicans)

In Brazil, a

lim raCial tenSi<>nS

a

n

•'racial

the

;

poverty, lower levels
of literacy and

«* W- America (Marx,
Brazilians tha, there

"

" 0t eXiS '

democracy.

” Brazi1

’

Haitianiclad

and as • -suit

tha. extensive

is

,

998:

,

5)

(I

in

„ clear

an absence of

Dominican Republic

more complicated doctrine
was

In both cases, defenders

two countries argue

In the

has been constructed

and religious elements,
and has been contrasted
to

‘

•

be

l.mtted opportunities,
rather than clear
and racial discrimination.

ThC
“ ,e

" -'

A ,, Bra2ilians to

a„d

the

terms of ethnic

„,, nness) 0 „

articulated

^

which

stated

Brazil represented
something of

of the position

tha, racism

miscegenation makes

it

does no, exist

impossible for anyone

to

be a racist since every
Dominican and Brazilian has a
Afro relative, in-law, spouse,
or
friend.

Criticism of the marginalization
of Haitians

allowed the subject of a
Dominican form of ra
tacism

in the

Dominican has

to surface.

recently

Yet studies of race tend

to

focus only on Haitians and
Haitian Dorn inicans, due to the
lack of previous studies of
race and the belief that
racism refers to Haitians, and
not Dominicans. Criticism of
the
idea

of "racial democracy”

in Brazil

has a

much

longer history.

Among

the

more

valuable contributions, Carlos
Hasenbalg argues that “the social perception
of race

thanheref

r,

clcai

S,

Cspecia "-

1

T,
anda immutable.

the,r S0Clety

-

edrated and ‘’l^o/bramo, and particularly
in
However racial tensions are not perceived nor
'

I

his will be

examined

in

Brazil,

acknowledge

are racial idendties

greater depth
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in

chapter 4 and

5.

aCCOrdi " 8 '° 3 C °
minUUm ° f
'

dent,tleS

(HaSenba ' g:

Sl

‘" 6a:

—

^
‘

65)

Has

W

,o

a fragmentation

^He fragmentation of
identities has

-

limited

opportunities for political
activity and solidarity
an,on g Afio-Brazilians,
thereby

weakening

their political

agency and abihty

to ntobiiize
(Hanchard,

research on race in the
Dontinican Repub.ic
remains nascent, and

,

is

994)

While

prinrari,

impressionistic and discursive,
there exists in Brazil
ample research, including
verv

complete behavioral research,
which attempts
(Hasenbalg. 1979,

l

to

prove that

racial

lasenbalg and Silva.
1992; Fernandes, 1969).

«he idea that racial
tensions

do no,

exist in either

democracy

It

is

a

myth

should be noted that

of the two countries

is

something

that

has been accepted by a
great majority of the
population of the Dominican
Republic and
Brazil, especially

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
and

challenges to such discourse
has been very limited

masses (Spanakos,

Who
In

]

are the Afro-Brazilians
and Afro-Dominicans in such
a mestizo population?

attempting to address this
question

and yet one may be

may

temts of “conscientizing”
the

999a).

reflects both individual

but

in

the effect of academic

and

it

is

important to remember

societal perception.

identified by society as

One may

that identification

identify oneself as bein,

“X

”

“Y.” Thus, a person may identify
as nudaia.

be seen by society as being
negro, or vice-versa. However,
the complexity of

racal relations in the two
countries cannot be collapsed into
so

m a room of negros/pretos one
negros/pre, os

may

a scheme, because

person indie or bronco, and the same
person

room of blancos/brancos may be
considered morena
is

-

consider oneself morena (brown),
while the

may consider the same

discourse ol negritude

'

sir.;;

or negro/pre, a. Because the

so linked to a specific discourse of
political, social and
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in a

~

^iori, wi, hi „ a society which
S,aU S
‘

'

“•

dlstingu|shes

^
^
^^

^

e,C ’ lhe

**. racial identity ofan

Dominicans and
Euro-Brazilians.

A

dark-skinned educated

ma „ may

vcry weI1 be
recogni2ed by

Brazilian socie ty as
h lanco/brmco
,

uro-

^

^^

canahie of showing the
signs-educatio, wealth,
job. etc-, ha, prove
his,, a, a. The
Sa,,1C " ld,V,dUal

When

drCSSed

Si " lply

*" a

He harassed, and
even beaten. b p„,i C e
y
officers.

poor neighborhood
tnay vet, we

When

i,

is

clear that the poiice
are

dealing with an educated
person, the, will
apologize and adtni, ,ha,
the, ,nis,„„k" the

Afro-Domtntcan or Afro-Brazilian

Dominican or Afro-Brazilian
"confusion.-

educated

man

I, is

feels

lor

someone

else.

Very

often, the educated
Afro-

both anger and a son
of hutniiiation for the

important to point on, that
in this ease, the
police confused the

with a

"common"

considered -acceptable,or

^

This suggests

a, least justifiable,
as

tha, prejudicial
policing is often

long as the police read
the signs of

social “inferiority”
properly (Spanakos, forthcoming
a).

Stnce negritude

is

understood

in

terms of a color continuum,
and not as a polar

opposite of European identity,
people identify themselves and
are identified by society
a fluid way.

Due

countries, few

to the negative connotations
associated with negritude in the

Dominicans or

two

Brazilians, until fairly recently,
have identified themselves

as negro. Additionally,
the idea

of a continuum of color rather than
fixed

racial

categories triggered various
strategies of negotiation of
identity, such as dying and
”

"" ,di0 "

in the

Dominican sense

'

s

in

‘

nce

in

Brazil

il

refers to people

30

of Indigenous

Heritage.

^
straightening hair,
use of facial
powder, marry
ymg
recently, plastic
surgery,

of which allow;s
0ne

all

someone

lighter skinned,

move

t0

away from

position of “blackness.”

7

Pe ° P eS
'

Pne,0/Pm0
PS,

'

^

and more
the extreme

Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians? The
categories chosen
here

^

ei,hCr

" """

™

-

S

--

certain, or

-ndi, tons

perhaps a„, contexts

are unifonn for
a„ of the

however. Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-Brazilians
are

su,

all

affected, to vaiying
^
degrees, by similar
discourses which
denigrate “blackness,"
give preference to

miscegenation, and praise
“whiteness." Afro identity

ethmC3
no.

'-

USm8

all. light

3

^

PUrdy

conceived here as both

racial

and

definition could
theoretically gualify
many, if

skinned Dominicans
and Brazilians as Afro.
However, unless they
identify
ociety could identify

them as Airo, they

Similarly, the category
Euro could include

component. Once again,
It is

is

this will

important to note that

many

will not be considered
32
as such

dark-skinned people due to

depend on both individual
and
in identifying

themselves,

its

.

ethnic

societal identification.

many Dominicans and

Brazilians of v arying racial
and ethnic backgrounds will
define themselves exclusively
as

Dominican and

Brazilian, respectively.
Clearly this speaks of a certain
preeminence of

national identity and solidarity,
over a racial one. or any other
identify for that matter.

^;“s

n bi
k

“ T,h Afr

C0mblnatl0n of
“istror°:rzr.rt
two
n
these
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’

Brazilians.

°“
'

aspects

’

h

bu *

r

(Sansone. 1997- 458)

;^
f

,ogic

:

,her ide

"f

“«

ma,gmal socio-economic

identified

position

is

by sociely a S

similar to Afro-

. „

“- "
ZT
W
*• d

«

'» -•

"

Afro,
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—
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-

*
», fa, „ to, to to—
....

—
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,
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P’ PU, ““"
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toto-
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Mni

“

“• » to—
l

“'“ I “"°"

-

......

“•

er. 0,1,1,,

to-.-.™

i,

politician

utoto,

,

* «— .
to

k.itcsn mulatto Dominican,
and the neighboring "

°f the

Wg,0J

he

to—

to to

- «.p..M, to. to. ..
H.i,l

» """>

—

-

—

TCi " c

*»
ice

" “>

...

~

ia Haiil’.

to

The

to to—,.

overestimated.

There
Blacb.'-

lhe

iS

an CXpreSSion that “ in
the Dominican Republic,
only

Such a statement

USJ4 y6t ‘ he
’

Sta ' ement

is

hard to accept for students
of racial

makeS sense wh
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M

During several

lee, ,re

black students from the

™ "R eeZ

us

IS

'

D

the Haitian is

politics, particularly
front

™ one considers exactly what

""

wl " be dis “sed

P jb

IC '"

“'un"5""*
Z?
-

'

,he aUthor fo "" d

i,

means

•" chapters

US

2 and

to

be

3.

students, particularly

conce P ,io " s of race. Assuming
Vision of racial identification
that their’
laTcorTm
C ° ntCI ' l,Cy cn,,c,2ed
p
Dominicans
for no, recognizing who
are,
they reallv
•

gro and Haitian
a

1011 a

in

t

h e Dominican
Republic. One of
the principal
ideologues of

identity durin
g the

T rujiHo

dictatorship),

Manuel Arturo Pena

ne historical essay
-we [Dominicans]
should not forge
,
and Catholic nation,
that we are D
Dominicans, emerged
•

^^

fe

a

Batlle, writes
in

,
'

SlUin.

•

:t

pure and

Th

.

SPan 0la
'

^

D ° min

diffe^^H
essential because

*

homog e n0 us'’ (1943
P)

can People are
genetically and
culturally

H,spanidad (H Span
icness)
i

as Europeans
living within the

New

in the

The

haW

'°

ISla,ld

"

New

idewified Dominjcans

World, where
eas the Haitians
were “Africans”

liviins

World.

prejudicial distinctions
can be seen

^

° f he
‘

——

more
]n

-

u

--

and degenera,C ,he
PUrity

clearly in Joaquin
Balaguer’s The

^

iha(

Oom;n;cans

Haitians wil, leave
their side o f the

°f Dominican culture
and blood

(Balaguer, ,947). In
the revised version
of this text, published
as The Island
Upside

D° Wn iLa "*
•ha. they

Ba agUer
'

have a prominent place

—-

^

for “promiscuity”

“barbaric customs,”
including

and “incest”

in their culture,
tha,

they

reproduce life vegetables
and that they, “the
Ethiopian race,” are
“naturally indolent”
(Balaguer,

o.

1

987: 40, 37. 52). These
characterizations are no, the
mere jingoistic rantings

one of the count*’,
most ardent

•he three

nationalists.

Balaguer occupied

many

posts during

decade Trujillo dictatorship,
including secre.aty of
education, and he spent more
than twenty years as
president of the republic after
the fall of Trujillo.

^

'

here

iS

3 Clear raCial

j

attians, .be

former o f mixed
heritage but
,

“

r

CUlar ' y SinCe

mUCh ° f,he

n RCPUbiiC

i$

re,ated

di

l

~

°

problem o, the
Afro-Dominican

Hai ‘ ,an

"

,S

50

^

is

Dominican Republic.

-

even

rf

a„ d denigrate, tbe
Haitian

«

to

°f development,

be Haitian, or

and no, Dominican

identity,

in the

„on-Chr,s,ian

of racial and

who

bear the

ms

si,

such as darh-sKin.

of Santeria, Gaga and
Vodu.

interracial relations

It is

—^

^

^

that s/he often
demonstrates the type

•hat are assoctatcd
with Haitian identity

A, the same time,

«- “>

infe ° f

Wh °

"literacy, or the religious
practices

^^

«* between Dominicans and

.

and marriage are no,

--ommon in the

difficult to call such
relationships intemacial,
since such

differences are often seen
to be differences
in shading, rather
than racial categoty.
There

" alS °' " h

’

Bra?iK

" abS°

consumption of Afro

,Ute

Afro aesthetics and a vety
high amount of

cultural production.

Whether

additionally in Brazil, samba,
axe,

i,

be merengue, rap. hip-ho
P

pagode-r he Afro woman,

nude, a. and Afro culture
are almost universally
appreciated, even
stereotypes and

There
objectification

is

if

.

particularly the

high

brow culture

demeans them.
a simultaneous pride of
Afro beauty and culture, particularly
the

of women, while maintaining
an understanding of vety unequal

Of power among different
an adage explains that you

racial, or

many a

even gender, groups. For example,
white

woman, choose

34

in

relations

both countries

a mulata for a lover, and have a

*

A

black

woman as

WOrld

a domestic
servant 35

t

^

“Plataforma” show in

are y Clotlled
da "«rs

,r
.

show

consists of samba,

cost,,™
mes f

Por carn > v al,

~

pagode, barely clothed

and of several

^

men

fc

is A. -n„ ca

Also

,

womenA men and wo
women wearing

performing capoeira 16
‘
Th ' f

„

'

designed for tourists
does no, have any
an > performers
p f
.

there
.

.

is

and popular culture

contributions are

*

V3lUed

Bra2 "'

hlentified the

^

fi8Ure

ln
in

white figure

figure as
(

—
W

for Afro-Brazilian

^dems in

r

1

7%

1

-

Brazil

makes

this

r-

igures, students

S3%),

Wea,thy’" C ° mpared
With

or disagreed with
the statement

.

amount of shame.

“white” and ‘-bl^w-

(Hanchard IQQd-An
)•

in the past 33

may demonstrate

" reCem SUney 0fprim
^'

“

to Brazilian

the case,
particularly since
such

nowadays than

the pride that
Brazilians

W

is

*“* Sh ° W

are Fn™
n
-i-uro-Brazihan
suggests that

Afro
R
^bro-Brazihan
contributions

certainly

readily recognized

When shown

"

And
nd (tiv
b ,s

'

also tied to a
certain

is

painfully clear.

'

more

-ever,

contributions

b aCk

amount of P
pride

.

identity

who

•

quite a stgntficant

h

overwhelmingly

(85) an d only

6% recognized the

4% and 94% respectively for the

t

n another survey,

av,
“A good
nnnd A
egro

when asked whether

they agreed

•

is

a negro one with
a

branca (white)

35

of women by cultures

in

which national identity
was co,rari c
is no breakdown
of the “use vli

important to note that
there
countries exists, or a,

leas,, there is

that slaves

were able

capoeira has

no adage that refers io

Btazil, to being a
martial art
•ha, ,, once held
has

consumed by

slowly disappeared.
See (Guillermo-Prieto,
1990).
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PART

II

historical perspectives
lcat ofy

by Vule^’^f ^e^stem^tV^e

terminology of color
and

‘

T he fundamental
ideas eonsidered in
this book-^itizenship.
race and

democracy-are

all

concepts which can be
eonsidered

‘‘essentially contested.”

concepts are eonsidered
to be socially
constructed, that
pohltcal and

economic conditions,

Following Anthony Marx
(1998),
identities

and behavior

is

rather than

this

is,

shaped and patterned by

immutable and obje-‘-

book argues

molded over time with

that the construction

the State

These

assuming a

social,

realities.

of socio-political

particularly

significant role in the
interpretation of citizenship,
race and democracy.

This next section (chapters
2 and 3) will examine
dynamics and continuities
construction of the State and
identity

its

relation to citizenship,
as well as the definition
of racial

and exclusion/inclusion.
While

a,

no point

in the histoty

Afro-Dominicans or Afro-Brazilians
occupy the highest position

Dominican and Brazilian

in the

social hierarchies

were rarely

of either country did
in a hierarchical society,

rigidly defined along racial
lines.

Lighter skin color, education
and more European physical
features tended to correspond
to social

ascendance for people of mixed blood,
although ascendance did not

unequivocally necessitate acceptance
and equality. During certain periods
and

in certain

regions, social mobility, political
agency and the ambiguity of racial identity
were

more

considerable, while at others they
were quite minimal.

A
umque

brief note

s >' st

em

in

on method

is

necessary. In order to

make more

clear each country’s

which race and citizenship has been conceived,
few comparisons

will be

—
and An8, °- American

:r

" idemit>

W0UW

w°r,d

-—

^

* f°

r
white

and intensely exclusive,
especially

Chw

1

*- *•

“““
Brazilians.

1

rujillo,

——

The

who

poss.bil.ty

ruled for 3

1

was

real

was

rei * ners

of how Dominican

rly

’

ones. This

*-% - *< .»

-AM.

_

considering that the
Dominican dictator Rafael

vearsMOtn
ai\
years
( 1 930-61
),

Gctuho Vargas ,1930-45,
and ,950-54).
Brazil,

aw

in Brazil.

“ *'

r

~««*

was

the

a mulatto

of very humble origins
and

most significant

politician of the era in

especially sympathetic
to Afro-Brazilian
causes. Within both
eountries a

notion of integration and
assimilation was presented
as being necessary for
national
realization and, later,
for national security.

culturally

The

self-

nations were presented
as ethnically and

homogenous, although with an
ethnically diverse

past.

No Dominican

Brazilian could be the
victim of racism because
there were no “races”

in

countr.es due to centuries
of miscegenation. This
unity was reinforced

the

nor

two

in the

Dominican

Republic by highlighting the
‘exteriority’ and difference
of the Haitian.

Other authoritarian governments
clung

to the notion

of a national identity based

on unity which systematically
denied the claims of Afro-Dominicatr
md. especially.

Afro-Brazihans

who

challenged national rhetoric.

In the late

1970s and throughout the

democratization during the 1980s,
Afro-Brazilian activity was important

in not

only

challenging ideas about national
(such as the idea of racial democracy),
but also

of expanding the notion oi
citizenship. Afro-Dominican

activity also

was able

in

terms

to contest

CHAPTER 2
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN
THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1492-1930)
AND BRAZIL (1500-1930)
This chapter will
provide a brief historical
survey of political and
•he Dontinican Republic
and Brazil

between the

efforts that

began

in

1

of European ships upon
the

arrival

shores of the Caribbean
and South America and
the

racial identity i„

modem,

authoritarian, state-building

930. Alternating between
cou n, ties, each section will
review

relevant events and
relationships during different
eras in the
intention of highlighting
the uniqueness

two

countries, with the

of the construction of race
and citizenship

in

both

countries.

Although

the case!, dtfier significantly,
three

consistently throughout this
chapter.

The

common elements

firs, is that in

appear

fairly

both countries authority was

located within private and
paternalistic relationships and

power wa.

personal rather than institutional.
This personal authority

was

,„.tsidered to be

legitimized by a

hierarchical socio-political
system that treated certain people
as superior and others as
inferior.

The seeond

is

the role of political culture in
setting a system of values and

norms which conditions what individuals
I

believe, accept and are willing to
challenge.

he political culture of these two
countries, has not always been
unequivocally

authoritarian,

and

at

various points, political institutions, the
Crown, the government, and

the legal system, have been
able to force restraint on the powerful
at various points. Yet.
the historical tendency in the

limit the

Dominican Republic and

excesses ot the powerful, rather than

37

Brazil has been for institutions to

to serve as the

proper channels through

which

politics are articulated,
deliberated

«ha, racial identification

and the

and

legislated. Finally,

n, caning attached

it

will be

emphasized

race are equivocal.
While slavety

produced highly unequal
relations and was
certainly

cruel, masters often

assumed a vety
paternal and, at times,
protective role over
slaves. Additionally,
although the histoty of
Afro- Dominicans and
Afro-Brazi.ians

termined by slavery.

In

is

affected by the histoty
of slavey,

he

C ° UntrieS

'

miscegenation

m ° St
that

free and/or

imp011ant hist0rical

took place

in

-black” which differed
quite a

Iberia

is

no, solely

both countries, again
varying overtime, large
numbers of Afro,

nomimeans and Afro-Brazihans
were born
'

i,

were manumitted, and many
of

were of African descent. The

large-scale

both countries also led to
definitions of “white” and

bi,

from those

in the

Anglo-American

colonies.

and Africa

By

the end of the fifteenth
century,

when Spanish and Portugese

explorers

charted the coasts of the
Western hemisphere, the Iberian
governments had already had

considerable contact with various
African tribes and peoples. No,

all

of this contact

resulted in the enslavement of
the latter peoples; in fact, during
the seven centuries of

Moorish domination of Iberia, people
from northern Africa governed the peninsula.
Independence
and Spain

in

Iron, the

1492.

Moots

led to the creation ol the nation-states
of Portugal in

Removing Moorish dominance was

formation ol national identity, which, since
religious identity fundamental.

it

was

a response to the

Racial criteria, since the

Northern Africa, was also involved.
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critical to the

1

147

rudimentary

Muslim Moors, made

Moors were darker and from

The union of religious and
"'es ° f Vari ° US

MUSUmS

national identification
no, only ntade
problematic the

livin * in

centuries.

^ so

of Jewish people,

Both Iberian countries
defined

who

similarly had

their populations

on the basis

including racial ones,
between peoples were already
assimilated into Iberian
culture.

Scholars differ as to the
racial content of
-pure” blood, since

and

racial identity.

made very

Dominican

historian

Hugo

clear that the question
of the purity

racial difference

and

He

inferiority.”

i,

connoted both religious

Tolentino Dipp argues that

of blood

notes that those

in

”i,

should be

Spain was no, based on
ideas of

who were of unpure

blood were

-Jews, Moors, Africans, [and]
mestizos," and therefore
“purity” was no, a “racialdistinction (Dipp, 1992:
105, 101-2).

From

•Schw artz notes that idea
of pure blood
-distinguish those persons
writes,

was used

who were

for “the ideal white,

a slightly different perspective,
Stuart

was used

in sixteenth century Portugal
to

untainted by racial or religious
deviance.” Purity, he

Old Christian Portuguese, untainted
by the infected

races, as the expression
went, of ‘moor, mulatto, negro or

The
that to

fifteenth century

expand would mean

Jew'” (Schwartz,

was something of a golden age

either conquering Spain,

for Portugal.

which was highly

It

1

989: 248).

became

clear

unlikely, or

braving the Atlantic ocean. The
value of maritime activity was increased
by the vast

wealth that was believed to exist

in

Asia and Africa. Between 1415 and 1498,
Portuguese

explorers conquered lands and set up
trade posts along the eastern African coast,

The term

“purity-

of blood" would

later

be used

in the

different races and cultures.
‘

The P0rtUgU e and "Spanish" explorers were
not
? for the Portuguese, and
pamshu men sailed
vice versa.

colonies for distinguishing
between K
people
of
w
K

‘

’’

many

in the

different groups

necessarily Portuguese nor Spanish. At times,

Other explorers were
have claimed him as one of their own.
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Italian.

As

for

Columbus,

southwestern coast of
Africa, and

Asiaa- Sn
Spain also entered into
the

in

•

,

Portugal for the
possession of Ceuta a small
SmaH blU
’

although Portuguese
explorers were aWe
able
century', the

Spanish explorers were
the

m
10

lm P° rtant

in

Unc0ver

firs, to

fray, challenging

northern Africa, and

more

,errito

0

.

in

,

he fifteenth

reach the Americas.

Before examining the
“encounter" between the
Europeans and the natives

wonh examining

the

Old Wortd. Cotumbus

sabe, unified the Spanish
crown, which was
front Spatn.

set sat, the

a, so the

same year

tha,

Ferdinand and

three centuries earlier

independence of the tberian
countr.es coincided with
the unification of the
territory.

This

is

is

year tha, the Moors were
expelled

The Moors had been removed
from Lisbon some

provinces within the Iberian

i,

especially true of Spain

The

distinct

where

the marriage

of Isabel of Castile and
Ferdinand of Aragom united
two of the most powerful
Spanish
principalities.

T he construct™ of
national identity and unity
during this period,

following the anti-Moorish
sentiment of the Reconquest,
revolved around the
Christianization of Spain and
Portugal, and inquisitions
into the lives of those

not accept the Faith. The
institution of the Inquisition
was
than in Portugal, where

territorial

much

who

did

fierce in Spain

boundaries were newer, and where
religion was more

“inextricably" linked lo nationality
(Burns. 1980: 36; Freyre,
1933. preface).

Black Africans were no novelty
the

in Iberia in this period.

Moorish occupation, and they did not

not a condition that

was exclusive

Ordenacoes Manuelinas
(Schwartz,

1

989: 25

1

).

all

They had been

there since

serve as slaves. Additionally, slavery
was

to the black Africans.

refer to the treatment

As

late as 1514, the

Portuguese

of w hite. Moorish and black slaves

Similarly, the slaves in Spain were
"blacks, Moors. Jews, and

even Spaniards” (Dipp, 1992:

163).

However,

40

as the Atlantic slave

trade-which

the

Portuguese initiated

m

in the

1440s

3

-grew
*

’

s averv
Sla
' e,>

hp
btCame

|

more

_

"tore associated
with

,
color
of skin and place
of birth (Eakin,
1998: 18 ).

^ves were predominantly

domestic laborers

-wed a certain amount of freedom

im0

^

^

C0 0nial
'

^

to

in Iberia,

and were generally

maintain their customs
and religious

Dominican Repub, ic (Dipp,
,992:

f0Und C0 '° nieS SUCh
aS the PreVi0US
^ “"Inhabited Madeira

island,

Portuguese began to use
slaves as a primaty
source of labor

in the

,

66)

.

praxes 3

In the

new

’

Sugar production became
increasingly important
and
tHe B>Zantine

''

95).

By

1

1453 with the

who were

fal,

and Crete had been
dominant

493, the eighty sugar

(plantations)

Madeira were owned
predominantly by Genovese
and Jewish merchants
who
the labor of slaves

the

production of sugar

pro,), able after

EmPire Wh ° Se SU8a Pr °
dUCti0n

Europe (Cambeira, ,997:

however

relied

on

African, mulatto and
natives of the Canary
Islands

(Schwartz. 1989. 8-9).
This w as only the
beginning of the plantation
system

that

profoundly affect the lives
of manv
s million
miir
a c
9.5
> of the Q
African captives brought

would

•

Western Hemisphere as slaves,
with the

The slave
centuries.

That

is

trade

would grow

largest

number going

to previously

unknown

to

to the

a

Hr

levels during the next
three

no. deny to the ancient
roots of the practice, since
neither the virtuous

republic of Rome nor the
democracy of which Pericles
boasted were ignorant of slave

imr d
,°

exchange for gold

(mIj 986

'

r

d

“ EUr° Pe ,hr0Ugh
8

AWca "

S ' aVeS

members of

1989 20 ). faier
:

8 of

SZTaL ^ T*

century

e femi ies' an

plantations (ingenios/engenhos).

he

M -'l" caravans, and

,0 0, " er

14)

Repubiicand
“treated like

'

s

aws " tre

in the

10

increasingly used

41

m

the

Brazii

Mrk ™' ™

cari ° s
Dominican Republic were
customs” (Deive.
mining industry and in the
-

of

in

or .aws .ha,
Similarly, slave,

Afnca before

the

systematic^ denied
was an

bmh

institution

free status ,o , arg e

pans of ,he popuiatiom'.

which was quite well
estabhshed

of the Atlantic slave

trade.

in various parts of

Katia Queroz Mattoso
estimates that

anyw here between 30 and
50 percent of the population
of the region of Sahel,
Africa,

was enslaved (Mattoso,
094:
1

»as practiced

1

Slave* was

5).

no, limited to this
region, as

i,

also in Benin and Sudan,
if not in other areas.
According to Mattoso,

slaves in Africa were
‘integrated’ into a family
and could no, be

soM which seem$

suggest a paternal, rather
than exclusively commercial,
type of slavery
1

a region in

he presence of the Portuguese,
and

later the

tQ

.

Dutch, increased the slave trade

Africa,

and among Africans. Previously,
slaves were often victims
of war from other

tribes.

However,

the commercialization

of the slave trade allowed

tribal chiefs to

in

remove

Milage upstarts as well.
Additionally, during periods of crop
failure or drought, children

might be sold into slave., since
many families could
at

times, even

whole families sold themselves

eighteenth centuries, with such a high

campaigns undertaken

[in

demand

ill

afford extra mouths to

By

into slavery.

in Brazil,

and precious metals

in

and.

the seventeenth and

among

Africa aimed] to conquer not land but

20). Previous interest in the trade

fill.

other areas, “military

men”

(Mattoso, 1994:

Africa had been replaced by the

newest and most dreadful commodity.

For example, Herbert Klein notes that
the population of Italy contained

“...

seme two

it

has been estimated that

to three million slaves,

percent of the population" (Klein, 1986:
4).
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at

who

the height of the

Roman empire

represented between 3

s

and 40

Dominican Republic (1492-1791)
Christopher Columbus arrived
on the island which he
called Hispaniola
Spain) in December of
1492.

Columbus remarked

that the inhabitants

(Little

were especially

beautiful in comparison
to the Indigenous
peopies encountered on other
islands, since the

former were more white,
and looked more

was not alone
behtnd

in

Spaniards (Dip* ,992:

,

seeing beauty in the
inhabitants of Hispaniola.
The 39

at the Fort

concubines.

like

La Navidad (the

When Columbus

k.lled the Spaniards
because

Nativity) took

returned one year

of the

latter's

many of the

later,

native

Columbus

55).

men

he

women

left

as wives or

he learned .ha, the natives
had

abuse of the native

women (Moya

Pons,

1

995:

29-30).

Approximately 400,000 natives lived

in Hispaniola in

1492

6
.

By

1519, due to

forced labor, vicious massacres
and various epidemics, there were
close to 3.000

Indigenes

after the

left

(Moya Pons,

Columbus

himself, the Spanish

Nicolas de Ovando, in

few

The Indigenous populations were

hit hardest

Spanish presence on the island became
permanent. After two inept governors,

including

a

199o: 27, 37).

1

free Africans, and,

crown

sent a

more competent

administrator,

501 along with 2,500 immigrants, mostly
nobles and gentlemen,

most importantly, very few

Pons, 1995: 32; Deive, 1989;

(Dipp, 1o 02: 128;

Moya

Despite incentives for married couples and the

19).

governor’s persecution of those

women

who married

natives, miscegenation

became common

place and a mestizo (mixed of Indian and
European blood) population was

bom

(Dipp.

ls f,om Frank Mo >' a Pons
one of the most prominent Dominican historians (Moya Pons,
0ther estimates range from between 60.000 and the
3,000,000 figure produce by Bartolome de
las Casas. For the sake of consistency,
the numbers presented by Moya Pons will be used.
am especially
grateful to Jane Rausch for this comment.

IS

estimate

’

27)

-

I
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'

992

1

The new governor
enforced

30-5).

W

the enconu

of .he Spanish crow,
subjecting the natives

to harsh

s.ave*

gold mines. Access
to indigenous labor,
however, was

among

the Spanish population 9

and rePar, imi e n ,0 *
practices
primarily to working

i„

the

fairly limited to a
small elite

.

The enslavement of the
Indigenous population was
always considered
problematic
S.nce

one

ol the goals ol the
Spanish colonizers, in theory,

Indigenous. Asearlyas 150,
“the

Crown had

Crown

softened

its

position

to Christianize the

declared that the Indians
were free and

should be treated as such...”
(Moya Pons, .995: 33). But
wetght, and the

was

when

this declaration

bore

little

the governor explained
that the mines

could no, function without
the coerced Indigenous
labor. The Crown and
the governor

came

to a

compromise which allowed

the condition that the
natives

for the continuation

become educated

in the

of forced Indigenous labor on

Christian faith. Ironically, as
the

defense of the Indigenes in
Spain grew more vocal due to
the advocacy of priests such
as

Antonio Montesinos and Bartolome
de

" ,r° Ugh

SySKm
ofthe

MOya

>0r s VVTItes

renrTif
^
representing
only

J
1

"During

^ WhiCh

this

new

las

Casas, the natives were quickly
disappearing

" WCh

^

"

C ° nqUiStad0rS SeiZed ,ndi

“

10

—

—

1

".

-her of Indian
“P°" -he

reparti, niento a small colonial elite
of 82 persons
,

percent of the encomenderos

to appropriate 44 r
- ofthe Indians
only 646 colonists received Indians.
The rest of the
which
consisted of several thousand persons,
was left without Indians and with very limited
possibilities to earn a
m & except y working with their own hands, an idea
repugnant to those accustomed to Indian serfs
performing most physical labor" (Moya
Pons, 995- 36)

distributee

1

Apart from the

,

managed

-

elite,

pollal

1

'

3m 3 VOI Ce
in the wilderness; you are in mortal
and tyranny you use in dealing with these
innocent people. Tell me by what ri-ht or
justice do you keep these Indians in
cruel and horrible servitude- Are these
not men- Have they "not
onal souls. And you not bound to love
them as you love yourselves?” in Cambeira,
1997: 58) That
(
05 W3S qU1Ck y reCa " ed t0 Sp3in shows
that his Proclamations were not entirely
popular. In
hk |T ^rf'n
°f
A B
Ac^unt, Fray Bartolome de las Casas writes of Hispaniola,
'??
cr the cruelty
sin'LTeTel
l

'

‘

YeHnt
n t° l
thls
e

^

sheepfold, into this land ot

^f

meek

laved like ravening wild beasts, wolves,

outcasts there

cam some Spaniards who immediately
had been starved for many davs
killing

tigers, or lions that

terrorizing afflicting, torturing, and destroying
the native peoples, doing all of this with
most varied new methods of cruelty, never seen
or heard of before, and to such a

the strangest and

degree that

44

this Island

of

^

°

Between

1

520 and

1

530

was

it

clear that not only

was

the scarce of forced
labor

tone, but so was the
source of wealth, gold.
This prompted large
numbers of Spaniards

New World

empire,

Moya Pons

wns had C ° mpletely
Population of only
leas ing the island

0995:

Once

38).

institution, the

writes, “Emigration

A royal

again,

Crown,

is

it

worth noting the

to enforce a policy

whde

more

passive,

more

inability

upon

in history

There were two main groups
of Indigenes
far

decree in .520 prohibited
the colonists from

under penalty of death,
bu, emigration continue
despite

Before leaving the Indigenes

former were

intense that by 1528,
seven

dlsa PPeared and
those remaining held
a combined

,000 Spaniards.

1

was so

its

i,

is

of the

this

law”

central governing

citizens.

worth noting a few things
about them.

in Hispaniola, the

Tainos and the Caribs. The

society oriented, and
punished incest severely".

the latter were a warring
tribe that practiced
cannibalism

(Moya Pons,

1995: 27).

Questions about incest and
polygamy were constantly circulated,
and were intended

prove the natives’ lack of
civilization and humanity

.

One Spanish jurist, Pedro

Sepulveda, “argued that the Indians
were not truly human, but rather

were neither worthy nor capable
of being baptized" (Wucker, 1999:
brief period

'little

65).

to

de

men' who

Throughout the

of co-existence on Hispaniola,
the Spaniards, with few exceptions,

consistently looked at the Indigenes
as being physically and culturally
inferior beings.

S

° PUl
° P

C>
,

TI™
( a

S 3 pop

should not b e exaggerated.
Most

likely,

Zrh” *1

T

(las

Casas

1

'

estimated to be more than three millions)
has
The importance of these two men

now

l992: 29).

clergy supported the repressive forced
labor of the Indians as Ihev
a ""Arable

land-o^t!^ Hata

f ‘" e Africans

Revolution,
Revolution the Church '“^i
was often also
is

llation ,hat

,

I

•

'

“" dre d perSOnS "

owned

a considerable

number of slaves

StS that the Tainos vvere ve ^'
clear about incest, although Alan
Cambeira suogests that
possible that there was incest among
the Tainos (1997:
.

37).

45

it

“ —* —
and barbarian, whose
mentalitv
ntall,y

~

;
It Was

»>

-» »» .»M „„

„,mta

.

lou Sht

t^

rendered them incapable
of

conceptualizing civilization”
(Cambeira
1907
rra. 1997.53).
Considerable debate also
was given

.^

to the issue

of whether or not the
natives had

‘™

THe SPani3, dS n ° ted
Preferred the Tainos,

However, they had

more than
(Chapman.

who

souls.

-

dif

prior to the Spanish
arrival were subsistence
fanners.

a very hard time
getting natives,

subsistence, especially
since fanning
1

997:

•o validate for the

3).

Stoups of Indigenes, and
clearly

The indigenes' reluctance

of either

tribe, to

farm

for

anything

was considered “women's
work”
to farm in excess

of subsistence seemed

Spaniards their claims about
the lack of civilization
and the primitive

nature of Indigenous
society.

More

troubling for the Spaniards

no. survive the labor
in the mines, and

many would

run

away

was

that the natives

into the

mountains

to

could

avoid

repressive labor.

W ar agamst
weakened

a Spanish-raised Indigene

the colony.

I

hough

the population

named

Enriquillo, between 1519 and
1533.

of Indigenes was small, Enriquillo
was

aided by runaway African
slaves, whose presence on
the island was growing, and
by
Indigenes captured from the
other islands of the Caribbean
the

mines of Santo Domingo.

A

treaty

with Enriquillo

in

who were

forced to work in

1533 ended the

bringing a degree of peace to the
island. That the war lasted so
long

is

hostilities

not only a

testament to the guerrilla techniques
of Enriquillo's soldiers and the geographic
conditions of the Dominican
Republic, but also the weakness of Santo
Domingo’s militia

46

and government,
especially considering

mr
(Wucker,

that Enrinuill
qUI "° s

arm > “listed of only
500 men

1999: 66).

Indigenous labor and
gold mines were ,
soon replaced by large
plantations,

P

-mg sugar, and

later ginger.

These plantations were
dependent upon slave
labor

which by the 1530s was
increasingly African.
Free
had been

in

Hispaniola since

*«. Mejia h,d

leqst
at least

,

™ ™ »-

ndi

i

1

uqa
ts496, andj Dipp
notes

„

ns

„„„

that in

1

5

1

5

one

„

colon\ of Santo

By

the 1520s
i
-os,

Iberia)

It™*

:

. ..quid acquire

slaves entered annually
the

100)

™ — Minos

were bad influences and
were more

maintain control would be

.

•

Domingo (Cambeira, 1997

(Africans taken directly
from Africa).

_

a„

son African
some 500

G ° Vem0r ° Vand0 Wamed the Cro

‘'black’'

„f

,

» “» '* "Oh.

later” (Dipp, 1992:
160).

likely to run

(Africans

away and

who were

rebel than

The Spanish crown decided

living in

bodies

that the best

way

1995: 20).

produced any reduction

It is

to

send more female African
slaves (Deive. 1989: 20,
24). and.

to

1526, the Spanish crown
declared that one-third of all
slaves imported must be

(Moya Pons,

slaves

Dipp

“ “ Mi

rn

A fricans and A frican domestic

encomienda ,„di,„„,

E '“

initially

highly unlikely that the
increase in

in the

numbers of runaway

Estimates for the population of
Africans

in

number of women

slaves, although

consequence of greatly increasing
the numbers of mulattos
bon,

in

it

had the unintended

Santo Domingo.

Santo Domingo are very imprecise
as

figures exist only tor slaves
and even those are not entirely
clear. In 1545.

estimates the population of the
colony of Santo

47

women

Domingo

at

Moya

Pons

5,000. with an additional

,2

'“

!l

" % “•

'“°

*>

- - » ™,

'“» p “*

*> «... ... «.

,SB
many

that as

n by the

'***»>•

as 2.000 African
slaves

1

Some

I-

... ....

,

......

c_«„

were arriving annually,
but sugar production
had

570s, and slaves were
being diverted to
ginger plantations.

of the Africans, .ike
some of the Indigenes before
them, ran away from

Plantations where they
worked. Estimates of the

number of runaway African

have been as many as
7,000 runaway African
slaves

was Probably

....

less than

in

1

slaves in

545, Dipp argues that the
number

1,000 (Cambeira. 1997:
76; Dipp, ,992: 221).

Among

them, there

were small groups, as well
as larger groups which
formed a son of community,
ci, narrows,

that

c

often with internal
political and soeia,
structures.

that

272)1

i,

seems

that

cimanoms were

Wh

‘

Some

calied

writers have argued

rones created communities
reminiscent of African societies
(Cambeira,

However,

74).

and

inn,,

ladmos

often

vary rarely

assumed leadership

composed of only one

roles in

1

997;

many cimarrones

ethnic group (Deive.

1

989:

Ch Pr0blema,izes sim e
representations of the communities
P'
as replications of

pre-enslavement African communal

life.

Justifications lor African slavery
followed

-primitive- natives. However,
a

new

much of the

ideological argument

prejudices against the

was formulated

especially for

the Africans. Like the
natives, they were considered
primitive, close to the earth,

innocent and savage. But the
Africans were
naturally

the

more

much

believed to be better workers and

suited for slave labor than the Indigenes,
since they did not die off so
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n

eaSil>

'

U

DOmin Can

in,e " eCtUa

'

COnd '“ 0ns

better tllan

'

JU3n ISidr°

and 9,648

While

in

—

Julian

asserts -the

Indians” (in Dipp.
1992: 167 13 ).

The seventeenth centuty
has been
historians.

Ji

ealled the Century
of Misery by

1606 the population of
the Santo Domingo
was 5.960

slaves, the total
population

was 7.500

ginger plantations and
the selling of mahogany

two

people

in the

in

Santo Domingo were

south and cattle herding
in the

different societies,
particularly with regards
to race relations,

although paternalism
predominated

in

both (Hoe, ink,

Ha, eras, of the northern
region of the Cibao

same work, and

free

u
1681 (Moya Pons, 1986:
46 ).

in

hollowing the bus, of the
sugar industty. the
principal industries

north. Tins led to

Dominican

slaves often earned

often

1

994: 92). The cattle herders,
or

worked alongsioe meir

enough money

to

buy

slaves doing the

own freedom 15 While

their

.

lines

between master and

slave,

and black and white, were
becoming more and more

blurred in the north of the
country, the south continued
to maintain traditional
seigneurial
distinctions and privileges
which separated the pure blooded
Spaniards from those of

mixed

heritage.

Western

hemisptoe^

obllabala
167 y

t0

may ° r faCi idad qUe e
esclavitud, es fundamentaimente
su caltura inferior lo

T

be a

'

que mas explica

i

,

Pons,

e

1

“

"5

1

acce P ted ac

™s the entire

“ espantosas conidciones

'

d
n0t h aVe
f° rma,i0n °" ' he " umber 0fslaves
ItonTwas
colony
LasTi
«s people including
'I
70,625
8,900 slaves (Moya

" truth "

un,il

1

el

hecho"

(in

a q„e

Dipp. 1992:

769 "hen the population
of the
P

986- 46)

ple lived °" " ,e h “'° slavK ''"eluded
P
and social
of trust between master and slave pointed
lo solidarity
Sancher V
Vat
H re l1s ,hat "tasters
d
P°
used to have breakfast with slaves before
f
goin« to the fields to work
,1
0
31
ian laSkS; aS ° C,al divisi0n oflabor
was aN bul nonexistent. In this type of setting
slaves
did
(m.
’h
PPe
°" P lanta,ions dependent on slave labor, bul they
rather saved money in
oraer
orlr to buv
buy their freedom
ft
H
"m
(Betances, 1 995: 0).

rela^nshins

rem patriarchal.
mm'
ii? TTA relationship

J

'

,

S

1

49

•

re

dlfferenCeS

10

Wa

were time, when
poverty was so
extreme and widespread

beCame

'

eSS Stark

k baref00t Hke

'

'

Per,0d

W3S

Sl

'

Cambefra

-^

--«*

CHtiCal in eqUaliZing

« -in point:

same food (Cambeim,

-*«. ""hough

had developed during
the early period
of slavery
3

‘

t hr
tlnancial

that

-, sters
,

997:

,

even these

^

vvere

07)

.

Thi$

neve,, completely,

situation

whieh

of slaves, freed

peoples and masters
became increasingly
similar-in terms of
poverty and

and miSCegCnatl0n
COntinued

%

at a significant
rate.

CUQrteron and
Snf°,
'

all

indicating the

European blood possessed
by individuals, began

“ nC"

l

I

Ins

was

d‘

" C "“ (Wh

'

Distinctions, such as
negro,

amount of African and/or

,o be replaced

te of tho earth
) (Torres-Saillant,

a tr.bute to the laxing

much more

inclusive tenu

the non-Spanish
population. Additionally,
during this period, the

colony was so poor that
'n

9 98; Wucker, 19 99: 33
,.

of previous schemes
which counted the number
of

African and Spanish
grandparents a person had,
and gave a

whitened

1

by the more colloquial

i,

was incapable of importing
new

slaves, only receiving a
boos,

Population w hen a group of
immigrants from the Canaty
Islands arrived

Moya Pons

writes that ,00 families
arrived in 1684 and were
soon followed by another

201 families by 1687
continued, "the
than the

in 1684.

(Moya Pons,

1995: 66 ).

number of Caucasians

As immigration and miscegenation

easily surpassed

numbers of Africans” (Cambeira,
1997:

mulattos was also very high,
particularly

in the

1

15).

and remained consistently greater

The number of free blacks and

Cibao.

During the eighteenth century
the Dominican Republic
recovered from
depopulation of the previous century.

and by 1783

it

was

1

1

In 1718, the

population

w as recorded

the

as 18.410.

9,600 (Moya Pons, 1986:46). Cattle herding
and the sale of

50

^

W3S Pr° dUCed

- «*

northwestern par, of
Hispaniola
b ranee

m

in

1665, with a

territory, called
Sain, -Domingue.

Air, can slaves, and
vast

While the 168

^ves (Moya

Pons,

,

,

,

h e ear, seventeen,,,
eentnr, a

new

border defined

in

1697.

was astounding. Within
a

amounts of Dominican beef
and

territory

which would

The growth of this

short period the
Freneh

leather.

By

.

slaves

at

I

565

the iate eighteenth
centuty, sugar relied
upon a

slave labor force of
500,000 in Sain, -Domingue,
while the

San .0 Domingo by the

Domingo was

census of Sain, -Domingue
registered 4,000 French
planters

995: 68 76).

Domingo had only 600

raised in Santo

same

i.,.:

.:y in Santo

us disposal (Wucker,
1999: 99 ). The population
of

late eighteenth centiny,
in contras, to Sain,
-Domingue,

,0 °' 000 ’ Witl ’ 85
’°° 0 t>ee Whi,es

’

mula «<* and

was Cose

blacks, and 15,000 slaves
(Klein, 1986:

222 Wucker. 1999: 36;
Maingot, 1992. 230). Sain,
-Domingue was the world's
;

colony and larges, producer
of sugar,

w hile

riches,

Santo Domingo was one of
Spain’s most

insignificant colonies with
only a fledgling sugar industry.
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Brazil (1500-1808)

'•

fc

'500,

Portuguese uubl,

Ch possessed valuable
es, noi

did

it

acquit ed following
t

wood

but did not

offer ihe riches

^^

*,„» Clta|

seem

to

have gold, as did the
Spanish

of the spice trade
which the Portuguese had
just

Vasco ae
«;
de uama
Gnnm’cs circumnavigation
11 of
Afrirn
U1 Ar
iica.

it
it

was not

until 1530
ortu^uese crown decided
to colonize the
territory, essentially
to prevent the

Spanish from capturing
the territory for
themselves. Even when
colonization began, the
Portuguese remained vety
Cose to the Atlantic shores,
with few settlements in
the
interior.

In fact,

i,

was no,

until the

colonized on any significant

'nhke the

men

men

left

1890s

behind

These men, referred

took quickly to the Indigenous

by Columbus

integrated into Tupi society.

and by

several

left

,0 Iberia to relate his
discovety.

>

in

.ha, the

Amazon was

level.

Like Columbus, Cabral

"i legredados""

boom

rubber

in

in this

new

to in histoiy

women

like their

land before returning

books as
Spanish counterparts.

Santo Domingo, the degredados
became quickly

Some of them

possessed several Indigenous

the time the Portuguese
returned, there

was

a

new

in

as

race of mesticos (mixed

of Indigene and European).
Despite the dislike of the Portuguese
then mestico children, they were
forced to rely upon them

women

for the

degredados and

order to enslave the Indi gene

Ve
,u_ t Rl i

th ®
..

Holy Cross) and then

.

3

™6

*

^

^B

suggests that the"
;;to

bS'

W °° d

(Bueno ,99* 13).°™

^

” The de

Zl1
fr

dad»s were

criminals

who were

Cn
,The lsland ofthe True Cross) “ Provinca
*
f
Terra f
do Brasil" (The Land of
While some believe
-

Brazil).

that

Was found

in

abunda "ce,

'™ d "h™” W " iCh

a

new oook by Eduardo Bueno
COmK fr0 "'
E "Slish verb

Ulnl

exiled from Portugal as part of their
sentence.
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"

populations which
would be used

in

<-

sugar plantations
(engenhos), as well as
in the

cutting of wood.

The P ° rtU8UeSe

-

ike the Spaniards

'

natives as ignorant.
cuituraliy

’

C ” ildren

Wh ° Se

NObre8a Wmin8 fr0m
'

**

ab0r

'

nCW '-V

,he

—

for commercial

^

of Salvador

r,

Manuel da

I54 ,

expired , ha

in

,

he coercion of the
natives was justified
by paternalist
arguments which suggested
that
lhe na " VCS WOre
aC,Ua " y Baining fr°
m lheir servil[ idc through the
acceptance of, he
" r,St an ai,h
d/
EUr ° Pean dVilizali0n
Do-ningos Jorge Vclho in
694 explained
'

'

“ "

'

-

,

"" lhiS
nee

"

we

S°

diffCrCW fr0m CnS,aVing

teach them to

'hey did no,

1

know how

he Portuguese,

•he Indigenes (also

till,

to

to

*“>

do before whites taught
them"

natives in Brazil

subsistence. Governor

them a

price, ess service,

(in

Burns,

1

980: 46).

found cannibalism, incest
and polygamy among

the degredados), and
used these elements of
Indigenous

denounce the Indigenes as
barbarous and

many of the

* -her doing

sow, to reap, and to
work for their keep-something
which

like the Spanish,

among

*

And

uncivilized.

like the Indians

would farm nothing more than

Diogo de Meneses

in

tha,

to

of Hispaniola,

needed for their

1610 wrote “[tjhese Indians,

barbarous people having no
government and being unable

life to

Sir,

are a vety

govern themselves, and they

are so lacking in this regard
tha, ever in their
sustenance they will no, save for
tomorrow
that

which

I

is in

excess today”

to

Schwartz,

1

989: 3

1

).

he Portuguese crown assumed
a very paternalist stance
towards the natives

because of its perception

and

(in

tha, they

were uncivilized and needed

be protected from Portuguese

who might abuse

to be helped to develop,

the Indian's

„ u ,ting nature.’

King

** -

1

treatment. In

w f"

_

“•

759. a law guaranteed
freedom to

1

all

Indigenes

surnames and spoke
Portuguese (Burns,
,980:47-8,. By the

somewhat superfluous

s.nce the natives

availability and the sheer

could

still

it

the causes

were just, such as the

guarantee of the protection
of his Indigenous subjects,

mg m

BrazM Were even aware °f
•*,

Unlike
eliminated

19
,

in

let

and despite the

large

number of African

were subsistence farmers, and

"woman's work" (Schwartz,

1994:

9).

is

it

to the

.

As

for

of

Dorn Manuel's

vety likely that few people

it.

the

men

until the

But the Indigenous presence

28).

Dominican R^blic.

1989. 35). Additionally,

settlers in

province of Bahia

the natives of

considered agricultural tasks to be

difficulties adapting to the lifesty
le

Like the Spanish

slaves being imported.
Indigenes

in the northeastern

a very powerful one. Like
the natives in the

nomads and had

due

latter's practice

alone were restrained by

middle of the seventeenth
century (Schwartz, 1989:

Brazil

as slaves,

was

Santo Domingo, the
Indigenous population of Brazil
was never wholly

were the predominant source
of labor

was no,

the roya, decree

slaves. Additionally,
Portuguese colonists

cannibalism, or war against
the former (Schwartz.
18
1989: 30)

l,V

had Portuguese

750,

were no longer being used

number of African

enslave Indigenes

1

who

many of the

Indigenes were

imposed by the Portuguese (Mattoso,

Santo Domingo, the Portuguese noted
the

differences between the various groups
of natives, making clear their preferences.
The

Aimore, who were hunters and gatherers,
were much more

™

5

W2S " 0t P0SS

Sp

'

bie in lhe S anish coioni
P

0,he C0Unlr

eZ^n^T
Bums

1530 when the natives were considered

,he re 8l°n ’ 'here

free vassals

of

was a very significant decline in the population of
500 there were between and 2 million Indians (Bums
1980
There are currently approximately 250,000
Indians living in Brazil (Eakin
; p0

Indh.'
Indigenous
people.

17).

in

« after

resistant to Portuguese

>,
:
estimates
that

m

1

1

)

54

domination ,n„

Po

“"

“ ""

„„ „„„„„„

—

«*<

o,., ,

,„Id

"*
flesh;

and so on" (Schwartz,

The Portuguese Crown,
„ke

1

tHe ‘ aking ° f

^

epeated since

i,

AfnCanS With ° Ut

was common,

in spite

Africans to the Americas
(Mattoso,

sermon was
captive

in

a language alien

who probably

tha SlaVCS

The number of slaves

1

Crown seems
In

Jesutt school in

1

to

have been

689.

Bahia

that the mulattos

were

Unlike those

w hich

that

efforts ,o linri, ,he

were often

"convert." and a

liters ^

ritual.

baptisms, where the

new name was given

to the

Portuguese law also required

day of w ater during the voyage
across

could be carried was also
limited based upon the

were commonplace on the overcrowded
slave

efficient in protecting the rights

after the Friars

to the

ships.

to

allow them

to attend a

had refused them entrance, and the King
decreed

Dominican Republic. Indigenes

they could escape without

real fear

1

983: 220-1

in Brazil

).

had access

to a larger

of being recaptured. This also

applied for African slaves. While
the effect of the cima, rones was basically
minimized

by

1

546

in

Ye,

of certain mulatto youths

King

be admitted to the school (Conrad,

in the

...

In Brazi,. baptisms

Many were mass

some mulatto youths appealed

to

varic

994: 33). These provisions
were consistently disregarded

as emaciation, disease
and death

territory to

new

„

prohibition, for traders to
bring unbaptized

994: 32).

the

lK

prohibited Portuguese
slave traders from

did no, understand the
bizarre

weigh, of the cargo (Mattoso,

m Salvador.

of the

^ 8UaranteCd 3 meals and Z662

the Atlantic.

the

1

,«

Crown, made

baP‘-"8 *em.

firSt

in

989: 33).

the Spanish

slave frade. dominated
by Portuguese traders.

^

*

.k A

enjoyed human

fc

Santo Domingo (Moya Pons,

1

995: 41
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),

runaway African slaves were

a

)

" ""

...

paotalal,

„

am

M*. of runaway
cl« „

fo,

20.000 and 30.000
inhabitants (Bums,

was an extreme

case, there are

haudaad

1

„

980: 54; Mattoso,

many others,

the

,

994:

,

While Palmares

39).

although the number
of people involved

slave communities,
and they relied upon
slave hunters

-/or free or freed

^

„„ „„

.ho were predominantly

natives

Africans/Afro-Braziiians to
destroy the qtlilombos
and t0 brmg

runaway slaves (Schwartz,
1989: 471
While runaways constitute
an important

of the

part

stoty

of slaves

in

northeastern Brazil

is

the

Wha,

is

amount of control exercised
by

to

were no, beaten and

hilled,

the master over the
slaves

which masters

is

no

,

,

0 say

but the master's paternal
authority was often able

is

seen consistently

free slaves because

of

loyal service

in

manumission

letters

include persona! and paternal

documents.

comments

into

and wills

fell

what would otherwise be

These comments would be
considered gratuitous were

it

compelled

legal,

to

commercial

not for the

1741 provision defined a quilombo
as “any clandestime group of
more than five fugitive slaves’

56

in

and love. Most manumissions
were

bought, often by the slave,
and were conditional.
However, masters

A

T his

induce slate compliance
without the actual use of
castigation.
his paternal authority

20

in the

interesting about plantation
society

generally without resorting
to excessive force
(Mattoso, ,994: ,0!)
-ha. slaves

^

in Brazil, the

majority of slaves
performed no such acts of
open rebellion. The slave
plantations
northeast were particularly
well disciplined.

is

f

Patemal aUth0nt>

m 311

rdati0ns

in Brazi1
’

master and slave.
Mattoso found that
Phra$eS $UCh

I

—^-

" '"

bore htm (or her)
because

I

-ter and one of the slaves,

raised

in

manumission

Wel1 "

him

-»

Particularly those

.etters

i,

was common

rati °

‘

me "

to

the master,

-0 woman among

"

[i]n the

were generally

s. m

interesting,

ratio

of about two

less than 10 percent

was

best exemplified

Bradford Bunts' description
of the***,

of the slave population"

is

by the plantation owner
<***,).

quoted here

importance of the***, and
the son of authority

and especially vis-a-vis the

free, freed

tha, he

a,

length because of the

wielded

in Brazilian society,

and enslaved Afro-Brazilians.
Burns writes:

ate
tnei 3 ‘ rUe l0rd ° f thC
manor ’ was a Patriarchal chief who
nded^'
ru
ed family, servants, slaves,
and even neighbors-unless
they were lame
es a e owners like
himse.f-with absolute authority. The
grelfsTze ofThe
estate, its isolation from
royal officials, and the relative

r

'

weakness of local

all

strengthened his power. Furthermore,
the estate chaplain

and ocal parish

priest orbited

a*h° C
f ‘

<

around him like satellites, lending
the
hurcht0 al « mem his authority.

From

r
eranda ot
veranda
TfWs
Ins 5
house... the patriarch oversaw
the land, listened
petitions dispensed justice,
and in general

the shaded

to

held court... The rural economy
"
than the patriarch, latifundia,
slavery and export
° ps ' e '- thos e features dominated,
characterized Brazilian agriculture,
,
and shaped much of the colony’s
social and economic life.
1980-’

consisted ot

to

).

Paternal authority

bureaucrats

freed a,

period of ,684-1
745, n, that, os received over
45 percent of the

Bahian manumissions bu,
cons, in, ted
(Schwartz, 1989: 331

that

the siave population,

manumissions of female slaves
outnumbered those of males
by a
one. Additionally

encounter

(her)” (Mattoso,
,944: ,66). Children
of the

who were recognized by

° f near y tW °

to

even more intimate
.or the iove

a young age (Mattoso.
,994: ,75). In
addition, two other
patterns

DeSP,te thC

between

much more
,

(Bums.

/4).

(Mattoso, 1994: 138),

57

Schwartz adds

that the paternalist
notion

of authority was reinforce.
by -an i d eo,o ica,
g

contest in which the
.netaphors of family,
obligation, fealty, and
clientage predominated"

(SChWa " 2

’

'

989: 257)

'

Matt0S

°

Paternal form of authority
exerted by

•he master, which
served to discipline his
slaves without needing
to resort to excessive
force (Mattoso, 1994:
101).

There was a certain

literal

element

in the master's
paternal attitude

towards his

slaves, since his sexual
relations with his female
slaves often produced
children.

Santo Domingo, European

women were

As

in

quite rare, and masters
were able to use their

position to engage in
sexual relations with slave
and non-slave African and
Afro-

Brazilian

women which were often

coerced. Miscegenation
was prevalent, and mulattos

soon constituted a large
group. Schwartz writes

tha, in

Bahia “ [f] ield hands were
almost

always slaves, usually black,
and predominantly Africans;
senhores de engenhos were
invariably free and white;
bu, in the intermediate
positions of management,
technical
skill,

and artisan

craft

were found freemen, freedmen,
and slaves; whites, browns, and

blacks” (Schwartz, 1989:
312).

By

1675, sugar production in Brazil
crashed due in part to the increased

competition from the tiny colony
of Saint-Domingue. The economy,
however, quickly

recovered with the discovery ot
gold
cycle

also

in the southeastern state

of Minas Gerais. The gold

marked the beginning of the development
of the Brazilian south and

was

the beginning of the

development of some of Brazil's

gold and other precious stones were
found

in areas that

such as Vila Rica (Ouro Preto). Slaves
were used

58

interior since

were inland and

in large

southeast.

numbers

in

in the

It

many of the
mountains,

mining, but a

northern Prions.
WaS " S

raPKl eXP '° i,a,i0n

Since the master
.eased .and and his
on, y concern
'

-

he

*" -

«- a certain amount of precious

'0

metals every day.
Beyond a certain figure,
slaves could keep
what they found

-

..™. «-

,0 ,

—
mmmg rCg,0nS 10 hUy lheir 0Wn

IVeedom af,er

even the stoty of one
African. Chico Rei,

own mine and
"i the

in the .and

.

0ll| y

who

«

™

a few years of servitude.
There

not only bought his

eventua.iy the freedom
of his entire

this period.

became much more
atones found

in the

Portuguese interest

efficient as the

mines,

in

He was

tribe.

construction of a church
for African parishioners 21

String

r»

in Brazi,

Crown demanded 20

own

a, so

is

freedom, but his

very

much

invoiced

.

peaked. Co.onia.
administration
percent of ail gold and
precious

order to guarantee that the
Portuguese miners were

claim by his or her master
would be freed immediately.
fn

1

/63, the capital of Brazi.

was moved from Salvador

R, ° dC Janeir °- THiS Change
Was a tes,ame

Witnessed

in the las, centuty,

and a hint

a,

what might happen

led a rebellion against
the

independence for the southeastern
tevol, in

h

is

Pernambuco. But the

no. insignificant that the

1

states.

of

« <0 the amount of growth the southeast had

At the same time, rebellions were
becoming more frequent

men from Minas

to the southeastern city

Crown,

In

1

798 rebellion

most important sculptor

59

80

in

in

1

,

in

in Brazil.

next two centuries.

In

1

789. prominent

which they declared they wanted

anti-Portuguese sentiment led to a

Bahia

the

in the

is

perhaps the most interesting

town of Vila Rica, Aleijadinho, was

a

“

™

“

»« T.K

republic in order to
breathe freely because

lor

everyone”

By
but there

(in

Almeida writes

°“ !0S; ' ndianS mC‘ melUCOS
and
’

the slave trade,

are honorable and
valuable citizens...

Portuguese or Brazilians, even

were born

if

in

1

were citizens and should
be

822 “Mulatto,, ^bras, and

They

are Portuguese citizens,
the sons of

they are illegitimate.
Whatever their color, whatever

in Brazil” (in

Bums,

1980: 137 italics
,

Interestingly enough,

between

1

treated

our people, they are
Portuguese; they

'

their status, they

was no slowing down

to surface arguing
that these people

as such. C ipriano
Jose Batata de
i

subjugated and because

incredible growth antong
the freed and mulatto
population of Brazil

Documents began

a

live

hisjudgts,

Burns, 1980: 140).

the end of ,he
eighteenth centuiy there

was an

we

«_

798 and

1

81 8 the population

ip.

original).

of w hites increased front

1.000,000 to 1,040,000, that
of slaves from 1.500,000 to
1.930,000, that of natives

remained steady

(Bums, ,980:

at

,47).

250,000. ye, that of freedmen

There

is

inc,

eased from 225.000 to 585.000

something curious about these freedmen,
and

-most freed slaves were slave
owners" (Mattoso, 1994: 207).
As Maltose

tha,

is

writes:

masters were found in every class
in society. There were
white masters
masters ol mixed race, and black
masters. Their behavior did not
depend
ut their co or or social position
but on their quality as individuals.
But for
the slave, the master— w
hether rich or poor, white or black—
was always a
white master, because to be
‘white’ in Brazilian society meant to
adopt
certain superior attitudes, to
wield a certain power (Mattoso, 1994:
115).

mulatto.

60

that

I

his reinforces the
association

of the discourses Of
whiteness
voveo with
wuu ireeaom
freedom and

and blackness with
servitude, illegitimacy
and poverty, while also
providing

for

sta
status

spacefor

individual negotiation
of racial identity.

Dominican Republic
(1791-1882)
B>

Domingue

the late eighteenth
centuty,

Santo Domingo was highly
dependent upon Saint-

particularly as a market
for beef and leather.
Ye, as important as the

of Saint-Domingue was
for Santo Domingo,
influenced

its

was

i,

its

politics that

most

economy

critically

eastern neighbor.
Saint-Domingue’s rapid growth,
and the very low

percent of whites
(6 percent) relative to a very
large enslaved black
population

(Cambeira, 1997: 125) created
an environment which
was especially propitious for
rebellion.

Only two years

after the

storming of the Bastille

Saint-Domingue, which soon
changed

its

name

of Spanish elites, fearing
that the rebellion

Santo Domingo,

effects

The Haitians abolished

liberated slaves, but

blacks

who

1

in

794, a significant nun, bet

would spread or encourage

a slave rebellion in

of the Haitian revolution on Santo
Domingo was the

invasion of the Spanish colony,
which

.

By

began

Hispaniola with their slaves (Moya
Pons, 1995: 166).

left

The most immediate

government 22

to Haiti.

in f iance, revolution

was unwelcome

was

then in the possession of the
French

slavery,

which won support among the newly

to the large

numbers of whites and

free mulattos

and

believed themselves to be civilized
Spaniards, and their invaders to be
savage

Africans (Cambeira,

1

997:

1

37).

In

1

809. Spain was able to reassert control
over

its

former colony, and slavery was
re-institutionalized, and though Spain
easily defeated a
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In

,*,.** Nuflez

Caceres declared
Dominican independence
from Spain.

The

declaration of independence

pohnea, situation

in the

was premature. Sensing
„le weakness of the

former Spanish coiony,
the Haitian government
invaded and

quickly conquered the
nascent

The Haitian occupying

state.

slavery a second, and
final, time, and
redistributed

Church

to

many of the

lands that belonged to
the

former slaves. Hoe, ink
comments that due to the absence
of large sugar

Plantations, such as those
in neighboring
in

forces immediately
abolished

Cuba and Puerto

Rico,

-‘the abolition

Santo Domingo on.y
affected a society where,
for a long time, and

of siaverv

in large par,, siavery

had existed dejure, instead
of defect (Hoe, ink.
1994: 91-2). The number
of slaves
vsas quite low,

and the poverty of the
colony had also rendered
small the difference

between slaves and other
poor Dominicans. The Haitians

truly enraged

many

Dominicans when they encouraged
the immigration of black
Protestants from
s in an afiempt to

da. ken

the population
(Martinez-Femandez: 1995

Between 6,000 and 15,000 blacks
from Philadelphia accepted

:

71

the United

).

the offer of “free

trip, free

'edging and board for four
months and 36 acres of farmland
for every twelve workers,”

owevet. eventually only 500-600
settled

Haman
a time

occupation

is

In 1897, the

Spanish

Santo Domingo (Chapman, 1997:

remembered by Dominican

of chaos, violence and

elites left the island.

in

cruelty, during

This occupation

territory'

is

elites, particularly

9).

The

Euro-Dominicans, as

which plantations were burned and many

one of the more important moments

on Hispaniola had been ceded to the
French.
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in racial

consciousness forming

among Dominicans,

particularly the elites
and mulattos,

who

rejected the Haitians.

In

i

844, a group called
la Trinitaria
a fthe
(the

«.»»»

s

Dominican Republic.
e

o,d

„

hIi

,.

D

„

,h

Trinmo
nnit > ) insisting
of Pablo Duarte
•

•

1

fcl ,ta

,

ori]>

^

,

^

Tnnitanos could muster,
the Trinitarios who
were predominantly
,

were forced

to enter into
bargains witb conservative
caudiiios, particularly

Santana con, roiled the
militia regardless of
the
occupy, and the members
of the
•o

1

him no,

995: 20).

to

any invisible

He used

militia,

much

political posts that

to the

state or theoretical
ideal

liberals

Pedro Santana.

he did or did not

dismay of the TnnUarios,
were

(Moya Pons,

loyal

1995: 159: Betances.

his position to exile
the TrinUaria leaders
as traitors

and was able

to

consolidate his authoritarian
rule because of the
constant threat of Haitian
invasion,

which persisted

until a, leas. ,855.

which the Trinitarios hud
written
concentrated power

He

then replaced the Liberal
constitution of Moca.

in icse
1858,

+
with
a constitution that more
thoroughly
.;

j.

in the executive.

Sovereignty, which always
had a powerful external
dynamic, was no different
after

independence.

wanted

it

to

When

Caceres declared the Dominican
Republic independent he

be par, of Gran Colombia
because he believed

too vulnerable to another
Haitian invasion that
1 his second

W ith

it

i,

too small and poor, and

required protection

independence produced no more security
among

his lormer associate

was

„om a

its elites.

larger power.

Santana disagreed

Buenaventura Baez over which country the
Dominican

Republic should surrender

its

sovereignty: Santana’s preference
for the United States

clear, especially during the
1850s,

was

while Btiez leaned towards Spain. The
United Slates
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" r° UP ' '° eVa Uate the
SitUmi0n
'

s
States

S

[
had

aVe ' h0

'

/

lon g been interested
in the

dm8 P ° Wer "

^D

imerferenCe

•hat the

D ° minican Re P‘*'ic,

" ,e

Samani Bay. 23 The

^
«—

3 Sen0l ' S ,hr

° miniCan

^

-

«*

Dontinican Repubhe
needed protection front

The

possibility

of a

US

Haitian government
invaded

of Haiti 24

.

ironicaHy, Haitian

d the feats of the
eiites

its

bemg

‘

,

who

insisted

neighbor.

protectorate disappeared
once the Civi,

War

States began, and
Santana turned towards
seeking Spanish
protection, as

favored eariier. in

since the United

in the

United

Baez had

860, after a report
front a finance
ntinister that the
frontiers were

Haitiani2ed ’’ He fe "

m ° re

“ter

10

into an aihance

a European

protecting power. Santana
abandoned the progressive
religious tolerance
position of the
P3St ’

the

WhlCh IW Had USCd

ChaSti

few Black American

Protestants.

Church which he believed
the

- t,K <**“»* Church and to court the

to be the

He became much more

key ingredient

in

the Spanish Empire.

and

protective of the Catholic

convincing Spain to again
accept

Dominican Republic as a colony
(Martmez-Femandez, 1995:75).

Dominican Republic re-entered

British. U.S.

The

I„

iggl.the

reinsertion into the Spanish

aph CS ,hal US observers noted
“Not surprising” toe US
during this
Depanmentof Slat^'Tjf
b
d 3 C ° n inuous Preoccupation
composition of the Dominican
with the racial
Repubhe Virtually all
!?
|.
)
'

period.

compost £%

proportion with the racia,
independent Dominican Renublir
population consisted of about
over one hundred thousand are
•

Un

Hr

'

Horan

Intere

first

U.S. agent to the

“

7“

new

Buctana '*« ">= republic’s'
dT^n'0IJSand ot whom
,0 rty thousand

.* hu„d
whites.’

ne
7
0 [PreSideml

,

,

including lighter-skinned
mulattoes
blacks and whites,
,
„

2

-T'

as a PP
i

|

-

"7"
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"

are Blacks and
a ve f> liberal use of the term
white, obviously
$ reP ° rt eS ' at" ished 3
racial

ln

8

^

»«e

b

“

“

nt) >ears ol
Ila.tian rule

****
SP““'

”
“

" r"”’

•

ta. Co.lreras

*

,

|vtij

and two and a half
centuries of miscegenation

>—

~ * *— ~
>

™‘

„
...

" “« «»».««. of

„„

,

„

to Haitians prior
to the return nfSnan
ol Spanish
1

\

government. However, the
return of

Spanish government
destroyed any illusions
about Dominicans being
Spaniards.

The Spanish who came

Cuba and Puerto

to

govern the Dominican
Republic were primarily

[the race

Pneo

writes:

and color of Dominicans]
was a constant topic of
"8 '
beCaUSe " ,e

offended he"
its

front

Rico, slave holding
colonies, and they refused
to recognize the

Dominicans as white and
European. Moya Pons

p

S P a " ia

Don
ominicans who were reminded
e

etfect
effecton
on the
he

W° Uld

*

^

n
Dominicans

™

?

^

™"rtnually

Cuba or
a " itUde °f^Periority had
that in

themselves. The lighter-skinned
avoid contact with their
darker skinned friends for
fear of be,
ng assoc ated w ith them or of being considered
inferior
\ the new,
Spanish rulers (Moya Pons,
1995: 206-7).

people began

to

Additionally, the Dominicans
immediately

felt the

burden of the Spanish bureaucratic

apparatus. Be.anees repons
that the payroll of Spain's
administrators was more than

seven times the government’s
income (Betances, 1995:

65

18).

le,

„

i„„|

~

1

opposed

^

*»

DOmm CanS qU1Ckly remembered
‘

' SPamSh Cr0Wn

'

"

,he ex P!«i^tion
and the denigration
imposed by

-~ -

'

"P

R

“^
0n

,hC dark ' Skinned S°'
di

- °^orio

«o

remove

the Spaniards

from

Luperon and Uiisses
ieureaux, who
,

were among many
Afro-Do,

invoived in the battie
for independence.

war of independence
waged against
" aPPea ed
'

10

D ° miniCanS ° f a "

cmerta were crucial
whether

^

aga nSI
'

'

Ia '"

'

i,

1

iaiti. this

war had

(Mai "80t

was

,ad CaMed f° r lhe

the

-

'

a raeia,

«: 232).

Dominican

Cement, and

During both

rejection of the ‘black’

U ° minicans ,0 re Pel

Uke

the

like that

war

conflicts, racial

I

laitians or

the invading
African/blacks, a

climate which Dominican
historian Franklyn Franco
believes

to

have been “highly

propitious for racism"
(Franco, 1997: 74).
Dominicans rejected Haitians
as being a
d, lie,

cm

people. This

was

critical since as

U.S. agent Benjamin Greene
wrote

•Dominican blacks and muia,
toes acted and
42).

The war

fel, like

1849,

whites” (Marti nez-Fernandez,

1

994.

against Spain forced a slightly
different deflnition of
national identity.

Hoetink writes

that

by the

late nineteenth century,

Dominican nationalism

“lhe Spanish language,
the Catholic religion and
the idea of a population

predominantly mixed and Spanish”

would have been too much
effort

in

by Spain made

it

(I

to accept,

loetink,

but

is

it

painfully clear to both

1

994:

1

relied

whose

upon
origin

is

23). Admitting to African heritage

noteworthy

that the failed re-colonization

Dominicans and Spaniards,

that

Dominicans were no longer simply
ethnically Spaniards.

By
Italians.

the 1870s and 1880s,

due

to the

Americans and Cubans, there was

immigration of Spaniards, Puerto Ricans,
a

growth

66

in

the sugar industry for the

first

time

in

over two hundred vpirc
years

d
Bl ln
•

-

smg with them

the technology that
£?) mat

plantations of Puerto
Rico and Cnha, snch
as the

Hegan

to butld a

economte

came

modem

activity in the

to a close, the

capital

.

.

of steam engines and
railroads

court* (Moya Pons,
,995: 259-260). As

was

the Cibao.

The Dominican

the business of large

and was therefore
injurious

to the small

the traditional wealth
of the country

The presence

^

the nineteenth centuiy

growth of sugar made the
south the most important
region

that -sugar

in the

sugar industty which
would soon emerge as the
most dominant

Dominican Republic, replacing

Bono warned

ttse

wa , being used
was

depended”

intellectual

in the

Pedro Francisco

landow ners with great
amounts of

independent farmers on whose
progress
(in

Moya

ol light-skinned
foreigners not

only

Pons,

1

995: 261

built the

modem

).

sugar industry

but contributed to the
informal segregation of
Dominicans by color. “With the
white

newcomers,

Dominican

the issue o, race

elites

began

became more important. As

to gather in social

in

most of Latin America,

Cubs, meeting places where
members could do

business” (Betances. 1997:
42). These social clubs
became increasingly exclusively

Euro-Dominican. The importance
of race increased even more
so as the labor force
'he sugar plantations

horn the West Indies

became almost exclusively made
up of black

for

foreigners, mostly

25
.

This marked a considerable
change since before the assassination

of president Heureaux
(1899) the majority of the leaders of the
Dominican Republic were
mulattos, yet between

25

1

899 and

1

929 only one president was not a
Euro-Dominican

o

See the section on the Dominican
Republic (1882-1930)

67

in this

chapter.

(Wiarda, 1975:363).
although less so than

FO " OWm8
(COnSerVa, VeS)
'

the

a, ’ d

How ever,

wealthy Afro-Domi
means were

in the past 26

considered

“w hite,”

.

War ° f ReSt0rati0n tW0
P 01

^

still

<Libera

'

S) -

position as president
to b eeonte one
of ,He

^

^

P-ties were fanned.
the Ro,0s

were led by Luper6n

county

richest

who

used

men. The abuse of
state

persona! enrichment
and to institutionalize
clienteles did no,
begin, nor end

P-od

ot time, and the
period that followed
the

- .he period that preceded the

War of Restoration wasjust

as unstable

Spanish annexation.
Jonathan Hartlyn writes

that between
1865 ana 1879 there
were 21 governments
and 50 militaty uprisings
(Hardy,,. 1998: 29).

Brazil (1808-1889)

in 1808, the Portuguese

move
ships

its

capita, to

firs,

European colonial power

one of its colonies. The
Portuguese royal court

when Napoleon

•he capita,

monarchy became the

s

fied

Lisbon on Bridsh

occupation was imminent,
and Rio de Janeiro became
no, only

of Brazil, bu, also the
capita, of the Portuguese
empire. The

Portuguese monarch

to

arrival

of the

in Brazil led to
increased consideration for
the colony, as well
as

increased vigilance and
efficiency on the part of the
government. Colonial government.

Which had giv en

significant liberties to slave

owners and caudilhos

wTm'If-

negro would be accepted, although
not without reservations.

68

aS an
,h

gUeS

w°

in

in the early colonial

BrazN “ Whe rtch negro
°“ gh
“ meS ,he rich
'

is

a

•

period, and had

become

^

snd the enforcement nf a on

M

"

y

ureaucracy.

—-

increasingly present anH
'
P
and reStnCtlve sin
'

« the discover)' of gold

m’“

—— ^

also mean, a slow
growth of anti-Portuguese
sentiment that

I,

i,«

.... .»

would

eventually translate
into proto-nationalism.

Don, Joao, the
Portuguese monarch,
was quite comfortable
Portuguese crown back

to

Lisbon

in

1

in Brazil

and he only

82 1 w hen the pressure
exerted by the

Portuguese and British
parliaments was
insurmountable. Before
leaving, Don, Joao

fW mdePendenCe

he Sh0i " d

’

would be independent,
In .822,

raz.ll.

a, leas,

movement, because even
though
i,

would be ruled by

Don, Pedro declared

a Portuguese monarch.

Brazil independent and

Although independence
was

Brazil

virtually bloodless,

was

crowned Emperor

later

Dorn Pedro agreed

to

pay 2.9

million dollars to Portugal
and to assume Portugal's
debt to Britain of 6.7
million dollars.

Which meant

that Brazilian sovereignty

10 Britain (Bushnell

would be limited by

the Brazilian

external debt, particularly

and Macaulay, ,988:
160). Don, Pedro assembled
a group of

Brazilians to put together
a constitution for the

w ith

its

Andrade

.0 write a constitution
that

new

empire, bu, he soon butted
heads

brothers, dissolved the
congress, and selected ten
Brazilians

was more

to his liking.

The Constitution of 824 gave
1

citizenship unequivocally
to free
dollars or

bom

people with an annual income
of one hundred

more (Bushnell and Macaulay,

slaves nor to race.

The

1

988:

right to nationality

privilege of whites in the
empire;

it

was a

1

58).

The Constitution

did not refer to

and citizenship was not tnerefore
the

right that belonged to the free

69

bom”

(da Silva.

6 r ' 8htS ° f Afr °'
BraZ,llan

’

of Dom Pedro
Pr° V ,S '° nS

II’s

^

Councii of State in

make

h3tefUl diStinC

" e “ iUdin8

freedmen SUCH
’

^

!

citi

849

«ns were explicitly defended

2!
,

i

n

w h ic h

it

was declared

"- concerning mulatt0

in a decision

that “[a]ny

citizens

of

^

- a religious brotherhood

„

etc

are

unconstitutional” (in
Conrad, 1983:221).

Emperor's anti-slavety
bias was unable
0 e<IUa " ,y °‘

C ° nStitUti0n

fr0m

Brazilian society.
Because birth

and ,hey Were

m ° re

was so important

zihans. For example,

,ikel >' 10

bom of slaves

for citizens,
Afro-Brazilians'

more

likely to

m one extreme case, Schwartz

(Schwartz,

m the military, they could do so

have an “illegitimate”

be lhe descendants
of slaves than were
lighter

f children bor„
oi ,ree parents

children

prevent the forma,
guarantees

subverted by the informal
ine q ua,ity of

citizenship could be
questioned since they
were
b,rth ’

to

1

were

notes that in Vila Rica
in

illegitimate,

compared

989: 389). Also, although
freed

only as private soldiers
(Mattoso,

1

to

1

804.

98 percent of

,.:_ves

994:

1

were

79),

Brazilian political elites
were not always sympathetic
to the emperor or
his goals
to centralize

power, but many realized

that centralization

various rebellions from
spreading or snowballing.
Power
within coronets and
powerful
the need to support

ow n

cauMkos (local

some of the

activities

was necessary

to prevent

in rural areas still
resided

strongmen), however, these

of the government

in

men

realized

order to maintain their

position of power (Graham.
1990: 69). Social relations
continued to reflect vast

differences in power,
institutionalized through the
household and the family (Lauderdale

Dom

Pedro

II,

the son of

Dom

Pedro

I.

assumed

the Brazil ian thrown in 1831
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M

P
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,e ° r n

“"” n "

^

insisting that for
every individual

«„„« „„ M

tv.^

hCre

W3S

a Vei
?

arti

-'- place...." (Graham,

1990:

—3-4).

5 tHUC
’

UaS

d SlaVe reV ° h
n
’

revolutionaries were
imprisoned (Reiss,

overtones

left

,

Bah

9293,

'

a Which

xii).

was

Particularly clear about

That large number and
the

a strong mpri „,
on Bahians of all colors.
,n general, as

its

racial

i

Republic, free Afro-Bra
z i,ians {pardos
and
political Change, very
rarely involved

Revolt Of .837-8

made

is

a

good example. Schwartz
writes

free

with the enslaved...
Even

people of color
in the

Which people

ol lesser status

par ,

m

^^

fc

who

that during the rebellion
“attempts

met with opposition

no, only front slave-

objected to being placed on
the same level

midst of revolution, the
divisions of slave society
could

overcome" (Schwartz. ,989:
477).

Dominican Republic, understood

^

Dominican

themselves with slave
populations. The Sabinda

to integrate slaves
into rebel nrilitaty
units

owners but also from

not be

who

,n the

AM members

of Brazilian

society, just as in the

the hierarchy of social
relations, and the

ways through

could better themselves. For
Afro-Brazilians, and Afro-
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Dominicans, this
meant association with F„
ejection of the

«.

same aspects of
Africa.

—

.

* tan

.»,«

and piessure from
the English
'

a ln

^

iurin,

„ „„„„„„ „

-

inri
'

S invading Brazilian ships,
forced the Braziiians

without a source of
new slaves, and iven
the deplorable
g
conditions of slaves
and their
m0r,a " ty ra ‘ eS * S
aVer> W ° Uld
$00n enA
'

'

^""-g in .he

—

830s. the Brazilian

1

ernmen. began enconragmg
immigrants from southern
Europe
h the h0Pe$ ° f b0lh
the

;

avares Bastes explained

‘Wthou, , he

Brazil will never
progress” (in

-

Priding

immigrants of Qennany

Bums, 1980 223
23 t> ”
Hee

to

emigrate to Brazil

a source of cheap
labor

^^

^

30

-

’

fi
,h
further
suggested that the “pure

hlood of the Northern rarpe” tnn „u
ern races would
“renovate our degenerate
regenerate la^e. - tu
This immigration
-

decade of the tw entieth
century.

By

1

86,

ancipation

.

the majority of
Afro-Brazilians were free and
the trend towards
gradual

was hastened

after the

especially significant
because

lhe y joined the militia

war with Paraguay

many

is

864- 1 870). This war
was
their

freedom when

(Bums, ,980: 259).
Afro-Brazilian slaves could
also take

of the soldiers

do not'h'esh^tTtcfaffimuh^
workers grew scarce, not
adolescent slaves

1

some 6,000 Afro-Brazilians
recetved

of .heir master or master’s
son. and receive
of freedom,

(

their

who entered

freedom as a

the militia

Despite the promise

were hardly volunteers
(Graham.

explained

^

result.

the place

“I

know

our rural

districts,

and

,

tredtm ent ° f the slaves that
be § an after
more than 25 to 30 percent of therhVrf"
°f
proof of great child mortal^
of
(!n
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^

1990: 29; Silva, 1993-

"

„
Brazilians

iq'i

tk

-r

"

•

0ff,CerS r

and often coerced
a
coerrpH tv,
them
into
•

1

up poor Brazilians
and Afro-

m litarv
laiyserv,
servrVp
nm
C
Others, including
•

e.

razihans, voluntarily
entered the
e
S ° Cle,y

and

t0

<hat they

were

armv
arm
y

« a "cans of consolidating their

^

’

truly citizens

slavery.

that coexisted

integration into

31
.

in Brazi,

—-

,eChn0l ° 8y ‘ hat
Bra2ilia "

was a Liberalism

free Afro-

a

Coffee hecante the
ntos, important
crop

tramS

,

during the nineteenth
century

exposed

to international

marhets

q ui,e comfortabiy with socia,
hierarchies, and even

Elites used Liberal
ideas to

push for independence
and freedom of trade

Vio.ti

da Costa contrasts
the Libera, ism of
Europe with that of Brazi,
writing:

K

instrument

??

™

*

‘‘

**

8
merchants

^

h

'^^^w-rs'd''

.

Many of these
P-son who married

Liberals supported the
gradual abolition of slavery.
In 1831, any

a free person was
considered to be

free.

By

1

869. the government

prohibited any sale of slaves
which would separate a husband
from wife, or parent from
child.

In

1

871

.

the Free

Womb

Law declared

’

free children bon,

Br; ' ai "

°rwas

“1
which

tne southern Eu.opeans,

“

of slave parents.

hu, f„ u „ d that Ihe larges ,
certainly not the elites’ first
choice.

although their
masters would be
responsible f

work of them

In

i&Cs

ti

"

'he total population
(Klein.

^

Afm
1

'

'

o
2

•

-

t
ztltan population
When
w
hen

Among

,880S lte Hb ° mi0n
’

~

•

p
Princess
Isabel, in

absence of her

of the population of
Brazil

» Brazil began to aniculate itself

the stronger
arguments in favor of
abolishing slavery

“civilized” countries
had done so.

.5

,

accounted for some
43 percent of

™

time (Carvalho,
1995: 36; Bums,
1980: 278).

h

In 1872, the
first national

Afro-Brazilians. eon,
pared with only

986: 223 32 >•
)

^

723 000

the children,
and could request

“condmonally.

'

wem
"e a4

million slaves, and
the free

Sm g

sexagenarian law was
passed freeing slaves
of sixty,

conditionally, and
those over sK-tv

census showed that
there

rai

The use of the word

was

the fact tha,

“civilized”

was

a,

clearly

all

dte
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other

interesting since

consistently been used,
in the past, to
denigrate Indigenes and
Afro-Brazilians.

The most preeminent

abolitionist, Joaquin,

Nabuco. wrote, “Brazil does
no, want

to be a
nation morally isolated,
a leper, expelled from
the world community.
The esteen, and
respect of foreign nations
are as valuable to us
as they are to other
people” (in Skidmore,

free Afro-Brazilian

Galvao, included

‘°,

I'tioC ar fir'
in the

‘

appendices are particularly lellinC
6

fi8Ure ° f

“

'r PUrP ° Se

c^lfm “wrA? "7 "***

Martinique alffouadeloLipe
and 467,000 slaves, and
32,000 free colored
million whites (Klein,
1986: 224)

'

in th

little

(Bums.

]

980: 2

1

9),

Candido da Fonseca
S °"’ e ° f the letters
‘

Pe ° P eS
'

ideological differed

'

"(InOaC
&
tateS com are ^ w
P
'

’

aS PaS Se d

Vicsount de Albuqueraue

'

" d eS ’ deSP te 3

law^hTesS
scholars note there was

'

h

f

co^entS It

and the reverse could very
easTy
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T

>

|

“

GalviSo, a

'™en bf

Sa '"“ D °™"-e.

opulation of 53,000 whites
P
* t h 658,000
slaves and 1.3

b >' the Liberals, ever, major
by Conservatlve congress. But
as many
C ° nServatives In fact, the

^^

^^
'

'

i,

11

.

|

Sh0U d
'

,i0nS in

, fr0m 3 SUPen °

r '°

alS °

be n °' ed ,ha ‘ ab
° liti0n did no ' rem
°™ the power from social
BraZi " an

——

a " ln,en0r 10
’ reSl"
’
tin
'

CXemP " ned

^™

eVen eXCHange

whether social or...
Ved the

'

r

r

political”

freed °

egtslation, .he

'

While

c ^ ara cterized

r"°

mP

“—
was vety

.ha, entered Brazil
a, this time

dem

^^-

in

a"

totally mulatto, v.
bated in

30).

0fen

““

“ BritiSh reS

deg

'

its

ir

mos, reiarionsbips

spirit,

presence of European
foreigners in Brazil

The French

author Of scientific tracts
on race

a, the

from government

clearly a personal
gift.

was

scientific racism.

**

blood and

ons, and no,

pen* theorized that misce

°f

drfteient forms ol racial
prejudice

race and their racial
mixture.

freedom was a

(Graham, 1990:
27). Additionally,
since Afro-Brazilians

freedom of Afro-Brazilians

Another idea

Bra2il

m m °S

“[sjince

» agreemem between equals

«

-

"

-res,

and

made

g ena,ion

in

he wrote, has a
-population

fearfully ugly-

had existed

Henry Thomas

(i

„ Skidmore,

in Brazil a,

Brazilians even

1

993:

various points, the

more conscious of their

thinker Gobineau. perhaps
the mos, famous

end of the nineteenth
century wrote long
,

polemics arguing that no,
only was the white race
superior to the bl.k one,
but also

that

ure of the two represented
a perversion of both. In
a similar vein, Georges
Vacher de

Eapouge wrote
(in

that Brazil

was “an enormous Negro

state

on

its

way back

to

barbarism"

Burns, 1980: 363).

for other

ZT

American peoples— belonu
to Europe on all stratified

we belong

to

ed
:°

T'r m
6

AmedcTmene

levels

over the fomter. Our
imagination cannot

As

fail to

1

^

-

be
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h

?VVe

equality

Braz,l,ans

—and the same cannorbe

° n 3 neW 3nd fluctuatin
g

,a >' er

said

of our mind, while

The Europeans were

"

'

0, ten

no,

a, one in

noticing the degree
of miscegenation

rcfW

- same

person might he
marked

d

same time,

:
Oohieneau.
tha ‘

^

'

—

Brazilians responded
to the charges
of the scientific
racists. Silvio

0dUCed

*

-

Nina Rodrigues
distinguished between

a,ter

C0U d n °'
’

W "" n8 t0 aCCeP

‘

^ CiVili2ed (Skidm0re

^

’

-

civi.ized

Romero

rejected the arguments
oh

and inferior race,
arguing

Whtu many

36. 59).

1

in Brazil

Brazilians

AI >-n S and Indigenes
they believed

that

mulattos mtgh, represent
an improvement on
those races and
“whitening” was
considered a v table
developmental strategy by
elites (Skidmore,
993; 64).
1

Dominican Republic
(1882-1930)
In 1882.

Uhsses Heureaux, a mulatto
of humble

Dominican Republic,

a position that he

would occupy

origins,

came

to

power

tor the next seventeen
years.

through an authoritarian
political system maintained
by an extensive

clientelis,

d excessive borrowing.
Despite the existence of
racial prejudice,
like

Luperon before him, was
able

more of a

to attain the position

I

system of

leureaux.

of president. Heureaux
was

far

dictator than a president,
ye, he fel, the need to
legitimize his rule by holding

regular elections. While
the elections were not
necessarily

had

in the

,0 deal

fair,

and his opponents often

with over, interference and
repression, Heureaux’s
maintenance of an

institutional fagade suggests
that political institutions

However, Heureaux had

little

were recognized as important.

problem manipulate or ignoring
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institutions

when

it

was

—
!l

„ ltal

fc

"

MW ».«»«

i

'

h,
•

I,,

—
-:r^r:r~^
.

zz:r

7

R " '”"
1

(Bell

1981

m w“

°" isni "‘

M CM

1

ti-

-

,

.

««, „„

lelegiaph ,,,,

common, canons system
(Wiarda and Kryzanek,
The
th

S,ab " i,y

^

tal

,

.

during his regime

.

m0demiZati0n ° f lte

H

~

1982: 30).

regime created an
environment

,

CUtt,ng

^ced
CaW

““

to

^

C ° nSidered di

“' *

Dominicans, the overnment
g
was

——

import ,ahor. during
the Heureaux
period and for the
years

Pr ° dUCti0n beCa '” e
in

fr0m Hahi <HOetink

’

“^

'**

to

fodow, sugar

- -or from the British West Indies and
were very poor, wilhng

dreadfui conditions
that most
Dominicans cooid avoid, and
were

an ° rfKr

(Moya

As seen

Pons, 1995: 268)

in the section

^

UeCtl0n on,y
’

1

on the Dominican
Republic (.79,-1882)
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work

in

overwhelming, dark-

skinned. Thus, parade,
to the ascendance
of a white and foreign
planter and

voted

t0

elite

class-

People, out of an electorate
of 100,000
in this

chapter.

•
development of a dark.
foreign, and.
eventually Haitian
•>», labor
lab
f
force. This
labor
force was
reeeivedbvhott
by both xenophobia
and racism (Hoe,
ink. 1994:
108).

After Heureaux’s
assassination

in

1

899 POl
nolitioc
" lcs n
beca

u
and^ the
Dominican Republic
was saddled by deb,
y aebl

Heureaux-s government.
Additionally, the

_

that
Ihat ha
hadt

fiscal crisis

rewarding both
supporters and
opposition, which led

'*c

on , Wjth

(he

Repub

States guaranteed
the deb,

o guarantee
Dominican debt, the

ic s

» «• Dominican

again”

accumulated during

prevented pohticians
from

more

instability

deb( (o fore;gn
gove

of the Dominican
Republic

US

fairly unstable

,
,

and more

_ ^^
ms mou

citing the

Monroe Doctrine

took over the
Dominican customs house,
used 55

percent of the revenue in r^nxr
pay Dorn, mean deb,
and for

™

to

™

The

its

collection staff, and
gave 45

^

Dom„„

*"**-•

«, «. were

„

(l ,

exclusive source of
income for the Dominican
government.

660 1910 and 1916,
the United Slates
increased

Dominican

Rc„ W ,

n

national
the

economy. While the

D ° miniCan P °" tiCal

^

,

US

its

presence

^

in the

brought stability to
Dominican finances.

Sys,em crumb,ed
specially without the monetary
incentives
'

traditionally used to
maintain clienteles.

A

reaction from the United
States government
•heir

arms or accept

a

rebellion in 1914

which

was

i

vith a

stem

insisted that the rebeis
either lay

down

government chosen by the US.
The rebels assented, but
peace was

ved. Finally, in 1916.

US

marines invaded the Dominican
Republic, as they had

Haiti only one year
earlier.
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The US Mannes
governed
immediately began
an effort

to

population was
accomplished

“

the

Dominican Republic

disami the popuiation
and censor the
press

fairly rapidly
pidly
.

“

Disam

'

‘

““ «

r

»«

ideological

-

meanwhile, [JS Marines
were able

l.„

io ft

leureaux and to
stabilize the
political
arH
1
d

“

« system
Is,

t0

'

“

in the

sanitation,

*“**» -public
gifts,

critically that the

Cuard was

® was

industries,

this

created.

made

it

easier

But the accomplishments
of

nor were they without
cos,. Repression

dUring the

- many of the nation,

a Natio.,1

highways and mail
service were improved.
All

he V3ri0US regl ° nS

Wgh

systems. During
the eight years,
the

count,, histo, was
impiemented,

occupying government
were not

most notably

able to consolidate
controlling interest

sugar.

Wiarda and Ktyzanek
note

modernization projects of
the Marines were

r

gh
d Civili2er as a
‘P-gmatic
‘7!l^ omm,can
Re Pubhc, land titles

system allowed American
suea^fi
roads were designed
to facilitate th
forces,

S

?

and the public work
(Wiarda and
^ty'zaneky^S^fsxT/aliTs

A

’

ex P anct their holdings,
the new
'" y ° f ,he oecil a ‘m"
militaiy
P

®om n can pesos
‘

in

'

origina*!)^^

negotiated settlement
between Jacinto Peynado
and Charles Evans Hughes

called for elections
to be held, under

incurred to the

37

h*

with the except.on
of the gavilleros,
groups of

“* ~l»». 1«

Ic Hie

the

They

*«•*
*“

•

for eight years.

US

during the

US

US

observation, and the recognition
of the deb,

occupation. The winner of the
elections was the aging

With the exception of the
Caceres period (1906-191

79

Horacio Vasquez

was able
-

generate

able .0

little
c
e support

win enough
enouoh support

to

extend his term

time

in

Dominican

Despite

history there
appeared
,0 b’ a
10
P

.

P'ng order and of
ma.ntaining

•

.

S'X

^earS

’

1,111

,

thereafter.

that,

.

first

,

to

who was

civil liberties"

Moya Pons

"

writes

[f]or

,

he

government capable
both of

(Moya

Pons. 1995:
350).

Since Dominican
histoty in the
eighteenth centuty
was plagned by
constant
rebellions between
nolitinl ins
n e and
o a
outs, a priority
I0r the
me
> for
;

population and training
a National Cua h
Guard in order to

Il

iw n
is
IS Marines
•

was disarming

the

•

instill

a

more

professional police

orce and a more
stable environment.
Ironically, by
disarming the
population, the

null, ary support,

Vasquez made sure

Rafael Irujillo, be
the head of the
National
loyal Horacista,
that

is.

until

Army
y- And

that his

1 tujillo
Truiillr

most

loyal supporter.

was probably

the

most

he removed Vasquez.
from office.

Brazil (1889-1930)

The Empire of Brazil
was overthrown by

a peaceful military

coup

year follow,
ng general abohtion, which
launched a period of
Republican

monarchy

it

replaced.

54).

The

1890, and 76 percent

was

1,

—

still illiterate in

literacy requirement
not only

participation, but

**

removed

1

I.

is

1

less

extended

86 percent of the population
was

1920 (Andre..,, 1991: 73.
276

n.

large parts of the
population from

concentrated the citizenry
since literacy was highest,
by

southeastern and southern
states.

889- one

much

For example, the
Constitution of 89

" m,ted SUffia8e ‘°
a " ,i,CTate BraZilia
"
•'literate in

,

government

Historian dost) Mnrilo
de Carvalho has argued
that the Kirs, Republic,
was
inclusive than the

in

far. in the

estimated that 50 percent of
the electorate lived in

80

S

" P"'°' R ”

"

«“* *

Sul. Noi

p

„

Slin, |y Sl0

—
or buro-Brazihans

T

,

(Andrew, 1991: 73
).

B " ! “”

”>» '«

and
„ produced a
constitution within
'

edro

11

less than
than

»

two years of the coup
which removed
Dorn

(Burns, 1980- 291)
R,„ at the
) But
same time,

"Us ol llw

it

is

doubtful that too

Firsi

much

Republic. Carvalho
linds ihal

close to those of
the Untted
so-,*
Iniw States,
vot.ng under the
Firs, Republic
decreased
1

total

population voted prior

to the creation

of the

percent voted afterwards
(Carvalho, ,987:

knew

People

serious.

.ha, the formal [the
institutions

Firs, Republic,
while only

IW ,

He

the Republic

'987: 160). Rather,
abstention was due to
a lack of firth

political

system

farcical nature

in

soldiers

who

V\

,

he

t]

w as

no, for real" (Carvalho,

in political
institutions,

an

of institutional power,
the efficacy of
clienteles, and a

which participation

n. the

explains this saying

in official politics

ar with Paraguay,

had fought returned no,

many

was an

entirely alien affair.

uprooted poor and
Afro-Brazilian

to their old plantations,
but to the

growing urban

areas along the coast,
most prominently Rio de
Janeiro, and later Sao
Paulo. Without

81

1

of the republican
government] was no,

No, having a means
of participation,

awareness of the

between

°“ h

”

TlK mromial and
Peripheral staiusoflhsse
migrants made

“*«*.** M » h „
„•

e Integration of
former slaves, the
government

eCOn0miC PO
-

'

itiCa

'

andSOCiaiint

made no

effort to facilitate
the

--"--'-

Authority remained
linked to wealth
and status. While
the powerful in
the

"

^

S ' a,eS

remai, ’ ed

“*

—

d among the older
families

Two

observations by Engiish
traveler James
Btyce
oce speak of the
th extent
,
to which politics
had

—~

- *-*thal

thefe

279, 307,.

"" "° ° rganiZed "

J h,s attests to

alional

P olili -'

on an

both the continued
persona, and unchecked
authority of the

development of organized,
nationa,

institutional level.

Although
significant

it

began

in the 1830s.

between 1889 and

1

European immigration

930. Between ,830 and
1930

immigrants, mostly from
southern Europe, settled
arriving in Brazil
between

1550and

,

850

southeast and the south,
where the coffee

was beginning

, nd

parties in Brazil and
...state issues

Planter, vis-b-vis his
subjects, and to the
stunted
politics

«„„

.

to Brazil

some

in Brazil, the

was most

3.5 million

sa- -umber as Africans

Immigration was mostly directed
towards the

economy was

grow. Demonstrative of
this

is

still

booming, and where Indus,
ty

the vety high percentage
of Euro-

l0 "
1

PerCen ‘ aSe ° f Afr °Brazili

A

890
13

°' ' hat ln the
res t

Otv

politics

°f Brazil (Marx

i
1

»ns in the south
and

.....
998 66)
’98.
66). Additionally,

Sao Paulo

l„

.

Marx

points to the

,

percent of the
Brazilian population.

However by 950,
1

race

in

was included on

the census

39

,h,
C>

,

’

B
Brazil (Marx,

the next time
tha,

aCC0Unted t0r 62
percent of

population of

1998: 163).

While Brazil was
being whitened by
the southern
11 Lmopean
K,,.
immigrants, Afro•

Jazi lan citizens

—
Andrews

found that freedom
from slaverv
er> Was not
necessarily

8 at.on into the country

«r,y

s

economy and

in the southeast

writes, “Blacks

were permitted

pectfied area of the
park or plaza. In a
3

Pan

^ PUWiC

Afro-Brazilians had the

makes law”' (Andrews,
,991:

^

rioW
8
‘

,38).

miS,rati0n tha ‘ Afr°BraZi,ia

was slow and marred
by

strono
‘

1

to hold
„
hold... gatherings
as long as they
kept to a
.

™

924 ease

SqUafe

Wal
w

freedom.

where employers
preferred immigrant
labor

I

Cmer

society

real

in

which several blacks
attempted

any part of the

whites, the

scl ua

^ but

In so short a response
the

-

free ones,

raany years. Legal
status was subordinated
by social

mayor admitted

in practice

mayor was

to

that

‘custom

able to explain

had been experiencing
for

status,

and Afro-Brazilians
were no,

soctally equal to
Euro-Brazilians, and so they
could enjoy only an
abridged fonn of
citizenship.

Another

Mef rndden,

„

“P “““ « **'*'- «•*-*.
M
39

ri

^
^
M

, in

„„„

Mr ««,

Rare "as no, included
on the censuses of 1900
and 1920, probably because
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the

government did not want

perception that they
were

Afro - BrazT

mentioned

»

”

t

.

Wh

•

'

tened ’” SUStained
the low status
of given

general. After
the death of
Machado

that

Machado
actiado, hke
like v
Venssimo, was

to

de Assis, one of
Brazil's besl

•

Nabuco was highly cri
.

6

t

icai

of this

'

a mulatto.

“N abUC
a buco
°-

..

[mulat(ol
to], msistm
g that

Machado would

The

—ded

great

,

ahniv

GreekV

not have been
pleased by

<hink that nothing

krTTW*

'

ha ' CaUSed

it.

‘Your

me chills;

article,’

he

‘Mulatto

m uiatt0 and

would have h u,rt hi
’more'""
Lg } 011 10 0mit
remark when you
this
convert your article into
eiin
anent form... For
P
Machado was white and Lr
me
' h °U ht 50
S
Costa. 985: 241)
(in Viotti da
I

T

he suppression
of ,he word

wrote to Verissimo.

he was indeed a

•

1

,

1

excellent individuals
from the 'rabble’ of
Afro-Brazilians. This sort
of individual
negotiation of racial
identity, rather than
group contestation had
been very present

throughout Brazilian
society an H

it

me even more

prevalent as Brazil
continued to

modernize and urbanize,
even though economic
mobility of Afro-Brazilians.
as a
collectivity,

remain very limited.

Pomica, power shifted
within the coffee aristocracy
between Mtnas Gera.s and
Sao Paulo during most
of the First Republic.
But the alliance that kept
the presidency

within one of the two
states
the

Minero

aristocrats

Vargas came

to

know

to

power

fell

apart as Sao Paulo

grew hegemonic. With

and a military
} supported coup,
the southern

the support of

politician Getul 10

in 1930.

the result, and there

was no census conducted

in

84

1910 and 1930 (Marx, 1998:

168).

-

-

Conclusion

During the
approximate,, four
and a ha, f centuries
of his, or
chapter, political
institutions slowly
evolved and

ord

d,j,r

.

“

1

he persona
zation nf

““> « «p.nic

“ - •«-

~
;;; e relation of
citizens

^

^

fi

ernes.

""

„

poljitcal

*— — — —
to

one or more countries

in$iSted ,h3t

**

'»

to

^

which they aspired

to

be like or

countries, race
played a vety

different times in
both countries.
African heritage united
the

two

American countries
especially in relation
to the fberian
colonizers, however,
independence and nation-state
construction w ere the
projects of creole elites
who did no, use African
heritage as a

untfymg

potnt.

In fact, the elites
did jus, the opposite,

denying African influences
and

attempting to create
European nations. Additionally,
race relations, like

-ere characterized by
a combination of
unequal power and

all

relations.

status with paternal
concern

and control. In both
countries, having African
descent lessened one’s
legitimacy,
literally, as a citizen,

and ye, that did no,
prevent individual mulattos
and dark-skinned

Dominicans and Brazilians
from occupying

the

most prominent
positions

in politics

and

literature.

considered
..

was more

^

static,

countries.

white

both countries was
quite

in

such as when
modernization began

fluid,

although

at

times

in the late
nineteenth centuries in

Afro-Oominicans and
^-Brazilians who were success*,,
cou,d often

be accepted as white,’
with few people
offering protest.
What

miscegenation allowed

many

to enter the socially
privileged

this suggests is that

while

space of light-skinned

peoples, the social
significance given to
dark-skinned peoples was
generally no, positive.

miscegenation did no,

institute equality,
especially since the
sexual relations that

were involved were
often between people
of veiy different levels
of status. Additionally,
abolition occurred
without a fair integration
of the
Finally, in both
countries,

i,

seems

were more stringent,
diminishing mobility
groups.

The Spanish

newly

that there

for

freed people.

were periods when

racial barriers

Afro-Dominicans ana Atro-Brazilians,
as

rule (1861-5), the rise
of the sugar industty
(,870-19,4) and the

US

occupation (19,6-24) opened
up Dominican conceptions
of race to European and

American versions,

w hich

resulted in

more

clear forms

of racial prejudice. Similarly,
the

increased presence of the
southeastern coffee production
familiar with

European

literature

conventions on race, very
race.

This

is

that the type

much

made

on Liberalism, as well as European

affected the

means by which

no, to say that racial
prejudice in either country

of prejudice

that

the Brazilians

at the

'scientific’

Brazilians began to view

was

essentially foreign, only

emerged was increasingly influenced
by

European and Americans, particularly

more

the

scheme of

highest levels of societv. Racial identity

remained weak, however, and differences
along color continued
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to

be dominant.

CHAPTER 3
I

Th

'

S

RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN
HE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(1930-1999)
AND BRAZIL (1930-1999)

ChaPt6r Wi " C ° ntinUe t0
examine citizenship, race and
the political systems

or. he Dominican
Republic and Brazil, recusing
on the

las,

seven decades of the twentieth

century, .n this period
eertain social and political
developments are especially
important,
hirst, the nation-state

even

if

emerged

in

both countries as a legitimate
and powerful institution,

dominated by an individual,
the

militaty. or an elite class.

The

nation-state

effected the entry of the
masses into politics without
compromising the order and

hierarchy considered so
critical by

elites.

Curiously enough, the most
significant

extensions of mass politics
occurred during authoritarian
and corporate regimes.

Second, the nation became an
integrative tool imposing an
ideology which

assumed

integration, particularly

unified and

homogeneous

identification.

of people of different

Racial identification tended to
be minimal, although discrimination
along

looted individuals, rather than
racial categories,

in

terms of shad.., which therefore

which involved

such a system mobility and ambiguity
of identity was a salient
degree

to

The assumption of a

nation denied the possibility of
racism or. for that matter, racial

color lines did not disappear.
Color was perceived
el

colors.

collectivities.

factor.

which individual mobility existed may be
questioned, and

collective perception

of negritud/e remained reasonably

urbanization, and modernization occurred

at

static.
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However,

the

certainly the

Finally, as development,

unprecedented levels, the

differences between the extremes of the
socio-political

Within

traditional

spectrum— Euro and

Afro, rich

and poor, even

men and women

have only had limited
success
inequalities

in

were not mediated, and
new democratic
doing

so.

institutions

Persis.cn, social, econonric
and political

have been significant
constraints during the
most recent periods of

democratization and liberalization
in both countries.

Dominican Republic (1930-1961)

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo,
a mulatto of Spanish.
Creole and f'rtian descent,
rose

qu.ckly through the National
Guard formed by the

Army.

In

1

US

Marines

to

head the National

930, through a coup cTe'a,, he
became president of the Dominican
Republic.

While the United States was

hesitant about supporting a

man who

had come

to

through a coup, Trujillo
immediately legitimized his rule
by having an election
he

won some 99

percent of the votes cast'
(Hartlyn. 1998: 91). Satisfied,
but

ambivalent, the United States
three decades.

Even

critics

left

Trujillo in power, a position
he

US

in

which

still

would enjoy

for over

of his regime within the Roosevelt
administration were

prevented from overtly opposing
Trujillo because of the

ended

power

intervention in Latin

Good Neighbor

Policy which

America (Roorda. 1998).

During Trujillo’s thirty-one year

reign, the country

went through tremendous

transformations as the processes of
urbanization, centralization, modernization
and
industrialization accelerated.

the

US

military

disarming

i

Due

in large part to the

development which occurred during

occupation— the development of roads,

ol the

population—Trujillo was able

There was a 45 percent abstention

rate,

to build

however (Hartlyn
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,

the mail service, a tax system, the

an efficient and powerful

1998: 40).

authoritarian state.

Between 1938 and >960
“the nutnher of
manufacturing

establishments almost
doubled; cap,, a, investnten,
multiplied by 9

,i

m es;

the nuntber

of

workers and employees
grew by 2.5 times..., he
national raw product
used by the
manufacturing sector also
multiplied 14 times...
industrial sales also
multiplied

*an

12 times from SI3.3

could point no, only

mi„ 10n

to

^^ ^

S.64.4 milIion „ (Moya

to the increase in

investment and the

(which also enriched his
family) but also

many pubhc works

to the Trujillo-Hul,
pact

over customs receivership
to the Dominican
government. Trujillo

economic sovereignty
country

s

ol the

Dominican Republic, and

in

more

projects

which returned

won back

1947 he was able

control

the

to

pay off the

debt to the United States.

But while Trujillo was
concerned with constructing a
powerful Dominican
his

primary

interest

w as

Ot the small countiy.

his

own enrichment and

monopolization of the wealth and
power

For example, Trujillo raised

tariffs

particularly in the sugar industry,
in order to pressure

him.

Moya Pons

of salt, meat,
even

this,

rice,

repons

that,

state,

on many foreign

them

capitalists,

into selling their plantations
to

within a shon period, Trujillo
monopolized the production

and milk (Moya Pons, 1995:
359). And Trujillo’s reach went beyond

entering into cashing checks and
prostitution, and including a
10 percent

deduction trom wages of all workers

who were members of the onl,

r „litical party, his

Dominican Party (Partido Dominicano)
(Moya Pons, 1995: 360; Betances. 1995:
Wiarda. 1975).

By

1934. Trujillo

was

the richest

the time ot Ins assassination in
1961 he

man

was among

Pons, 1995: 360, 365).
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in the

99;

Dominican Republic and by

the richest

men

in the

world (Moya

This was quite an
accomplishment for the mulatto,

by Dominican aristocracy,
and no, admitted

bom

ou, of wedloek,
rejected

to their social clubs

(Wucker,

,

999: 45).

A

former plantation guard,
telegraph operator, stable
boy and pimp, he had been
humiliated
by the upper class on
many occasions (Diederich,
1

990).

.o Trujillo's attempt
to crush the white
social clubs,

er his fact before
appearing in public.
‘ hat

White P ° Wder C ° U,d make
him

considered him an outsider,
or tha,
people, and the US.

prompted

his

I,

is

It

is

likely tha, this rejection
led

and also to

his use

of white powder

not unimportant that
Trujillo believed

legitimate

i,

I, is

among

made him seem more

the social circles which

legitimate to the

also likely that the rejection
by the

Dominican

Euro-Dominican

extreme narcissism and egomania
which was evidenced by

elites

his love

of

2

lilies

,

the obscene

number of monuments honoring him 3
and changing
,

Samo Domingo

to

Ciudad

son Ramfis a colonel

at the

Trujillo (Trujillo City) in

1

the

name of

936. Trujillo even proclaimed his

age of four and brigadier general

at nine,

and

his daughter

Angela queen.
Trujillo built a regime that

practices.

totalitarian

went beyond personal enrichment and
authoritarian

The Trujillo regime was the regime

regime

in Latin

that

most closely approximated a

American history (Wiarda and Kryzanek. 1982:

37).

More

s

than any dictator before him, and
since. Trujillo extended his control
into the most
intimate aspects ol his subjects' lives
through a vicious intelligence service (SIM), high
levels of surveillance,

and through control over education and

intellectual production

When
a lad
e

?ooi
77oi
1

he was president in the 1950s he was
addressed thusly: His Excellency, the Generalissimo. Doctor
Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Honorable President of
the Republic, Benefactor of the Nation. Restorer
anC,al Inde P encl ence of the Country and
^'"
Commander-in-Chief of the

Armed Forces

94).

There were 1,870 monuments which honored
Trujillo
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in

(Hartlyn,
J

Santo Domingo alone (Cambeira. 1997:

12).

(Hartlyn,

IW8:

UVed 0U ' Side

S6>.

There were really no
independent

,He diCtat ° r

-

'

S

Columbia University was
kidnapped, brought back

mch... was lowered
into a va, of boiling
water”

(O.edench, 1990:

dissertation on

to

later to

“The Era of Trgjillo”

Santo Domingo, and [i]nch by
be fed to a poo, of sharks

Eduardo Galeano writes of
Trujillo’s reign of terror “
[w ]hen a

9).

Piece of land interests hint
[Trujillo, he doesn’t
buy

it;

he occupies

it.

When

appeals to him. he doesn’t
seduce her: he jus. points”
(Galeano. 1992: I06 a
).
Trujillo’s

who were

regime became even more
repressive. He
involved

in anti-Trujillo
activity, and. in

1

killed three

of

Mirabal murders and the

fall

of Batista

in

Cuba

-

By

Mirabal

1959.
5

sisters

,

failed,

and

after the

1959, international pressure
began to

Trujillo's stronghold.

Modernization allowed the
Dominican
areas of the country, most
important of which
1

in

-

woman

a

960. he attempted to have

Venezuelan presrdent Romulo
Betancourt assassinated. The
attempt

weaken

^

safe from his wrath.
In l95 , a former

government employee. Jeshs
Galindez, working on
a
a«

^^

930s, ’’Haiti had

become

the

state to reach into

was probably

main source of cane

cane growers” (Martinez. 1996:

2).

The

large

even the most remote

the border with Haiti.

cutters for the

By

the

Dominican Republic’s

numbers of foreigners involved

in the labor

force of the sugar mills as well
as the use of Haitian gourdes 6
in the Cibao and the

western parts of the Dominican
Republic troubled Trujillo, and
of

in

1933 he began a period

Dommicanization of the Dominican Republic.
That year he passed a law which
0

n

SfcSr

0m

AdTioialR Tmiii Vr'

Virginity to the Dictator.
U

a

Saw °"

that

U ng

,he S,reet and they

would

later

•

expecting

men Seeking

l
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brought before him.

fav0rs ,0 0tTer ,lKir

;
For more on this,
see (Deiderich, 1990).
" Ve
recently dealin with the Mirabal
8

ber ° fWOri “

A|va Tz |995)

h"

sisters

iter’s

(Aquino Garcia, 1996;

deciared .hat 70 percent
of laborers in cane fields
had to be Dominican
(Martinez,
44).

When

he received strong
pressure from

US

in the

Dominican Republic
In

1

at that

is

tt

996:

multinational corporations.
Trujillo

allowed those mills to
continue to use Haitian labor.
In
eported (Wucker, 1999:
104). but

1

estimated that

1

934. Trujillo had 8,000
Haitians

some 52.000 Haitians were

living

time (Maingot, 1992:
233).

936, the Dominican foreign
minister suggested that Trujillo
be nominated for

a Nobel Peace Prize,
because of his work with Haiti,
a suggestion that see.ns
especially

misguided considering the events
of the following year.
border towns, Trujillo

He

later

w as

In 1937. after a visit to
the

reportedly shocked by the
presence and influence of Haitians.

ordered his soldiers to brutally
eliminate the Haitians along the
border, although

anti-Haitian violence took place
to a lesser extent in the sugar
plantations in the east and
south.

Between 5,000 and 35,000 Haitians
were

ktlled by beatings, since

gun shot wounds would have made

work of the army (Wucker,
was

1

999: 48

that illegal Haitian squatters

the event, minister

killed during this massacre,

7
).

were

The

killed

official

it

most were

too obvious that

it

was

the

government account of the incident

by local Dominican peasants. In
justifying

Andre Pastoriza explained

‘“illegal Haitian penetration seriously

obstructed the Dominican government’s
aim to improve the low Dominican standard of
lit

ln g; to

defend the clean traditional customs of our
citizens;

to protect

property on the frontier from Haitian bandits;
and to preserve our

them’”

(in

rzi'.zl

Dominican
superiority over

Roorda, 1998: 136).

Haitian currency. The Dominican currency
at the time was US dollars.
After international pressure forced Trujillo
to recognize the incident. Trujillo agreed to pay the
Haitian
government $750,000, but after some reported bribes, Trujillo
paid only $525,000 (Moya Pons, 1995: 369).
7
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Under considerable
president in

03,

1

^

international pressure,
Trujillo decided no,
to run again for

although he

SUPP ° n

stil,

eontrol.ed the

*

governor He

Jewish P-Ple

attended

who were

tl

to regain

eein g Europe.

By

accepung the Jews,
Trujillo took pressure
off US President
Roosevelt whose hands
were
dUe '°

^
I

^

rujtllo offered

then,

q

on

his land

United States vis-d-vis the
war
1

00,000 visas

on

in the

in

Europe

Jewish refugees Peeing
Germany, and offered

to

to settle

northern region of Sosua.
Trujillo's magnanimity
might be

tioned by his limits
on married Jews, since
he clearly was luring the
Jews in order to

whiten the population
(Wucker.
settled in

Sosua (Roorda, 1998:

1

999: 57). In the end, only
about 235 Jewish refugees

146).

Additionally, during this
period Trujillo

encouraged European immigration,
much as Brazil had done

earlier.

He

explained “ It] he

urgent need that the
Dominican Republic has to attract
people of the white race,
particularly farmers

of the Spanish race”

in

order to counterbalance “the
excess of

peoples of Haiti... [who
created] complex and
various problems with their
clandestine
invasion” (in Franco, 1992:
81). In ,937. Trujillo
explained a

which would

facilitate

such a process of “whitening.”

immigrants of the White race

is

He

new

immigration policy

writes “[a] great quantity of

needed. The immigrants shall
be Spanish.

Italian,

and

also of French origin.
Immigrants of Caucasian stock shall
pay a fee of six pesos for the

residency permit and those not
of such origin shall pay 500 pesos”
(in Cambeira, 1997:
185).

The combined attempt
presence

in the island,

to

whiten the population, and

became a fundamental cornerstone
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to

to eliminate the Haitian

Dominican

national

identity

8

And

.

i,

was during

the period of Trujillo’s
dictatorship that a conscious
nationa,

den, iw was formed,
propagandized and disseminated.
-During the epoch of Trujillo.
Dominican historiographers
felt

(Nunez,

1

99 0: ,87’, To do

Manue, Arturo Pena

necessary, for the

this, Trujillo relied

foe.

on a

Batlle and Joaquin
Balaguer.

created the image of
Trujillo as a

firs,

time, to invent an official
pas,”

stable of intellectuals,

His bevy of intellectual
sycophants

wamor/hero who had

finally

who had defended DomtoamUad
(Dominicanness) from

represented, and

The

who was

leading the country into a

Trujillo period

most notably

vanquished the Haitian
the degeneration that Haiti

new epoch.

was one of the most important

for the

development of a

national identity with a
racial/racist component. Since
the late 1880s, black foreign

workers had been used
only by the

1

92 0s and

The growth

Domimcan

in

1

increasing levels by the sugar
plantations. However,

9 30s that the most predominant
group

among

it

was

these laborers

was

ot the sugar industry' had led
to the creation of a very small
Euro-

or American elite and a caste of
foreign laborers of African descent.
Cane

cutting began to be thought of
as Haitian labor, and the Haitian
laborers occupied the

lowest and most peripheral rung in
Dominican society. The increased presence and
denigration ot the people of this caste
transformed the dark-skinned Dominicans
into

™

X 1 lle SOme to
of anti-Haitianism had been present in Dominican
l
society, it did not become a
significant part of Trujillo's nationalist
ideology until 1937 (Demby and Turks, l^ n 2:
67).
R mon 1 na Brea cleverl y synthesizes the dominant
form of historiography employed bv the intellectuals
!
.,
of
the
rujillo regime. She writes: “[tjhe
constant battles in the mountains, the
.

\

. .

political fragmentation that
d'sseminates the caudilloist power all over the
territory, the multiple foreign occupations and
interventions,
le dif hcuity ot constructing an
institutional power, are symptomatic aspects of
the obstacles that made
difficult the unification ot the society,
and, in turn, the emergence of the Dominican nation
and

constitution of a

the

modem

State" (Brea, 1988: 36). Given such a history,
a heroic male figure was needed to
unify the people and bring peace to the nation.
Conveniently, Trujillo fit that description. For another
analysis of this historiography see (Mateo,
1993; San Miguel, 1997; Moya Pons, 1995: 360).
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a

since only the
Haitians were considered

“negro”

IV «»!«««, „l,h, Trujillo ,o !in
Tnjj'ilo, ,ho

massive

»„*,

j

„

,

n IU,« d b, Tmj„|„,

fc
S

land.

i~i.« *iu.

Pena Battle writes “we
should not

Catholic nation, that
Battle, 1943: ,2).

we

are Dominicans,

^^

They emphasise!

“African" o.lrur, „„

forget that this

is

„„

a Hispanic, Christian.

emerged pure and homogenous"
(Pena

Other work by Pena Batlle
emphasizes the Hispanic purity
of the

Dominican nation (Hispanidad)
and
Trujillo,

„ >Wm Wor!

„„

" » *»»»« •• V.

”"»

chaos

the sanctity of the
border.

He

writes

a

no other Dominican
governor had understood the
phenomenon of the

Dominican-Haitian frontier [and

economic

life

its

importance

of Dominican nationality”
(Pena

vis-a-vis]... the juridical,
political

Batlle, 1943: 10);

and

and “[t]he

pauperization, miseiy and
productive incapacity of four
million angiy beings on the

extreme of the

island., constitute,
necessarily, a

permanent and

tragic threat

of massive

penetration” (in Gratereaux,
,996: 14). These prejudices
are echoed in Lizarazo’s

iluminada which explains that
«[i]„ as much as
predominates, the population of
Haiti

is

in the

Dominican Republic

integrally black...

most primitive form, over America”
(Lizarazo,

The

intellectuals helped Trujillo

1

is,

the white

With the exception of some

select groups... the intense
majority of black Haitians
represent a
their

La

comer of Africa,

in

946: 97).

produce a national myth which emphasized
the

Hispanic and Catholic aspects of
the Dominican people, contrasted
with pagan and
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African

Ham

Andres

.

L.

Mateo writes

that the ideology

of Trujillo

is

best explained

through “Messianism,
Hispanisn, Catholicism.
Anti-Communism, _.d Ami-Haitianism”
(Mateo, 199a: 36). The
Hispanic, Mateo argues,
was a metaphysical creation
which
1

was

used to define the Haitian
as the Other, and to sene
as a unifying symbol

Dominican people (Mateo,
,993:

Bu,

31).

it

is

for the

important to note that the
Anti-Haitianism

inherent in Dominican
nattonal identify, as posed
by the Trujillo regime, was no,
only a
nativist ideology, but
also a racist one.

•'[plrobably the

racism

most important

(Cassa, 1982: 764).

which through

its

Dominican

historian Roberto Cassa writes

theoretical proposition

The Dominican

rejection of Haitians,

w as

nation

which justified nationalism was

was

a predominantly mulatto
nation,

able to establish itself as culturally
European.

H not phenotypicaily so (Perez
Cabral. 1965). The use of an ideology
with
overtones allowed for

all

Dominicans

racist

to be considered Hispanic
in relation to Haitians.

While also allowing Dominicans
to distinguish amongst themselves
based on their

proximity to the abstractions of
“Hispanidad” and “Haitianidad.” Therefore,

argued that there was no racism within
the Dominican, while

at the

it

could be

same time racism was

used to organize Dominican society
through a hierarchical notion of place.
This
understanding continues to be dominant today.
Trujillo s policy of Dominicanization

foreigners and the immigration of white
ones.
frontier lands through construction

was

He

not limited to the slaughter of black

invested heavily in integrating the

and development projects, and by sending Church

missions to the border towns (Balaguer, 1947).
Dominicanization was also something

The Truj Hoist image of Hispanismo was consistent
with
became dominant following the Spanish Civil War

the conservative form of Hispanismo which
(1936-1939). Fred Pike notes that prior to this date
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•ha.

occurred in .he res. of
the country as Trujillo
constructed and institutionalized
a

nation-state".

Dominican
Through
affairs

As Betances

state

and

writes ‘‘[,]he Trujillo
dictatorship consolidated
the

initiated national control

a national identity,
Trujillo

of a nation and

political apparatus,

to

weaken

over the economy’’
(Betances. 1995:

6).

to include the entire
population in the

traditional regional isolation.

Through a repressive

however. Trujillo made
sure that the inclusion of
the populace did no,

mean an extension of civil and
most trusted

was
as ab
able

modem

political

political rights. Citizenship

and business

allies.

particularly the poor,
dark-skinned,

Civil

and

was

available only for his

political rights for all others,

and Haitians, did not

exist.

Despite the Haitian massacre
and the overt anti-Haitianism,
the Dominican sugar
plantations

gam

(CEA) depended upon

Trujillo

labor tor the

Haitian labor. Recognizing the
possibility for mutual

and Papa Doc entered into an
agreement

CEA. The Dominican government was

in

1952 which

„ 0vided guaranteed

financially dependent

upon sugar

production, which required the low
wages and lack of labor organization that
Haitian

migrants

made

identity in the

ethnic/caste

possible. Simultaneously, the
construction

Dominican Republic depended on

of a ‘'Hispanic” national

the Haitians serving as an Other,
a

which represented the inverse of what

the

Dominican was.

Hispamsmo, had both

liberal (secular) and conservative
(Catholic) variants, which both posed the
importance of Spanish culture and the authoritarian
and hierarchical ordering of society (Pike. 1971

Trujillo, obviously, did not conjure a
nation-state out

of nothing. He

development of the Heureuax and Caceres administrations,
and the
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US

relied

upon much of the

Marine government.

).

Brazil (1930-1964)

As remarked
more exclusive than

in the las, chapter,
the Firs,

the monarchy.

Getuho V argas through

Mass

politics,

The new

Republic

in Braz,

H

,

S 80-1930)

was even

era of mass politics began
with the rise of

a popularly supported

coup (Bums, 1980; Carvalho.
1995:

65).

however, should not be
confused with mass participation,
and individual

integration into a democratic
political system. Although
Vargas did no, use a pluralist

system to integrate individuals,
he did extend the reach of the
State through the
construction of a corpora, is,
state apparatus.
large portions

size

of Brazil,

of the population was similar
its

diversity and

its

The recognition of the need

to enfranchise

to that of the Trujillo regime;

however, the

relative institutional

development made

totalitarian rule

impossible.

In contrast to the federal

central government,

He saw

executive.

system of the

First

Republic which produced a weak

Vargas empowered the national
government, particularly the

a strong and efficient central state
as the only

way

to achieve national

unity and development (Reis,
1983: 13). During the various
governments he led (1930-

,945 195 °- 4 >- he increased the role of
the
’

state in the national

economy, created a

large

bureaucracy, and invested heavily in national
industry. Economic policy was
protectionist and populist, limiting foreign
imports, aiding national producers, investing
in

construction and infrastructure projects, and
raising wages (Page. 1995: 133).

A

Ministry of Labor was created and a series of
pro-labor laws were enacted. Through a
corportatist

same time

framework, Vargas used the State

to

channel worker demands while

de-politicizing the growing (especially urban) worker
population.
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at the

He was

able

>0

use a corporate state
and his personal charisma

i,
in

order to engender a
paternalist

which was especially
popular among the poor.
Page writes
substitute the

government as the authority
figure

that

“it

w ould

was easy

for

Vargas

state.

to

take care of the needs
of

employees, just as the
landlord or employer
had done in the countryside”
(Page. 1995203).

Vargas also expanded the
voter base significantly
by extending suffrage
eighteen year olds and
working
ballot.

women who were

However, he was not a democrat,
and

and provided

literate,

1937 he dissolved

in

all

for a secret

political

associations establishing,
with the help of the military,
the proto-fascis, Estado

(New

State).

In radio

to

Novo

addresses justifying the coup,
Vargas emphasized his cotporatis,

understanding of democracy
saying that political parties
were licentious, and democracy

must be based on collective
rather than individual
crisis,

such as the one through which

we

are

rights.

He

explained “in periods of

the

democracy of parties...

now passing,

subverts the hierarchy, menaces
the fatherland, and puts

in

danger the existence of the

nation by exaggerating
competition and igniting the fires of civil
discourse” (in

1980: 407).

He

later asserted that the

Bums.

“decadence of liberal and individualistic
democracy

represents an incontrovertible fact...
Individuals do not have rights; they
have duties.

Rights belong to the collective!”

(in

Bums. 1980:

410). Vargas's discourse met with

little

resistance.

Despite his authoritarianism, Vargas'
government was the
institutionalize the nation as a collective

and the

state as

° f the natl °n-state meant mass
enfranchisement, even
especially democratic procedures.

The

first

government

an institution. The construction

if this

was not achieved through

Brazilian historian Jose Murilo de Carvalho
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to

" ri.es

“there was, a, least,

.ha, sonte

some process of font, a, ion
of a

movements of authentic

Brazilian identity, to the
extent

politic, participation
sprouted- (Carvalho, ,995:
66).

Similarly, Elissa Pereira
Reis writes “[a]s a
constructed reality the nation
provides for the

ideological reconciliation
between bureaucratic
domination and soc,, solidarity...
„
niy within the
authoritarian
that a national

level.

ideology

Vargas created

gamed

modernization experiment under
Vargas ( 1930 - 45 )

relevance in politics" (Reis,
1983:

political parties,

which were used

propaganda, bu, which nevertheless
continued

Vargas also dabbled with a
nationalist
tonalization of Labor

,

to

participated.

the

1
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1

produce presidents

community went

Law of

who had had

in the southeast.

deeper than

this.

spiritist

italics in original).

oi "racial

Gilberto Freyre (1934)

decades. Unlike

single

who

many of his

He

But Vargas's support from

He encouraged

umbcmda,

in

Afro-Brazilian

which he reportedly

civil service"

also advocated the idea ofracial

He

signed

(Marx.

democracy" which

most important national ideology.

democracy”

is

associated with Brazilian sociologist

challenged the scientific racism of the previous
three to four
contemporaries, he argued that the socio-economic position

The Law of Nationalization

that at least two-thirds

Among

a difficult time

In 1934, he supported the first
national Afro-Brazilian Congress.

The concept

^

far

samba, candomble, and the

would become Brazil’s

1

afier his death.

rhetoric, including the 1931

Arinas anti-discrimination law, and
partially opened the

1998: 170-1,

more concrete

which ended the century of European
immigration.

competing against the foreigners,
especially

culture, "such as

a

as vehicles for his popuiist

the principal beneficiaries
of this law were Afro-Brazllians

the Afro-Brazilian

On

3).

of Labor was part of Vargas’s nativist/nationalist
nolicies. The law required
of employees of any businesses, particularly industry, be
native bom Brazilians

(Andrews, 1991: 147). This

is

similar to the legislation passed by Trujillo

100

in

1934.

0f Afr °' Bra2llianS
WaS

nW

^

***- problems, bu

10

effects of slavery and
the patriarchal system
that

.™e Brazilian was

it

,

due

had engendered”

t0 the disturWno

He argued

that the

a mixture of the
Portuguese, Afrtean and
indigenous raees (aithough

(The Masters and The
Slaves), Freyre argues

that

due

to the cultural

disunion of the

Portuguese, the climatic
conditions of Brazil, widespread
miscegenation and the cultural
influence of the Africans,
violence between whites
and blacks was rare
(Freyre. 1946:

mu). Freyre equated
Brazilianization with
ixiv),

and

and suggested

which

were peacefully integrated

work of Freyre, was propagated

cultural hybridization
(Freyre. 1946:

of hybridization made

fluid, contributing
to a situation in

.ha, all races

the

that the depth

and

racial

identities within Brazil
piastic

racial tensions

were very

rare.

The notion

into a racial paradise, a
naive simplification of

as the fundamental

mylh of Brazilian

nationality.

Afro-Brazilians identified themselves
no. as negro, Afro-Brazilian
or mulatto, bu, as
Brazil, an.

14

Samba was

considered to be Brazilian, not
Afro-Brazil;.....

Vargas also seemed
Paulo based

Freme Negro

to be very sympathetic
to Afro-Brazilian politics.

The Sao

Brasileira (Black Brazilian Front),
the larges, of several Afro-

Brazthan organizations, mostly
located
other political organizations,

it

in the southeast,

was closed down

supported Vargas,

in 1937.

Freme Negro and Vargas deserves
some mention.

In

The

until, like all

relationship between the

one case, despite laws preventing

discrimination in the civil service, the
Civil Guard of Sao Paulo had an
informal policy of

preventing Afro-Brazilians from
entering.

S

r

^

dily

among

the

law opened up the

legal possibility

aCrep ,ed byal1 elemenls <*«* «*c*ed elite.
One critic insisted
colonist be separated from the “Negro,”
since the latter

rreyre s discussion
Frew's'
dbl7sion?f
thTp
of the
Portuguese

belong

When

tha,

,

“beasts of burden” (Freyre, 1946:

more properly
nronerlv

Ixiii).

of the entrance of
Afro-Brazilians, the
contender of the Guard
h

1

"^ 5 C3n eMer

When

i,

’

W

C3n ° Pen * he d00r

became dear

that the

exceed -Now tha,

P« ™d cripples” (in Andrews,

t0 le

Guard would no,

hire Afro-Brazilians,
the

,991

:

,5

, )

Frente Negra

"appealed directly to
President Var as, who,
g
after receiving a
delegation of the Front
leadership, ordered
the

Guard

to enlist

immediately two hundred
black recruits”

(Andrews, 1991: 151).
Vargas’s Estado Novo
was cu, short

in

1

945 by a militaty coup, which
ushered

a twenty-year period
of restricted democracy,
wherein the militaty
political actor.

In 19o0,

Vargas returned

found an active Congress
which resisted

to

power through

much of his

was an important

direct elections.

legislation.

was
his

work

to define his

elected president in

1

won

the

,

’fifty

years of development in

^, 0

impressive economic growth, built

its

composed

a final

and then committed suicide.
Jusceiino Kubitschek

955 and promised

regime Brazil continued

hospitals,

15

legacy

However, he

With veiy serious

allegations of corruption
against top aids and mounting
pressure. Vargas
literary

in

1

S

During

five.’

,

aborts,

World Cup, invented and exported
Basse Nova and began
,

° f J ° rge

»
attain*

me

°

Amad °

PreSen ' Bra2 lian cal,ure as especially
mulano
aSainS ' ,he pe0ple are newl >’ coordinated
'

folbwte desttav^llV"*

P opie that now
0S

‘"T*

and raised

abandoned. I cannot give you more than
my blood... I offer my life in the holocaust
0 be WI h y ° U alwayS
humiliale
fou will feel my soul suffering at your
side wKe„Tr„"
er beatS
h , 3t] ° Ur d °° r y0U wil1
&er
y
teel in y° ur chests the energy for
the fi°ht for yourselves
and your children. When they humiliate
you, you will feel in my grief the force for
reaction My sacrifice
\v ill maintain you
united, and my name will be your
battle flag... I
fall

W

S

’

,

’

,

,

^

fought against the looting of Brazil

l00t .'" g

of ,he people

I

have foual " bare-breasted. The hatred, infamy,
a°nd calumny did
not beat dow'
y !' nl gave you my life. Now offer my death. Nothing remains.
Serenely take the
first step on the road to
eternity and
leave to enter history” (Bums, 1980:
448)

« rr

’

1

I

I

1
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I

construction on a
Brazil,

new

capital
P

,

Brasilia
rasilia,

nil
all

„ i u cot which
figured into a 'Golden
•

and particularly for Brazilian
national

Age’

for

identity.

Kubitschek's government was
followed by Janio Quadros,
whose belligerent
political style

was countered by an

obstructionist congress. Claiming
the country

ungovernable, he resigned,
hoping that the countty would
beg him
res, gnat, on.

Instead, his vice president,
the popular, and populist.
Joao Goulart.

Goulart

who

s

presidency encountered

many

from 25

obstacles, primarily from the
military

to

government witnessed a

towards the

power

rise in inflation

100 percent, as foreign loans dried
up and the economy slowed (Eakin.
1998:

Increasing pressure applied by
the military and the Right

tardier

the

became

considered Goulart a communist. 16
especially considering some
of Goulart’s radical

policies as Vargas’ Minister
of Labor. Goulart’s

54).

to rescind his

Left.

He attempted

ol the military.

When

to mobilize the

masses

was me, by Goulart’s move
in order to counter-balance

Goulart supported the unionization of
lower ranks

within the military, the military
removed Goulart from office (Siquiera Wiarda.
1990:
1

82).

One

point that should be noted

would remove military

limitations

electorate voted five to

one

was an unambiguous
the military

16

He was

in

in

at the

that in

1

963 when there was a plebiscite which

on the president,

in effect since 1961. the Brazilian

favor of presidential autonomy (Eakin,

1

998: 54). This

sign of support for democratic institutions,
however, one year

coup was met with

China

is

little

resistance.

time of Quadros’ resignation.
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later,

Dominican Republic (1961-1986)

After the 1961 assassination
ofTrujillo. the Dominican
Republic suffered from a

veo

significant

power

void. For a brief period.
Ramfis Trujillo and other

members of the

Truj.llo family attempted
to maintain control
of the country, while also
investigating and

ertng almost

environment

all ol

in the

Trujillo family

the

members

group

that assassinated irujillo.

A

changing

United States and the
Dominican Republic made a
continuation of

government

unlikely, and puppet president
Balaguer

encourage the Trujillo family’s
its

ot the

exit.

Balaguer dissolved the Partido

was able

to

DomMcano.

used

funds to reward friends and
members of the armed services, and
nationalized the vast

lands and industries belonging
to the Trujillo family

Balaguer was exiled, a provisional
government was

(Moya Pons,
set

were won by author and former exile
Juan Boseh. and
(PRD). But some of his proposals
seemed too
conservative, and for elites

States.

whose

Alter only seven months

fears

in

up

his

to

1995: 384). After

observe elections which

Dominican Revolutionary

radical for a military that

Party

remained very

of a second Cuba were shared by the
United

power, the ineffective Bosch government

fell to

a

military coup. Again, provisional
governments were set up, but in 1965 a group of
pro-

Bosch supporters launched

Dominican Republic
which the

US

president,

won

a counter-coup. That year, the United
States invaded the

for the

second time

this century,

and

in

1966

instituted elections in

favored candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, former
Trujillo ideologue and puppet

(Sanchez, 1992: 303).

Balaguer was elected president three consecutive
times, although twice his
opposition abstained from participation. During his
twelve years, the Dominican

104

Repub, ic had pc, idea,
agencies.

The

parties, congressiona,
assemblies,

and a judicial, as

we„

as

news

effectiveness and the
freedont of these organs,
however,

is a point for
debate. Balaguer
promised order and “a path
without danger" and
spouted ideology

consistent with that of
the Trujillo regime.

He

on a mixture of economic

relied

nationalism, large works
projects, centralized
decision making, personalism,
and an
obsession with peace

and order. He

enjoy"

(in

Mateo, 1993: 117,

more independent economic

Armed Forces

w rites "Peace

Under Balaguer

elite,

is

the major

there

was

and Balaguer was also

than Trujillo (Hartlyn,
,998: ,09).

A„

good

that a

People can

a relatively free press,
and a

less intimately

connected to the

this represented
considerable

progress iollowing the
thirty-one year dictatorship
oi Trujillo and the five
years of
instability since his
assassination.

Nevertheless, Balaguer's “path
without danger" translated into
a continuation of
authoritarian policies and
a very significant repression
of all politically active

members of

the Left, particularly
around elections. During the
1966 presidential campaign alone

more than 350
Bosch

s

political activists

campaign was limited

military kept

him under

virtual

were

killed,

to radio

house

while candidate and former
president Juan

messages broadcast from

arrest.

During the twelve years. Balaguer
used

classic carrot-stick incentives
to the political opposition.
political activists

were murdered. At

it

was not

safe for Leftists to

At the same time, Moya Pons notes

amount of Leftists, who were wholly
positions at the growing

Between 1966 and 1974. 3.000

points, despite the regular elections
and the

constitutional appearance, Emilio
Betances notes,
streets (Betances, 1995:
119).

his house, since the

that

walk the

an inordinate

unqualified, occupied academic and administrative

Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Moya
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Pons, 1995:

390-5). This

on large and

was

the softer side of
Balaguer's authoritarian politics,
the side dependent

inefficient state budgets.

Balaguer continued
other Strong-tnen

who

in the tradition

ruled the

of Trujillo, Heureaux, Santana,
Baez, and

Dominican Republic through a
powerful executive and

through public works projects
which employed supporters and
provided lucrative
patronage for associates.
‘'Public officials and high
ranking military officers generously

doled out contracts for public
works

roles

of investor and entrepreneur

industrial

were
as the

in unfair

Dominican economy grew

at

high

rates.

1978, the Dominican Revolutionary
Party

Or

at least, the

coup seemed

coup and led

Balaguer

s

inevitable.

to a settlement in

and

candidate until

US

President

Jimmy

which Guzman was allowed

— PR) gained four

Congress (Espinal, 1998:

That Balaguer was a candidate
to prevent fair

PRD

members

and stopped the vote count (Sanchez. 1992:

Pressure from

party (the Reformist Party

to maintain a majority in

(PRD) candidate Antonio Guzman

voting favored the

of the National Police closed
voting polls

A

competition with traditional commercial
and

financed by massive amounts of
US aid. however, aid gradually decreased

elected president.

309).

to play the

groups" (Moya Pons, 1995: 401-2).
The projects of the Balaguer government

initially

In

the

themselves, enjoyed exemptions
for the tax-

import of all the consumer
goods they desired, and became rich
enough

free

was

among

in the

to

seats that

Carter prevented

be president, while

it

did not win, in order

95).

1978 presidential elections, and

free elections, constituted nothing

new

in the

that

he tried

Dominican Republic,

considering the considerable precedent (1966, 1970. and
1974). However, there was

something new and exciting about the

fact that
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Balaguer was leaving

office,

even

if his

party

maintained a majority

still

eleetions

in

of 978 no, only marked
a

As Ramonina Brea

et al write, “[,]he

.

elections but also an
ascension to

expansion of citizenship

(e.g.

as civil rights were

environment was
as well as

more

instituted,

i,

transition

from semicompetitive

power of the

PRD

which allowed

respect for public liberties,

disarticulation of military
groups

much

Congress.

...)

more

more

did no, take long for

safe

for

competitive

an impulse of

respect for civil rights,

and democratization" (Brea

respected, and a

to

e, al.

1995: 86). But. as

and democratic

Guzman

political

to disappoint the electorate,

segments of his party.

Guzman

attempted to duplicate the
patrimonial politics of Trujillo by
not only

relying on elientelism. a
traditional and legitimate
practice in the

Dominican Republic,

but also by involving his entire
family in the government. In his

first

year in office

Guzman

hired 8,000 people, and the
public payroll swelled from 129,161
in 1978 to

201 ,301

in

1982.

The public

the national budget,

sector had

grown

and Guzman was forced

so large that

it

accounted for 85 percent of

to resorting to printing

money (Moya

Pons.

1995: 406).

Despite the disappointment with the
the

PRD

candidate, Salvador Jorge Blanco,

promised

to

was

deepen Dominican democracy by

However, the debts and
crisis,

Guzman government, and Guzman’s

fiscal indiscipline

which would soon

hit all

elected president in xv82. Blanco

instituting an

“economic democracy.”

of the previous administration and the debt

Latin America, forced belt-tightening. While
publicly

denying any negotiations with the International Monetary'
Fund and continuing
rhetoric ot

suicide,

economic democracy,

the Blanco

government was

negotiating an austerity package with the IMF.
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to spout a

secretly involved in

The severe package accepted by

the

Blanco

govern, resulted

harsh repression.

One

in

mass

strikes, to

three- day uprising
in

tunraround. and led
,o 70 murders

which

th e

,984 challenged the

(Moya Pons,

G6mez was

supporting his

govemiWs

,995: 4,5). During
ihese strikes

remamed undear whether
Santo Domingo Mayor
and PRD
Francisco Peha

^

govern, responded with

i,

Secretaty-Genera, fosd

own government,

criticizing his

government’s

actions, or fomenting
popular unrest.
In the

midst of increasing
political instability and
economic

elected in 1986, this
time over

PRD

that he

and

1

said, a safe

was no democrat, he offered

economy grew during
974 (Hartlyn,

•hat the re-election

1

stability,

and predictable path.
While

1

09).

his election

was

growth between ,968

There was a considerable
amount of evidence

of Balaguer was no, a good
sign

Dominican Republic, since

i,

and people remembered
how the

his administrations,
averaging 7.6 percent

998:

was

candidate Jacobo Majluta,
by a margin of 40.000

v°te, Balaguer
represented, as he had

•™e

crisis. Bala. aier

in the

meant a return

to suggest

democratization of the

to a centralized,
personalized

executive, and impotent
institutions. Dominican
sociologist Rosario Espinal
explains

with Trujillo, the
as always

Law

was subordinated

corrupt as the

seemed

as

under Balaguer did no, really
acquire any important position,
and
to personal dictates,

rmation of the new political
identities

As

‘

in

and

would have

Dominican

PRD presidents were, government

to be reasonably

it

..-imited effect

the

society'" (Espinal, 1987:
107).

institutions, particularly Congress,

empowered. Guzman and Blanco were

also able to

weaken

presence of Truji Hoist officers within
the armed forces, and the
election of the two
politicians legitimated a transition
to an electoral system.
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or,

the

PRD

The overwhelming
presence of Balaguer.
one of Trujillo's
ideologues, for

more than

anti-Haitian and racist

a decade during the
twenty five years discussed
in this section

had considerable effects
on the concretization of
negative

attitudes towards
Haitians and

Afro-Dominicans, although the
agreement between the Haitian
government and the
continued, even through

PRD

CEA

governments. History books and
educational materia,

continued to be dominated
by terrifying portraits of
the Haitian occupation
and the
\

anous Haitian invasions

Durmg

in the

nineteenth century.

the Balaguer regime,

particularly those of
Franklin Franco

anti-Haitian roots of

new

historical perspectives

and Roberto Cassa,

benan

to

emerge,

who emphasized

Dominican national ideology.
During the 1970s,

the racist and

a small group of

“conscientized” Dominicans
created a folkloric organization
which celebrated native and

African roots of Dominican
culture. These intellectuals
were able to capitalize on a

m

merengue, which had begun following
the death of Trujillo,

in

which merengueros

accentuated more -African'’ roots.
Merengue. the national dance and
so
national ideology,

more

became

increasingly "Africanized” as

clearly, the popular realm.
Trujillo

ironically, since he destroyed

many of the

promoted merengue since he was

was
all

in the

Euro-Dominican

much of this,

social clubs.

He

also

more rhythm-driven merengue which

1960s and 1970s.

is

in Africa’” (Austerlitz, 1997:

This sentiment was not universally
well received, and one composer called

unpatriotic.”

of

the parlor and, entered

actually responsible for

Fradique Lizardo argued that ‘“merengue’s
origin
o).

left

vital a par,

a notoriously suave dancer,
although he preferred a

refined type of merengue, as
opposed to the

emerged

i,

shift

it

"Afro-Dominican music found advocates also among
members of the
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meVa CanC, °n (ne 'V SOng)

movement

originated in Chile in
the

>

throughout Latin America,
using local music

in

1

960s and spread

the struggle agatns,
rightist authoritarian

regimes, economic
inequity, and U.S.
imperialism.” (Austerlitz,
.997: 109). Also as
the

number of Dominicans

living in

more Afro-Caribbean sound
There was a small

York

increased.

(Austerlitz, 1997;

Dominican merengue adopted

a

no).

Black Soul” movement
during the 1970s, following

international cultural
trends

However, the

New

and production

political effects

and the

in other areas

visibility

of the African diaspora.

of these people were

limited.

Simultaneously, there was the
rise in the number
prominent Afro-Dominican
politicians.

Most prominent among these

Jose Francisco Pena

is

Gomez, who was

Genera, of the PRD. the
most power*,, political party.
However,

Pena

Gomez

it

the Secretary

should be noted that

continually employed a
class-based analysis, avoided
discussions of race,

and did not identify positively
as an Afro-Dominican.

Brazil (1964-1985)

The

military coup that

government

that

would

rule in the Brazil's

oi Trujillo,

and

1

it

was

removed President Goulart

last for

modem

slightly

970s, particularly between

1964 led

to military

twenty-one years, the longest period of
direct authoritarian

histoty.

more

in

While the regime was

in

no way as

totalitarian as that

authoritarian than the Balaguer
governments in the 1960s
1

968 and

1960s and 1970s, the military government

1

974. Like Balaguer's governments

in Brazil left a strong imprint

in the

on Brazilian

«
political culture,

however, the military
gov
government
eminent was f
a more
far
institutionalized than
was the government of
Balaguer.
Despite the military’s
criticism of Vargas,

whtch were seen as
means of incorporating
a« .he

same time

limit,

ng mobilization”

i,

adopted similar corportatist
poiitics

different sections

in this regard,

it

military 's attempt,
through institutional
means, to justify
scientist Bolivar

•

•

'

is

of Brazilian society,
while

interesting to note the

its rule.

Braziiian politica,

Lamounier explains:

[tjaking the period
1964-1

9R4

j-

qc n

.

ertain

dear (and

after

,

974

i
virtS^^^^^
game and

Dlections were regular,
although congress

was

were increasingly recognized.
The military
Institutional Acts, as a

to

avoid

fairly impotent,

also,

and opposition victories

oddly enough, passed a series
of

means of legitimizing what would
otherwise be

arbitrary

authoritarian politics.

The

first

two

Institutional Acts, passed in

1964 and 1965 respectively, gave
the

prestdent the right to declare
a state of siege, to intervene
into states, to dissolve
political
parttes,

and

to

remove

security for a period

that the military

the political rights of persons
considered to be threats to national

often years (Bums,

1

980: 508-5

1

5).

What

is

striking about this

used an institutional act to deprive
citizens of their

is

rights, but constrained

e
WaS Ve0,
Ch
UenCed a " d KaS indeed advised
Harvard professor of
government, Samuel P. Huntington,
H
,
,f Political Order in Changing
whose 1968
Societies warned of the
anger ol too much mob, I, ration

gov?™enf^37

l

r

'

'

*

without institutional means to peacefully
channel

i,

(Hunting!

1968)

ns

own

authority by limiting
these extraordtnaty
powers to o„,y ten years.
Cear.y the

military'

government feh

.ha,

its

government had

to be legitimized,
although

depended mos, heavily on
the success of the
economy which placated

elites

its

legitimacy

and

discouraged mobilization
against the regime.

The period of ,968
history

to

,974 was the mos. repressive
period of modem Brazilian

18
.

Beginning with the

Institutional

Ac,

5, essentially institutionalizing

mass

censorship, this mos,
violent period of military
rule attempted to
eliminate the very small

subversive revolt,, ionan'
groups, labeled “communists.”
During this period of repression
•he military

1

government benefited from
remarkable growth

973, the Brazilian

economy grew

a, rates

close to

to

1

"Miracle.” was halted by the
increases
industrialization

I

1

in

plant.

sets, a

The

military

to

be

1973 and 1977, since Brazil's

foreign petroleum. Nevertheless,
the military

economy continued

he military also extended the
reach of the nation-state through

power

seemed

fell

998: 227). This growth, called
the

of oil

to contain a passive
population as long as the

buy television

Trans-Amazon highw ay,

to grow.

a variety

of

the Niteroi Bridge, and a

government offered low-interest loans

for citizens to

policy which extended the reach of
national ideology (in a country

6 mili ary C ° nSidered trying 10
'

PRMn

in the price

was highly dependent on

projects such as the construction
of the

nuclear

inflation

7 percent per year, and
import-substitution-industrialization

paytng oil as domestic demand
was growing (Eakin,

was able

Between 1967 and

percent per y cu .

1
1

from 100

rates.

Mexico"

make

i,s

P 3 "*

(ARENA)

serve as a hegemonic party, like the

18

significant that at least as late as 1968.
the Brazilian militaiy allowed Marxist
literature to be easilv
C
k S ,0reS( chwarz ' 19921 l26 - 9 >- Th*
most significant crackdown was between
.
ivestld
968 and T974
1974 but
kT'as Mattelart and? Mattelart write “even
when censorship was at its most repressive
It is

M°

stry

,9

^

Med 8 ° vernmem 11 ca,mot be
that this totalizing/totalitarian project of a'
T
'n
of Truth
was really
concretized" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1990:
57).
The highest rate of growth in any country
in the world with the exception of
Japan.

E!
m

v

-

where dhteracy
identity in

ra.es

were

still

very

Hi*) <Pa 8 e.

.

995: 169)

The

.

^^

p

an authoritarian context
meant that national identity
became synonymous with

national security. ,n
1968, Professors F.orestan
Fernandes. Octdvio ,anni
and Fernando

Henrique Cardoso were
removed from

their positions a, the
University

ostensibly because
their sociological
research asserted that
Brazil

democracy. “In

1

969 Brazil, National
Security Council

racial discrimination
in that

was not

a racial

identified studies and
repons

country as subversion"
(Fontaine, 1985:

2).

did no. contain the
category of race, and by
the end of the decade
the

InterAmerican foundation
was pressured into eliminating

of Sao Paulo

all

US

on

The 1970 census
based

research on race

in Brazil.

and eventually was
“expelled” (Skidmore, 19 92
10 ).
:

National identity revolved
around the belief that racial
identity was no, salient
Brazil,

and

if

Afro-Brazil ians were more likely
to be

consequence of their economic

class,

and no, the

Fernandes and a team of scholars
funded by

illiterate,

result

UNESCO

poor, etc,

it

was

in

a

of racial prejudice. Flores,
an
in the late

1

9 50s and early

I

%0s

challenged this idea, although
the number of people aware
of this criticism was relatively
small. Afro-Brazihans
continued to identify, in general,
as Brazilian, and did not speak

out or complain about racial
discrimination.

1

970s began

to

view

this as a matter

A

growing group of new scholars

of ideological hegemony. Afro-Brazilians.
they

argued, fooled themselves into
accepting the idea of racial democracy,
that this

was only

a “myth." Carlos

Hasenbalg argued

ideology of whitening and the idea
that racism

mechanism destined

to

in the

is

when

that the cornu, nation

it

was

clear

of an

absent in Brazil, was “a legitimize

absorb tensions... a means of anticipating
and controlling certain

areas of social conflicr (Hasenbalg.
1998: 115).

Hasenbalg writes
shades of color, had led

Nelson do Valle Silva

Pre‘°S

W!>S

that the -social
perception

a fragmentation of racial

to

in

1

979 explained

n0 ' SUPP0 " ed by

Sta,islical

thanks, and

slightly better

far

of race according
identities'-

that the belief tha ,

to a

continuum, of

(Hasenbalg, ,996: ,65).

pardos are

treated better than

evidence which showed that
pardos faired only

worse than broncos (Valle

Silva, ,979). Nevertheless,

despite academic falsifications
of the “myth of racial democracy,” 20
the majority of
Brazil's population accepted
the idea
there

was

little

racial prejudice in Brazil.

common, although
goals of

US

consolidate.

virtual civil

civil rights leaders in
the

The populace,
war over

the late

local organizations

Comparisons with the United States
were

1

in general,

960s was similar

saw a

racial distinctions,

to those that they

companies

that

were trying

to

very frightening situation and
a country in a

which appeared

to

be wholly different from the

life in Brazil.

1

970s, as the Military regime began
to liberalize, there was a swell
of

which focused on

identity politics

and mobilization. Middle class

Atro-Brazilians were finding that they were
marginalized
the

that

the lessons learned
diverged. Afro-Brazilian activists
claimed that the

experience of daily

By

of race/color conceived of as
a continuum, and

employed them 21

.

In the

in the state universities

and

in

year of the ninetieth anniversary of the

abolition of slavery, Sao Paulo black
activists attempted to create a -black”
movement.

Alter the murder of an Afro-Brazilian
worker by police officers, and the removal of four

Atro-Brazilian volleyball players from a social
club, the newly form-H Movimenlo Negro

bnificado
also

(MNU,

Unified Black Movement) was able to gamer some
support. The

promoted Afro-Brazilian

~°(Spanakos, 1999a).

culture, following the "Black Soul"

movement and

MNU

employed

“

a -Black

is

Sma " Afr°- B

Pr08ramS Wi,h

——

—~

Beauiifu," rhetoric.
Prior to the
fonttation of the

Af" Ca
'

•

«*

MNU there had

P ro g ra ms and even exchange
'
,

- different cities across the

count.
During the Geise,
0974-8) and Figueiredo
(1979-85) admin, .rations
the
Braztltan government
allowed for
a gradual abertura
(opening process) in

government reduced
repression and opened
iimited space
government was no, willing

pany drafted

a

hi,,

to give

now”

(dire.asja).

opposition's candidate,

was

Kingdom of Palmares once

rallies filled the
streets

in

other

1

984. the government

cities,

of Brazt, demanding

elected by the electoral
college in ,985
that, in

o„ e

the

interesting sign

stood, began Project

Zumbi, a program which
offered
in schools.

Other such projects began

most prominently Sao Paulo,
whose Project Zumbi

films, conferences,
exhibits

-direct

1982, the state of Alagoas,
where the

education about Afro-Brazilian
history and themes

appear

In

The government proposal
faded, and Tancredo
Neves,

of change and
democratization was

to

fight.

Bu, the

delaying direct eiections
in Brazil. The
response to this was

immediate and unanimous
as large
elections

up power without a

for opposition.

which the

featured

and other educational
programs (Andrews, 1991:
218).

Dominican Republic (1986-1999)

Balaguer returned

in

,986 and immediately suspended
deb, payments, ignored the

recommendations of the IMF, and
pursued an aggressive campaign
accusing former
president Jorge Blanco of
corruption.

Interview with

Amaury Mendes,

14

,h

By

attacking Blanco so intensely,
Balaeuer

of October, 1998.

,h

'

^
~

.Ki„ „

„„

”*"* -

“ ‘ i,h

and a decrease

non,,.

«

ton,

„

ich

^

P»J~ «h **. , „„

<«»» p™.

» printing

Mm>r

„ hith ln „„ id„

„„

^

Mlg

dm

, lgiiion

„

gffc

in foreign
investment.

^

Reelecting Balaguer
mean, a return to a
well-known polities, which
would

-deepen the lack of
institutional!* and the
personalization of the
•00). This

dollar

was obvious by

his investment in
pharoanic projects, such
as the multi-million

Columbus Lighthouse 22 and
by

his designation

,

Balaguer had always been
consistent

The numbers of Haitians

95).

decrease, although they

now

1

had even

985, Balaguer published

1986 the formal

Haiti over Haitian labor

ended (Wucker.

willing to live in
deplorable conditions did no,
less protection

the 34 years of official
agreement between the
In

of Haitians as “Others.”
Although

in his disdain for
Haitians, in

agreement between the
Dominican Republic and

1W:

state” ,Brea e, al
1995:

La

and legal status than they
did during

two governments.

isla a! reves

(“The Island Upside Down”),
an

updated version of his La real,
dad dominicana (“The Dominican
Reality”),
assert

Dominican nationalism,

thus reinforce his

own

reinforce

popularity.

Dominican

The timing was

fear

in

order to

and hatred towards Haitians, and

particularly relevant since Balaguer

used his stereotypical and offensive
portrayal of Haitians to discredit
Jose Franciso Pena

Gomez,

the dark-skinned

PRD leader and

believed to be of Haitian descent.
Pena

former mayor of Santo Domingo, who
was

Gomez,

a very emotional speaker,

was blamed by

.

9

many

for inciting the
riots in

1

984. a view that 14,1
Ba agUer See " led
'o suggest
through racial
'

„

„„
pamsh and

D

„ b!0

, „„„„ orwTOio>

_

h;

traditional

Puebio in America”
(Balaguer
' er. 1985
651 Despite
n
1985.6a).
its ability
to
Hispanidad, “contact
with the black
Wack[l
[i e ‘HaY
Hainan], e
has contributed,
-

conserve

its

'

ingle doubt, to
the relaxing of our
8

without a

nnW
PUb “ C CUS,0mS ’”

which

results in “the
progressive

ethnic decadence
of the Dominican
population
P pulation... ”,Ri
(Balaguer,

1985:45). Balaguer
also
explained that the
difference between n„
Dominicans and Haitians
is no.
•

•

exclusively

cultural, but also
biological, writing
“[,]he excess
° eSS

U

*"“ h "

1

RS- j7)
983
'

.

in Haiti constitutes

,

d
Balaguer

an

„„

i

'

““ « »-”j

"***•

•

,

—

"•

species of vegetables”
(Balaguer
°
•

of no
Population

»v

s “scientific”
treatise

—

“W *= M, „
«

declared that

- *. „
do ,0

fc

i»

o«„

subsistence" (Balaguer,
1985: 52).

Balaguer's argument
are the

most Hispanic people

is

unclear since

in the

i,

seems

Americas and

that

difficult to believe
that

Dominicans have devolved

because of the cultural
exchanges with Haitians.
While Balaguer recognizes

Dominicans are of mixed blood,
he seems

to

Dominicans

that

use the terms “Haitian,”
‘-negro" and the

“Ethiopian race” fairly
synonymously suggesting that
Dominicans are light-skinned

1

J7

™« PreJUd CeS
'

coml

„„,„ ot .fcl

^

n<>t S ‘

mPly H,era0

'’

[

,

.

md ,hM

Wlii
lK Used

,

“*

Haitian laborers.
During one three

1;wii

Position as president
to

week

stretch in

Balaguer .ssued the
deportations of some
50 A000 Haitians
~
laiti,
rr
(Ferguson, 1992: 89
)
When Balaguer returned
to power ,n
oca
in
986. he sttrprtsed
few people with

1

99

I

.

i

1

art, cult, tor

of soctal

°™ ed

[Ba,a8Uer

Pa " y] f
’;

•he

masses tn

demands and proponents
of the extension of
citizenship

-

01 a

that ‘reform only

project, atomizing
and

situations,

to

990

anrl
d

1
’

"

qq/i
4

such as the 1991 coup
P

,998:

'

deposing

won

the

-

3 lnbute t0 his

in Haiti
the
•am, the

brilli

™‘

ability to

ns
US
embargo and
t

los,

manipulate

political

,

the

1

994

US

and violated the law.

,

intervention

990

06)

later,

'

the

,

margin of victory showed
him beating Juan Bosch by
fewer than 25,000

our years

PR

«.

maintain power, even when
he had clearly

official

I

1

the

was capable of being
an instrument of a
pauperizing and

corrupt clientelism”’
(Espinal in Brea etal
1995-85,
x s -o- it,,
’
Balaguer narrowly
elections in 1986

his laek

votes.

he won. over Pena
Gomez, by only 0.7 percent
of the votes (Espinal,

b° ,h CaSeS aCCUSati ° nS
of doctoral fraud were
rampant and vety
’

in 1994,

many

scholars,

NGOs, and

international monitors,
including former

congressman Stephen Solarz,
spoke ou, against the
fraudulent
1

he pressure that followed
the

1

994 elections

credible,

US

elections.

led to the passage

of a law which

prevented immediate reelec,
ion for the president, and
to a negotiated .Clement

clear.

„

is

in

dea2

which

—
“r“—
Bosch

s

protege Leonel
Fernando?

° ^,,,

p* man

"“'“• “'""" J “

M

i.™.„, ta

*

fahtw „

,

ez and Balaguer
formed a “Patriotic

*

<>.«

P.~. (Espinal.

,»

,,„,

Brazil (1985-1999)

The promise of Brazil
democratization quickly
Iurned
death of president-elect
Tancredo Neves

presidency

calied the

of** Same,

PDS) who

backing of the

Samey had no

MDB.

.eft in

a

this

member of the government

the largest political
party, and

MenL
who was

when he

he

^

party

Uniike Neves,

who

(now
had the

elected by popular vote,

entered office and faced
an intimidating

which had just surrendered
power

comment was

,

power. Since Samey was
the candidate of few

newly empowered Congress
which saw him as

however, that

^

,

.984 to join the Fren,e

people, he had virtually
no mandate

dismay

Apri of 1 985, and the
ascent to the

Samey had been

real base for his
political

military' institution,

in

t0

a

weak

after

twenty years of rule, and

president.

not aimed, specifically.
at the subjects of the
Ethiopian

1

19

state.

W3S &Ced

Zl!

W“h Se ' eral

daUnting eC0n0mic
P r°blems

•

”

a

and an abundance
of inefficient and
costly

,c*n,

“
7

Politicians,

finally achieved

"

n0

H,

who bad

‘

0n$

’

m0$ ‘ abU$ed

inSti,Uti0nS

to

0 US '" 8 PUW,C
agenC,eS

Brazt,

rated by the

International as

204)

-

state agencies

"

f0r

firs,

—

^
1995

-

-is, economies outside

J

were considerably

corrupt.

organization Transparency

in their

survey (Bakin,

-

is in

1

99 ,

the relations

rw
Businessmen overcharge
the

r-

Pr0fit ,0

P? 24

the politicians

who awarded

j

ended as inauspiciously
as the

firs,

one had. The young and
charismatic Fernando Cello,
de Meiio became

age of 40, defeating long
time

da Silva. Conors campaign
capitalized on
state

.belt personal

NO. only were
bureaucracies a means
of

and industries and
politicians
pomicmns

initially (Page.

barracks

agencies were a
mong the

of, his corruption

Leone. Brizola, and the
leader of the relatively

home

-

politically connected,
they

mrt nftu
Pan
° f ' he

Civiiian

nationalism, and to
the traditional
practice

directly elected
presidency in Brazil

indirectly elected

a, the

^ P— -

—-

decades of economic

in turn use
’
6

them the contracts

The

^«

state bureaucracies.

one of the most corrupt
countries included

government and.

President

BraZiI

deb, high
’
‘

,he milftay
retreat t0

interfere

German non-govemmenta,

BraZiliamS ' J ° SePh

between

'

unemployment of the

was

CnSiS

" """ ^ ***

communis, w orld due

staving

power si „ C e

—massive

Leftist,

and brother-in-law of .lode
Goulan

new Worker’s

Party, Luis (Lula,
Ignbcio

his heroic battles
against corruption in his

of Alagoas. During Collor’s
two years he was abie

to briefly gain success

fightmg inflation, although
his economic team’s
radical measures failed and
the economic
This seems to be a practice
that has continued.

120

cns,s soon worsened.
Ironically, Collor
was the
,

f,
from office

tlrst
firs,

.

in the history
•

of corruption, made
by

•

ores',
pres
'*n, impeached and
removed

of the
e Western
western Hemisphere
He
because of very
serious allegations
•

,

his brother.

Itamar Franco’s
25
presidency
•,
was marred h,
'
by a similar
inability
•

he economic
.

...

crisis, until his
selection

of sociologist
,SI

„

2eman
Fernando
o° H
Henrique Cardoso
'

Cardoso’s economic
plan brought
UC1 " 8 3

neW

CUrTenCy ’

S ° me,hing

in 1994, beating

PreVi0USly at,em te
P « during the

da Silva handily

as

down inflation

Collor governments.
Cardoso’s P
plan
n. the Real Pi
Plan, was so
successful

became president

to control
inflation

that

Samev and

Cardoso

in the firs,

round of elections.
C ardoso’s four
years were characterized
by adjustments to
neo-libera, plans,

negotiations

a " 0Wed f0r imi,ed
PriVa,i2ati0 "
'

'd

“"

1

“ *“'«• •» <**.

in

amendment which allowed

»'*** companies, an

for presidential
re-election.

994, and the Asian and
Russian crises of 1 997
and

1

increase in foreign

Despite the Mexican

crisis

of

998. Cardoso's economic
team was

able to maintain
inflation at a veiy low
rate and limit
devaluation by maintaining
high
‘
interest rates

and spending government
reserves of dollars.
With the

deepening and threatening
Brazil. Cardoso
defeated da Silva
presidential elections

of 998. also
1

for a

crisis in

Asia

second time

in the

in the first round.

Afro-Brazilian mobilization
probably peaked between
the celebra, ion/con,
esta.ion

Of the centenary of the
abolition of slavery

in 1988.

anniversary of the death ol
Zumbl, the legendary
In

1988. “President

Samey used

'as Collor's vice
president.

and the three hundred year

last

king of Palmares

who

died in 1695.

the opportunity [of the
centenary of the abolition of

He assumed

the presidency in

1

992.

Braz,han headed by
[Abdias, do Nascimento”
(Marx. 1998: 261).
The
SC,Zed

"

° PPOrtUnity

° rgani2e

~-

•hey caned abolition
-an act of po, idea,

•he

was

the death

MNU have been

dentiftcation

of Zumbl

(20.

ct-ii
i

•

°- BraZilianS

-*

number of Afro-Brazi.ian

ow (Silva.

,998:

,

which

64),

lower

-

in

Brazih

members of

MNU (Burdick.

,998,

statistics

suggest that the

(Wood and

students encoded in
universities

is

Love,,

disproportionately

and the number of
Afro-Brazihans who are V,„ ed
by po|ice

sets constitutional

is racist

that should be

the politicized

Euro-Brazilians

punishments for

,

997:

,

9).

racial discrimination,

attempts to penal, ze racism,
two major problems exist:
there
incident

^

in Brazil.

officers is disproportionately
high (Fagundes and
Aquino.

law,

and the holiday

with the radicahsm
of the

Despite the be,ief that
racism does no, exist

>998), the

m

unable to ntaintain
the success of that
period due to a ,ack
of

amon g Afro-Brazihans

^ Afr

,

,

existed,

November, However,

and the persistent belief
, ha, racism
does no, exist

llfC Cl ’ anCeS

C0lmm

Ne.. ro

romanticism’’ (Fernandes.
,989: 78). Others

argued that the abolition
was a farce slavprv
0
celebrated

marches throughout the

Moving, o

since the race of the
people involved

is

is

Despite the Cao

and other forma,

no consensus on when an

no, always clear; and
preventing

racism faces a severe obstacle
from informal, social and
political perceptions. As
Teresa
Caldeira notes, the ‘criminal’
in Brazil

is

associated with “the poor, with
black people,

with migrants from the
Northeast of Brazil, with single
mothers, with consumers of
drugs, with promiscuity, and
with conicos and favelas”
(Caldeira,

assumption

that Afro-Brazilian

1

996: 20

1

).

Given the

have lower class culture, poverty,
crime and violence,

122

it

is

„

»

....

~

^

Afto-BraziMansdo

- ™ A,«„

*„„„„ ^ _
Bill

I.

.1* ....

»..ll.,.

.....

»
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~ ...

Afro- Brazilian,

...

„ * Brazilian

b,

„

„

„

„r

»*.«„,

.

,a

„

M

of society, and are not
the victims of
prejudice.

Conclusion

The growth of a

nation-state has been
central ,o the

many

unsuccessful attempts to

build democratic
government in the Dominican
Republic and Brazil, and
particularly

terms of developing citizenship

in

in

terms of rights and positive
freedoms for Afro-

Dominicans and Afro-Brazi.ians,
The

nation-state in both countries

was

truly bull, and

institutionalized by authoritarian
governments. Thus, the increased
capacity of the

government
still,

to

implement policies occurred during
non-democratic governments. Worse

increased capacity

government. The most

w as

often linked to a lack of
self-constraint on the part of

critical difference

the authoritarian state in the

between the two countries

Dominican Republic under

in this regard is that

Trujillo and Balaguer

was

especially personalist, or
“sultanistic” (see Hartlyn, 1998a,
1998b). Only Getulio Vargas

could clatm the sort of deference
that Trujillo and Balaguer received,
although
personalism was very

was

less personalis!

much

and

far

a factor

more

in local Brazilian politics.

institutional than

Dominican authoritarianism. Vargas

did not hate the powers that
completely eclipsed institutions
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Brazilian authoritarianism

in the

way

that Trujillo did.

and even

„s most

a.

brutal, the militaty

government

in

Brazil limited

its

and even made vety
careful notes records
about torture*

^

common

denominator between
the two countries

homogenous

zation

meant

nation and an ordered

is

state.

the pol.ticizat.on
of Afro-Dominicans

own

authority

that corpora, ,sm

Democracy was

was used
often

and Afro-Brazilians.
and the

specter (reaiistic or
no,, of Revolution
encouraged eiite support
of authoritarianism
dictatorship and/or
milittny rule.
Contesting politics and
opening polttical space
for the
ost marginal
members of socety was
seen as a threat to
stability,
far

<han simply an
opposition victory.
Bosch's election

and the election of
Guzman
Vargas' popularity
political sphere,

989. That

the

among

in

in

more dangerous

1962, the counter-coup
i„

1978 raised significant
fears among

elites,

much

,

965

as did

the poor, particularly
labor, Gou, art’s
radicalization of the

and eventually,

to a lesser extent,
Brizola

and da Silva’s campaigns

Gass and color element
of the “marginal”
populations commingle

surprising, given the
perception

of race

in the

During the pas, seven
decades race

two

in the

is

in

no,

countries.

two countries has been
conceived of in

terms of a color continuum.
People consistently identified
themselves along a color

scheme, and no, through the
use of racial categories,
and they did no, recognize
the
existence of racial discrimination.
However, discrimination along
color lines has been
clear,

whether

i,

was

Trujillo’s destruction

of the Euro-Dominican social
clubs, or

his

support of the “whitening”
ideal by powdering his
face before public speeches.
Both
countries encouraged
immigration to further “whiten” the
population, although Brazil was
26

See (Weschler, 1990).
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far

more successful

in this reearH
gard.

At u
A,
the same „me,
daring the 1930s
and 1940s a

salience (in Brazi,)
of racial ldeMity

mtnican nationality
argued

ome racial

that the

^^

^

Dominicans were

f

culturally Spanish
and European.

mixture. Racial
discrimination

-s only one race in the Dominican

” ^^

was propaga(e ,

was not

possible since there

Republic. Similarly,
Brazilians began to
believe that

-

^ WWCh

racial divisions

more mild than

in

legacy of its African,
European and Indigenous
ancestors.

Even

" ke y t0
'

if

these nationalist
“fictions- were believed
in both countries,
which they

^

^ het,er

W

~

Haitians

made up

a

^

caste in the

Dominican Republic, and
although Dominicans
often considered
dark-skinned
Dominicans to be
and not

dark-skinned Dominicans
predominated

alongside Haitian migrants
and residents.
darker than

is

its

middle class neighborhoods.
While

high in Brazil,

population

Brazil’s/^ (shanty-towns) are

i,

is

also true that the

i,

is

perceptibly

true that miscegenation

extremes-the poorest and

was and

riches, sections of the

tend to be very ethnically
homogenous. The same holds true
of the

Dominican Republic.
There

is

individual mobility, often
considerable, for Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-

Brazilians. Mobility tends
to be greatest for those

who

and for those among the lower
and the lower middle
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are mulatto, rather than very
dark,

classes. Mobility correlates with
the

—
idea of “whitening,”

which

is

conceived of,

T^

increased education,
high paying
job ,

^^
”

liS '’ ,er lha " °'
,eSe f
are typical
examples of what
has pejoratively
be
been
called “whitening ” \vu
*'
n economic
or educational
success is
n
, s def
defined
mtenns of co, or, i,
isclearlhat , hemobi]
°'
individual
Afro-Dominican or
Afro-RrwT
azilian is contingent
on their

-ss

'

'

^

•

*

•

.

”

'

different

from the stereotype
of Afro-Dom,
Afro Do
•

.

means and Afro-Brazihans.
Therefore

„
exception reinforces
the marginalization
of the rule,

e political cultures
in both
countries

r*"

serves a specific
putpose, but
razi Ians

Var '° US

"

^

——

in the

the courts, wii,
remind other

v
withm

society.

Dominicans

order of their social
and political systems

of government, such

members of their

as the police, the

status

should the former
This idea of place
most clearly limits
the citizenship
of Afro-Dom, means
and
Afro-Brazihans who are
generaily assumed
to occupy the
positions of lowest
status

citizens.
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is

•

^e..

among

the

based on an
understanding of
politics which

also given a
certain value
val
-rta.n

ave a specific
“place”

memberS

.

nnlnao and

it

i, is

is

”

•

PART

III

SST

LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN
IN

he previous section
(chapters 2 and
3) discussed the

I

which race and citizenship
have been conceived
^

cultural,

ciTi7i?ve.»»r.

contemporary
AM) BRAZILIAN POLITICS

and

,W0 deCadeS

'

political

"

iS

commitment
azt tans

is

Dominican Republic and

under

Brazil.

insi

systems which have
been democratizing, on
and

CrkiCal ,0 begi " b
>

(generally no, race)

give

in the

historical conditions

™ d "i„g

-ha.

off. for the last

one-s identification by
color

determined by context and
no, by one's positive
and inevitabie

to a specific
"race."

However, although
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

do not always identify
and arc not always
identified as Afro-Domini
nn ican or

Afro-Brazilian, discrimination
and persecution are not

consequences for democratization
as

i,

uncommon. This has

limits the extent to

considerable

which Afro-Dominicans and

Afro-Brazilians can exercise
democratic citizenship,
whether defined

aits

Liberal or

Republican.

This next section examines
the extent to which Liberal
and Republican notions of
citizenship apply to
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
While the presentation of the

cases in the previous section
was used to follow the significance
of race and citizenship

m

each country's specific
ry

goal

is

and

culture, the

history-,

so as to avoid making uninformed
generalities about

tw o chapters

in this section are

more

explicitly comparative.

no, only to present evidence
that addresses the (lack of)
institutionalization of

citizenship for Afro-Dominicans
and/or Afro-Brazilians. but also to
compare the two

The

-e.
(

Such a c„ mparis0 n

d emographical ly

gi ves insight
into countries

speaking) racial groups

who

no, organize
politically along
-racial” lines.

successes and failures
in either count™
n '° t'°
aid in the construction
of

new

consistew)y

^

also gives ,he
opportunity for the

COmnbU

'

e *° a

more Eeneral knowledge
and

strategies.

- •»-««! N.
“

i0

•**» »»* ,h.

—“ — - ~
d,„,
"

o, „„„ obl

^m

«

„„ IM on

tel!

substantive claims.
Advocates
ocates of
oi th^
the fx
former pose that democracy’s
institutional

Advocates

^

.. ..

*“*

-h«h„

„

with significantly

and

legal

procedures that ensure
universal

of this point subscribe
to the Dahl, an vision

institutional

arrangements necessaty

advocacy of a minimum

se,

for

political

and

„ MUI11 OI
-ength

lie in

the

civil rights.

of polyarchy as the minimal

democracy. Procedural,,
are no, alone

of recognizable and
enforceable

rights, as

set

in their

New

Institutionalists support
similar claims, and. although
the scholars in the

above groups do

no, always cite them, so
do classical Liberal, libertarian
and neo-liberal theorists.

Republicans

would

insist that

who

argue that democracy must

make more

substantive claims

democratic procedures, institutions
and rights are not enough

maintain democracy

if

to

they are not enforceable.
These scholars choose more maximal

Visions of democracy which
propose not merely elections, and
free press, but also
attention to socio-economic
disparities and alienation.
Substantivists are joined by those

who

study political culture as well
as a host of post-Marxists

who

of

argue that socio-

“
r
-—
"d

.

—~

^

«*

-« -«<— ..«.
“ ”"“ ” * “ - *• -«<

;

political reality,

seems

to

in

chapter

-

I, is

.i»

»«,«„„ «, „„

be quite similar.

A study of Liberal citizenship,
outhned

~
*

'’

i

°

-

conducted

in

conceived

chapter

4.

in

tcnns ofcivi, and

po.itica, rights as

Liberal ideas within
the sub-field of

democratization studies are
considered and then sonte
pre.iminary comparisons
between
1116 '

W0 C0Umr eS Wi "

be

'

made

'

EmP irical

ev ‘dence from the
two countries

is then
presented, dela.hng the
respect and violation
of civil and political
rights of Afro-

Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

Finally, the evidence

compared and some evaluations
about

from the two countries

is

the quality of. and
the posstble improvement
of

Libera, citizenship for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
are considered.

Chapter 5 examines the
extent
political

agency and

activity, exists for

to

which Republican

citizenship, in tenns of

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
Like

chapter 4, chapter 5 begins
with Republican ideas
advanced by literature on

democratization before moving
to a brief con, ex, ualiza.ion
of Republican citizenship

he two countries.

This

is

followed by empirical evidence
from the two countries,

particularly addressing the
role
nc-gro,

in

of NGOs

in increasing self-conscious
identification as

and mobilizing Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-Brazilians along

political lines.

The

Chapter concludes by comparing
the successes and failures
of groups in both countries to
attract

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians,
as well as

Republican citizenship

for both groups.

to

improve the conditions of

CHAPTER 4
1

THF nn, !!®'

1-

C 'TIZENSH1P IN

individual rights

Liberal nottons of
citizenship are
dependent on a bot,o

m -Hne recognition of the
cv.l and political
rights of a„ citizens.
The institutes of
Lihera, dc.ocmcy
are

designed to protect these
rights and

to

ensure that abstract
universa, quality
of ah

ndiv, duals can be
transited into the
practical and

legal world.

In the Dominican
Republic and Brazil,
Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Braztlians have faced
serious challenges
eXerC S ng Libera
Ci,i2enShiP
of .he very institutions-,

m

'

^

'

'

'

•he courts, and the
government in genera,

-hile .he exercise of
political

-who are supposed to defend

those rights

rights has received
increasing support in
both countries

-he guarantee of civil
rights remains illusoryin both the
particularly for

he police

Dominican Republic and

Brazil,

Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians.

Procedures, Institutions
and Democratization

In the

concluding essay of their
multi-volume 7> unsit ions

to

Democracy

Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe Schmitter focus on
the unpredictability

series

in the

transition period of the
liberalization of a country's
political system (O'Donnell
and

Schmitter, 1986). This essay,
considered one of the more
influential pieces of scholarship

on democratization during
the most recent wave of
democratization, has been challenged
by more recent research,
which argues
limitations

making

transitions

more

that

democratic institutions can impose
structural

predictable (Karl, 1990; Mainwaring
and Scully,
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o
19 ^ 5 ).

Some

scholars even
,•
suggest
that
"g
31 Hpmr.
dem ° Crat,C
lns "' l "ions
•

s>

stem which gives

pp
c
Pa> ' 0ffS
f° r

actor's

provide an incentive

*

'

behaWn®

‘democratically’ <i,.
with the

m es Qf
,

the system)
(Rustow, 1970; Geddes,
1994 ).

TheSC SCH0,arS

n0mS

° f m ° dem Hberai
d

cmocracy are me,,

“
“ -

^

°"

^ lm
y

and that institutionalization
of formal

empowerment of institutions
while

be,iefis

'

tins constitutes
a

***“*- institutions and ,He
if the

formal retirements
for

marked improvement
over
political structures
is

less

formal structures

procedures

is

“““
go\emment

government

wane

in

importance.

structures and

consistent with Liberal
notions of citizenship,
in that

... or , gl „ „„

citizenship

the previous

dependent upon t h e

Understanding democratization
through the use of
institutional
titutional

procednra,

*—

institutions are charged
th^ r
with the
responsibility

|[<n

_

d>

.

U

of protecting

political

and

civil rights.

Scon Mainwaring

writes

''

[democracy's fundamental Cain,

to legitimacy is no,

a

substantive one (greater
efficiency, equity, or
growth), but rather a;.,
cedura, one:

guarantees of human rights,
protection of minorities,
government accountability, and
the
opportunity to get rid ot rulers

Th
is

*

S iS

Simi ar ,0
'

HuMin 8 ,0 »' s

who

lose their popular support”
(Mainwaring,

cWm that "democracy has a useful meaning

defined in institutional
terms"

(in

992: 306).

only when

Robinson, 1995: 50). Citizenship,
thus,

understood within a poiyarchic
system, a government that
provides a

1

is

minimum of

poh.ical access and the
maintenance of civil liberties
through institutional protection

(Dahl, 1971

).

The

role

of the

citizen in "liberal democratic"
politics, according to this
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i,

of reasoning,

line

not one of
political

is

Peeler argues that
”,he establishment

elUe action" and
that

r

engagement.

In f

•

,

d^

of libera! democracy
isfi

^^nelitesinliberald^ocracy

is

“ Pr0 teC " 0n °' Vari<>US dVil llbertieS
d
dominant
n8htS

’

in

^

Wh

‘

,e

^

8180

77
^

mUCh

orski

^

'

Wh °

IS

revive,y marginal”

a col| ection of
political rights as
well

—

^

ne0 ' Hberal

^^

Pr0m ° ting inJiVidUa

m ° re

Wanderley Reis, 1996:

'

emphasj

dGfined

dem ° CraCy

as the

^^^

righ ' S

-—tic
ri

§ ht

* -ruts of preferences

citizenship

to

be arbitrarily killed

- "'« *.

1

““

“

»—»» » «,
,na

was proposed h
y
(in

121).

‘“ “" — «
V »«

^

°f Liberalism, which
has

The spectrum of literature
which examines
procedures and

'

^

,

Citizenship, according
u*
8 to Liberal
Sral th™
th ° Ught
’

^

'°

r

,

(P
(Peeler,
,998: 190, 192,
italics in the
original).
,

^^^

“* ""*“•*

thetr essay in the
firs, issue

— —

focus

institutions in

«

.

„ „c, dura „ d

,

ama

•'««* «i.

of the Journal of Democracy,
Lany Diamond and Marc

Planner exp, ain that
democracy has "three essentia,
features":

real

and considerable

competition for political
positions: an inclusive
system that allows political
participation;

and "o high feve/
of civil and political
original).

These

liberties include

’

liberties "

(Diamond and

"freedom of speech,

freedom of peaceable
assembly; freedom

to

Planner,

religion, opinion,

1

990:

5, italics in

and information:

form and join organizations;
and equal
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nghls,
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the criminal justice
system and to protect
individuals or

members of who

are

systematically denied their
rights.

Democratization

in

La , in America from the
standpoint of po, idea,

relatively outstanding
in the las. decade.

rights has

Elections are a regular
feature of the political

scape of ail Latin
American countries, with the
exception of Cuba, and
suffrage
universal to

all

people of majority

status.

Elections are generally
mandatory which

intended to increase citizen
participation as well as
decrease feelings of anomie
citizens

.

been

is

is

among

Additionally, both the
Dominican Republic and Brazil
no longer employ

literacy requirements.

The

electoral system has been
fairly successfully
institutionalized in Latin

America. This

may

best be illustrated by the
fact that although

Venezuelan population supported
the coup

to

44 percent of the

remove President Carlos Andres
Perez

in

1992, 93 percent believed
that democracy was the
best form of government
(Brooke. 6

Dec, 1996). Former coup
leader Hugo Chavez became
president

in

Venezuela

in

1998

only via an election. Perhaps
a more striking show of support
for institutional structure

is

the expression of popular
and elite disapproval through
increasingly institutional channels

With impeachment a

real political

America. For example since

1

option and a decrease

in serious

coup attempts

989. there were serious coup attempts

in

in Latin

Venezuela

in

1992, Paraguay 1993, and Guatemala
1993, three presidents were impeached
and/or

130

removed from

office by the
legislatures of their
countnes (Coll
countries
(C ollor in Brazil

Venezuela 1993, and tSuca
Bucaram
ram
’

impeaching Fujimori

The

&r an<i

in

p
Ecuador
.

1

992 Perez

in

.

in 1996),

and thee Peruvian r
Congress proposed

December of 1991

in

institutionalization

of e,ect,ons has led
scholars

free th ° Se e eCti0nS

m ° St ° bvious 'y. by analyzing

'

(Mainwaring and Scully,

,

to

995 , Some scho|ars

examine .note deeply how

^

the partv systems

^^^ ^
„a

between the mstitutionalization
of a pany system and
the institution
a, ion of
democracy (Peeler,
998). Mainwaring and
Scully write "(t]he
nature of parties and
party
SyS ' emS ShaPeS lhC
°
Pr SPeCtS * hat S,able d
will emerge,
whether it will be
accorded legitimacy, and
whether effective
policy-making will result"
(Mainwaring and
1

^racy

Scully, 1995: 2).
Jonathan Marilyn's
examination of the

distinguishes between free,

fair,

is

relatively free, the
degree

questionable. This was
most obvious during the

when computers crashed

electoral system

frequent and open elections
(Hartlyn, 1998: 221-2,.

While Mexican elections are
frequent and
openness

Dominican

after electoral ballots

from Mexico

1

of fairness and

988 presidential elections

city

gave opposition (PRD)

candidate Cuahtemoc
Cardenas a lead over Carlos
Salinas. Mexican elections
are also
unfair in that the ruling
partyfPRI) uses the State's budge,
to finance

enough popular pressure
challenges the legitimacy of its

its

campaigns, and

local governors,

i,

w ill remove

and replace them, regardless
of whether they indeed were
the winners of the
the replacement

was even

One of the most

a candidate

significant

contest, or

(Oppenheimer. 1998).

problems

in institutionalizing party

systems,

is that

poht.cal parties, like other
formal institutions, provide a
democratic veneer which hides

This

is

not to say that

it

is

necessarily effective, since

many

voters produce "blank" and
"invalid" ballots.

if

.

"d
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„i„
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,
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Peronists in Argentina.

Aside from
P otection of civil

political rights,

liberties as a

procedural, s and

institutionahsts look a,
the

fundamental cornerstone of
Liberal democratic

dearly articulated and
protected by law. Protection
of civil
civil liberties

liberties.

liberties requires

be recognized by a legal
system which has the capacity

Latin American constitutions
are without

fail

laws that

to ensure those

Liberal and, very often,

progressive documents. Citizens
are protected from
arbitraiy arrest, from
torture and
death, from acts of
discrimination, and are given
the freedom to express
themselves.

These are

all

rights tha, are defined by
national governments, and
are considered the

privileges of those

Latin

who

are citizens of the
respective country. In addition
t0 these rights.

American governments have signed
numerous documents

solidarity or

On

commit themselves

paper,

all

Latin

to various international
standards

American governments have

systems as well as police forces
trained
rights.

While

In recent years,

living, the

monkey

almost

all

which they show

in

to

Tiao, a fan favorite

in the

to not violate individual

America have moved

in this

public zoo of Rio de Janeiro received
,
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rights.

legally independent judicial

maintain order and

countries in Latin

of human

their

many

votes.

direction,

others.

dative

.though some seem

to

have moved much
closer

However, the majority of
the judicial systems
to the presidency,
to e.ites,

and even,

to this institutional
idea,

in Latin

America

are s,i„

a, times, to
po.itica. parties.

than

weak

The judicia,

system does not tend to
serve as an independent
branch of government
which checks the
power of the executive and
legislative branches,
but

more

as an institution
which tries

criminals of vio.ent
crimes. The buik of
the indicted are poor
and considered marginal,

having a clear bias
against
majority of those mdtcted
are poor and marginal

marginal citizens. In

many

is

group.

One of the

i, is

reasons that the

that police tend to
arrest only

countries in the region,
po.ice torture

disappearances remain an option,
although
the

this

nowhere near

as

is

poor and

commonplace, and

commonly

used as during

970s. Such conditions
obstruct the rule of law and
decrease popular legitimacy,
but.

1

more importantly, they contribute

to the

certain people are
considered to have

maintenance of a hierarchical
system

more recourse

extreme cases, some groups
are considered
occurring even

in

protect

its

have no rights

it

is

dangers-such as

human rights-then we must

also

society have the right to be
equally protected..." (Leeds,
all

In

w hich

more

This seems to be
virtual caste.

generally assumed that “the duty
of the state

citizens against certain basic

property, and civil and

underlie

at all.

Costa Rica, where Nicaraguan
refugees constitute a

Elizabeth Leeds writes that since
[ts] to

to

to rights than others.

in

1

threats to personal safety,

assume
996:5 1

that all

).

segments of

That right seems

to

other claims to civil liberties and.
indeed, even political rights. However,

since political rights are generally
understood in terms of ability to vote and
the potential
to associate, political rights in
electoral

not resemble any "democratic ideal."

systems seem relatively secure, even

What

this

means

is

if they

do

that other political rights, such

as participation,

open choices

in eiect.ons,
fair

campaign opportunities,
open and

democratic political parries,
are ne g ,ected. or
are considered too
much for a
defini, ' 0n ° f dem0CraCy

^ ***“

'

are

electora. systems,
especialiy ones with
societies
in

which vioience towards
marginal groups
In

is

it

is difficult to

structural violations'
ot

structured, and

considered acceptable.
i
in
Brazil,

Paulo Sergio Pinheirc

ensure political and
civil rights "in
countries where

economic,

social,

feature ot society"
(Pinheiro, 1992:
262).

and cultural rights seem
to be a permanent

Althom h
[

hierarchies in the

threats within

which are hierarchical
ly

an analysis of
state-sponsored violence

explains that

more obvious

Dominican Republic and

enduring, rather than
permanent 2

to

chapter posns that the
structural

Brazil are largely
responsible for the failure
to

consolidate rights-based
notions of citizenship

dynamic and show some
capacity

t,lls

change.

in

As

those countries, these
hierarchies are
a result, they are better
described as

.

Liberal Citizenship in the
Dominican Republic sand Brazil

The

New York

rates countries

rights

and

based Non-Governmental
Organization Freedom House
annually

on the degree of freedom

civil liberties

5

The

.

repressive poiiticai system. In
fairly

J

in their political

ratings range

1

from

1,

the

most

S

K

(

in

terms of political

free, to 7, the

most

988-9. both the Dominican
Republic and Brazil scored

well with the Dominican Republic
being assigned a

See Diamond (1996) Wiarda

system

1

and

3

and Brazil receiving

1995).

aken

—

vnv lfccdomhouso nroiOntin.. par
These „ umbers are
ofltienliflc
cientific sfudfrf
study of objective phenomena,
but are merely comparisons of
the degree which analysts

J

',

a 2

and a

3. for political

bit better

rights

than the Latin

and

civil liberties
respectively.

Amer can average of

B°th recorded scores
quite

3.35 for both political
rights and

civil

liberties.

'

UP

10

'

he

he m0St reCeW S,Udy
’ * he

D ° miniCan

“d

RePUWiC

and lira,, have worsened.
The
liberties, respectively,
in the

win,
" S,ed
,He

the

,

^

^ ** -

"4^

nUmber

2 Sh ° Uld

radngs for the
Dominican Republic

999 surveys rated the
degree of political

Dominican Republic as 2
and

La,, American Averages
were 2, and

"

countries seen, to
have caught

1994

3.4.

3,

and

in Brazil as

Dominican

and

civil

3 and 4

political rights

- election of foac,

*

rights

were

Balaguer, and so

over the previous several
years.

I

lowever

.he institutionalization
of democracy in the las,
ten years has no,
greatly increased
political access for the
majority

Hoard

in cither

h.

illiberal

and

to foreign critics

in

improved across the

the

of human

rights violations, but

I,

to

has also

backlash.

some ways, democratization

Of the press

civil rights

of these two countries.
Democratization has opened up
some countries

...ore self-criticism

endured an

of citizens nor have

has improved Liberal
citizenship. The autonomy

Dominican Republic and

NGOs and other pressure groups, especially

Brazil

is

considerable. There are

in Brazil,

which

try to

improve

many

political

access and civil liberties
particularly for marginal sections
of the population. Voter
registration as well as electoral
fairness, always problematic
in the

improved considerably in
Republic led to a change

consider political rights and

1

996.

The

in the style

civil liberties

election

of Leonel Fernandez

of political leadership,

guaranteed.

135

Dominican Republic,
in the

Dominican

to a less centralized

and

au.hon.anan

political system. as
well as ,o a

govern. more

need of coahtiona,
support, and ntore
willing « 0 negotiate.
Elections are regtdar
in Brazil and
challenges of
fr aud are rare.
During

bo ,h

Cardoso appeared

his firs ,

in

^^^

and second

to differ front his
predecessors in tha, he has

J

heen very successfu,

in

maintaining the support
of a coalition of
political parties*, which
are normally qu i,e
-undisciplined.” This style
seems

much more democratic

than the centralized
and

exclusive governing cadre
of Collor. or tha, of the
militaiy government.
Bu, as

democratization has occurred,
in some
me areas,
areas

at the
at
the level
i

i

c
of
national

much

as

•

politics, local politics

continue to he dominated
by socio-economic and
political structures
which lend

themselves to hierarchy and

to the

Liberalization has also

empowerment of informal

made

i,

easier for

NGOs

political processes.

as well as international

organizations, such as

Human

international, to

evaluations about the condition
of civil rights 5

make

Rights Watch (formerly
Americas Watch) and Amnesty

.

While these groups

are often criticized for
challenging the nation's sovereignty,
they are nevertheless less
restricted

and

less subject to violence
than in the past.

of human rights

activists is

still

no,

uncommon

in

However, the beating and deaths

both countries. In the Dominican

Republic, international
organizations have been invited,
although they face

domestic opposition,

1

990 and

1

to help observe presidential
elections.

Jimmy

much

Carter was present

in

994. a, the request of Dominican
candidates, and the presence of
international

monitoring organizations

is

believed to have been a factor in
restricting police violence

prior to the second round ot the
1996 elections (Hartlyn. 1998: 266).

f

9
'

Cardoso

'

s

u
tr.H v°
? obstructionist
traditional
It is

contro1 over his allianee shifted, and
Brazilian
and rent seeking practices.

political parties reverted to

possible that greater access of said
organizations have led to more
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critical

more

assessments of civil rights
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i.

“Black"

*

Tl

of Geography and

includes color in the
census and produces
data which

and which demonstrates
income
such data has been
published

,h™, „„

disparities

in the

between

is

Statistics

(IBGE)

published by mainstream
media

W,o,« audios. No

Dominican Republic, and

as of this writing

i,

is still

unclear whether such data
exists. Chapter 5
discusses the nascent ueoate
over racism, as
a sidebar to discussions
of anti-Haitianism.
However, racism remains a topic
that
is

acknowledged or discussed on

a large scale in the

Dominican Republic. Additionally,

since the census does no,
include an option for color
or race, since

synonymous with "nation"
prejudice, no data

is

(nacion), and

"available”

no.

•'race"

(c)

is

often

Dominican society does not acknowledge
color

which can

statistically

prove impressionistic claims

that

darker skinned Dominicans
are disproportionately poor,
harassed by the police, and

poorly served by the judiciary
system.

There have been quite a number
of obstacles
law and respect for

Recent

civil

and

political rights,

literature in democratization
studies,

as well as

how

to

to

implementing a universal rule of

and for empowering democratic

which focuses on democratic consolidation

-deepen,” “construct,” or “build” democracy,
recognizes

democratic consolidation requires that the
government be perceived

in

the

two

institutions.

countries.
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to

that

be legitimate

a

(Gunther, Dia„,andouros
and Puhle,

,

995).

consohdated democracy
a pohtica, situation

“

~

institutions are seen
as the “rules
th ' S

•o

Und

apply

in8

"d

to either the

it

Linz and Stepan write
in

which,

in a phrase,

„ e mean bv a

democracy has heconte

of the game” and the
proper channel, respective,

C

* employed

Dominican Repuh.ic or

Brazil, or

ri

g orous ly

,

it

,

wou,d he hard

prohah, an y other count,

i„

•he region. In both
case, democratic
procedures and institutions
certainly provide a se,
o( rules and channels.
However, they are no, the
-only game in town ,,
and often

^^

even the dominant
-game
found that Dominicans

al

in

town.

still

quite skeptical of institutions.

In a

major survey conducted

prefer extra-institutiona,

When

asked about the

percent responded that
panics “serve only
al-

1994: 70).

A

survey conducted

in

in

a fare,

means

“utility

to

in

1

994,

Isis

Duarte

e,

problem solving, and

are

of political parties. 56.2

order to panieipate in
elections” (Duarte

e,

by the Brazilian Order of
Lawyers (OAB)

"found that 56 percent of
the sample surveyed
preferred ‘infernal channels’
of resolving
conflict, as

24 percent

compared

who

to

20 percent who preferred formal
processes of adjudication and

expressed no preference”
(Leeds, 1996:62).

Prelerence for informal networks
and patronage

is

based on the perception that

institutions are slow, ineffective,
biased and uncooperative, as
well as the ignorance of

citizens

of formal options. Citizens are
also aware

mechanism

in

which the

and their importance
3),

and

it

has

Of course,

in

relatively powerless can gain
access.

Dominican and Brazilian

become a very

the military

was

that clientelism

in

at

the time.
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an efficient

The presence of clienteles

politics is quite old (see chapters
2

salient ordering principle

power

is

of the

political

and

and

social system.

In 1975.

D

Howard W.arda wrote

““

L.»,

-The

P.I.O..,.

h„

in

Patronage

Practices, although

it

“Wrue power,

history'' (in

later, a

is

Sumrn. 1995:

frequently

little

more than

regions where the agency
of clients

countries. Clientelism

and

).

As one

is

is

pervasive, and

weakest relative

is

also strengthened by high

institutions, are often the

is

vested in a relatively
small

in

it is

whom

most

and

that includes

Dominican Republic, the north

urban complexes

unemployment

in

both

figures, shrinking state

for political support

socially

and patronage, rather than through

immediate or

efficient recourse.

Roberto da Malta's work on Brazil
(1987, 1991) attempts
clientelistie

negotiate

most constrains the economically,

clienteles

available,

cl, wits to

especially powerful in the

economy, and considerable payoffs

In short, clientelism

politically marginal, for

analyst writes of northern

to their patrons,

Haiti in the

and the ghettos and shanties

in the national

(Hartlyn. 1998. 22o

privilege through
clientelistie

a venue for patrons
and

of both countries, the border
with
in Brazil,

Mnvbur.

accessed through complex
chains of patronage.

favors" (Butler. ,998:
,59). Clientelism

and northeast

its

derived from wealth and
influence,
is

o avid

|n

154,.

not limited to rural
areas.

is

|97j|

I,

small elite maintains

segment of the population
and

involvement

in

«ta 1»h,ie.

,h, Brazilian Ihtetlo,

Three decades

Government

W

Tnij ill(ldiclalorship(w|alda

P,„i„„

beginning of Brazilian

rural areas

and clientelism were
so ingrained

~'> •«*« fc

following the end of ,
he

Brazil,

that patronage

systems can become so embedded
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to address

in social practice that they

how

can engender a

particular rather than
a universal vision
of citizenship.

universal citizenship,
hui.t on

modem

roles

which are

He

tied into

socety and a market; and
also other forms of
affiliation
ot citizenship

stem from the intimate
re|ational
,

Ma«a, 199,:
'individual

321). This

is

^

modem

within society, or as da
Malta clearly writes
rites "fwlhn
[w J ho you
.

society-other forms

^^
is

i

^

g nora„, of the

is

determined by one's "place"

know
t

versus

who know,
1

in

e, a,

Dominican

political culture

(Brea

e, al,

system which institutionalizes
hierarchy according

condition

status.

is

is

the

observe a similar recognition
of the “person" rather than
the
1995: 125).

The use of the person

rather than the individual
as the basic agent of
political life aids in the
construction

economic

^

fact in the Brazilian
social calculus" (da
Matta, 1991: 322).

Ramonina Brea
'individual"

a form of

bureaucracies. ,n Brazil,
there are no individuals,

only persons, and
persons are not equal.
This inequality

fundamental

is

ope~., n ofa

to Brazilian

because, he asserts.
Brazihan society

and of “neutral"

-

writes ‘-.here

“The acceptance of hierarchy,

to personal identity

ofa

and socio-

authority, power, priv ilege,
rank, social

linked to a vision of a
differentiated society cut across
by inequality.

ponsibihtie

,s

and pi n

from power" (Brea

et al.

i

leges are learned as attributes
derived from social conditions,

1995: 125,

italics in original).

Equating one's agency within a
democracy with one's personal

economic position

is

clearly antithetical to Liberal
claims for universal

attributes or socio-

membership and

equality be, ore the law. However,
recognizing that a “relational universe,”
as da Matta

puts

it,

coexists with, if not dominates, a
legal and bureaucratic one,

understanding the institutionalization of
citizen rights

See also chapter

6.
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in the

1,

necessaiy to

Dominican Republic and

Da Matta

Brazil.

explains the coexistence
of a Ltberal and a
partictdar notion of

citizenship writing “if
I
ral'y, in

when

WUh

no way do

want

I

need a bank

1

am

assuredly a citizen on
Independence

to

be only a cittzen

loan...- (da Matta,

eqUa,ity ’ and

"C

'

ear

fr °

m

*

,

99

.

:

when

rights

^

i„ the poIitica|

an, struggling with
the police... or

320). Coexistence should
no, be confused

^

hiS

better positions will
not only seek the
clientelistic relations

I

Day

in situations

anonymous

rights

and hierarchical status

to

ensure results.

This system of hierarchical
relations

is

most deleterious

of the marginal. Marginals
are distinguished

in the

where power

is

of citizens, but

necessaty

will use

to the protection

of the

Dominican Republic and

Brazil

b> the very tenuous
socio-economic and political
positions that they occupy.
For

example, Hartlyn estimates
unemployment
decades to be consistently
between

1

The

Dominican Republic

in the last

two

9 and 25 percent, with the
informal sector and micro-

rprises pro\iding the chief
source ol

(Hartlyn, 1998. 14 j).

in the

income

for

one

in five families in

infant mortality rate for the
Brazilian northeast

1992-1993

is

1

16/1.000.

"one of the highest in the hemisphere
and comparable to the poorest parts
of Africa"

(Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 279). Haitian
workers

in the

Dominican Republic, even those

with official papers, are subject
to constant abuse by police
officers
disregard or tear up their documentation,

woik on plantations

demand

who

bribes, or torture them.

are often not allowed to leave the

routinely

Those who

compound. Between 1988 and

1991, an estimated 5,644 streetchildren were
killed in Brazil, and 16 percent of the

population supported the use of brutality to
eliminate streetchildren Dudley. 1998:
35).
v
In

worlds where rights are recognized by

against those ol limited or no status.

The same
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status,

it

is difficult to

prevent violence

political culture that recognizes people as

"marginal"
cite just a

a, so

perceives ,hc, as “frith,”
“trash,” “demons,”
“thieves,” and “animals,”

feu ep, diets

In

.

to

a survey conducted in
the Dominican
Republic in 1994. 66.43

percent of the sample
agreed that "Haitians bring
problems to the countty"
(Brea et al.
' 995:
227), Most societies are
unaffected when people
considered to be marginal
within
•heir borders are
arbitrarily arrested

and harassed, yet Dominicans
and Brazilians seem

to

strongly support violent
methods used to deal with
“marginals.'” particularly in
Brazil

Where

citizens

have protested the imprisonment
of leaders of death squads
which

streetchildren (Dimenstein,
1991

It

ts

;

48)

necessary to elaborate the
perceptions and discourses that
surround

citizenship in the

Dominican Republic and

notions of citizenship apply
or
clear that the majority

fail to

in Brazil in order to situate

have been

illiteracy, poverty, lack

Dominican Republic, with

Haiti.

very- difficult to

lor this

among academics— in

of culture,

is

achieve for Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians.

that there is a clearly understood
hierarchy in

Brazil says, “there

negros know their place.

domains

in

Along

is

no problem with race

which Afro-

As one expressionin Brazil,

because

similar lines, Livio Sansone found that
there tend to be

which Afro-Brazilians operate: "tough" domains
such

as the

workplace, encounters with police, and
searching for a spouse; "soft" domains such as

could trace

this idea

is

Despite legal guarantees

Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans
occupy a very marginal position.

One

It

in Brazil, constitutional
provisions against racial discrimination.
Liberal

One reason

three different

Liberal

of Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians are adversely affected
by

stupidity, violence, and, in
the

of equality and.

how

apply to Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians.

negative stereotypes which
associate negritud/e with

rights

killed

of dehumanization of the Other back
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to debates during the early slave trade.

leisure activity

and

sports;

and "Black Space"
such as cantaval,
Afro-Brazilian relimons

capocra. etc (Sansone,
,997: 470). in the
"tougher" areas,

more

clear and racial
identities are less
flexible,

razihan. In the

softer

their racial identities
are

a„ Afro-Brazilians
ntay be considered

areas Afro-Brazilians
face less racial
discrimination and

'

more

i.e.

racta, discrimination
is often

flexible

and

far less relevant.

For example, the color
of

soccer players in Brazil
and baseball players in
the Dominican
Republic
if

noticed at

all.

spaces are ones
positive.

Finally, the areas

in

which are

which Afro-Brazilian

Since this

is

identity is valued

an investigation of rights
and

which Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians

most

attention,

attention.

The

whereas areas where race/color
intention here

is

rarely relevant,

traditionally considered
Afro-Brazilian

and

suffer the

is

is

liberties, the

mostly with wha, might
be considered "tough"
spaces. The
in

is

considered quite
essay will concern

result

of this

most prejudice

less important

is that

the areas

will receive the

w:P .eeive
.

itself

little

no. to overstate racial
prejudice, only to emphasize
the

conditionality of the political
rights and civil liberties
of Afro-Dominicans and AfroBrazilians.

Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic
where the protection of political
election years, although

presidential elections

presidency, and this

it

was

is

one of only a handful of countries

rights

worsened during the

has improved since

as certain as

was no spurious

was

1

last

in Latin

America

decade, especially

996. Electoral fraud prior to the

1

in

996

the candidacy of Joaquin Balaguer
for the

relationship.

about whether the natives and Africans
had souls.
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The most

blatant area of violation of

political rights in the

Peoples'

names from

Dominican RepubHc has
been
electora,

lists,

paying citizens

electora ,

in

^^

exchange for

^

their voting cards,
or

allowing the
mi,itary-.onsti,utiona„y banned
front voting-, o vote.
Every e.ectora,
contest since

Banner's 966
1

opposition, although no,

victory has been

have been. As detailed

all

significant that serious
opposition

presidential elections.

Congress

to the

The 978
1

in chapter 3.
repression

withdrew and abstained

front the

,

No,

the losing

was so

1970 and ,974

elections involved the
awarding of a majority of
seats in

P RSC as pan of a deal
that allowed Antonio

Charges of fraud were also
made
substantial.

denounced as fraudulent by

in

1

surprisingly, despite

982 and

1

Guzman

to take

power.

986, although the fraud was
no, nearly as

compulsory voting, abstention

between ,978 and ,990. and
only ,994 showed a decline

in

rates increased

abstention (Hart, y„. ,998:

231).

There were numerous claims
of fraud following the 1990
and especially the 1994
elections

d, visions

which were voiced by national
and
within the

PRD

and Balaguer's lack of popularity,
the PLD's Juan Bosch made
a

strong run at the presidency.
Since the

began

Bosch

to

buy

electoral

for the price

voting fraud that

Moya Pons

urban residents

Moya Pons

had a very shallow electoral base,
the
to

PRSC

be sympathetic to

of 100 and 500 pesos, roughly SI
0-50 (Moya Pons. 1995: 439). The

it

reports

is

votes in the areas where they

cards.

PLD

ID cards from people who were
believed

Dominican Republic, and

who were

international groups. In 1990.
due to

was mostly confined

common knowledge

knew

made up

that

to the poorer classes

of the

Reformism technocrats bought

they were not likely to win. Poor
Afro-Dominicans

a majority of those offered

also reports that approximately 8.000
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money

for their voting

members of the armed

forces

and national police were
provided with

electoral cards so that
they could vote, despite

Constitutional provisions
against this. Finally, the
Catholic hierarchy and the
armed
forces, both very
pro-Balaguer institutions,

prohlerated of a coup

Jimmy
Electoral

if

Bosch were

to

spoke openly against Juan
Bosch, and rumors

be elected

(Moya

Carter's electoral monitoring
group as well as the

Board (J.C.E) were unable

to detect clear evidence

Balaguer was declared the
winner, winning by

1

.

1

Pitted Balaguer principally
against

Pena Gomez,

Dominican Central

of fraud, and Joaquin

percent of the valid votes. In
contras,,

even the most casual observers
recognized massive fraud

the J.C.E.,

Pons. 1995: 440),

in the

who now

led a

1994 elections which

more

unified

which has generally been considered
weak, conservative and

PRD. Even

corrupt,

established through an investigator)'
committee that

more than 28,000 voters had been
fr °
'

m

deliberately disenfranchised by
having
lists at the 1.500 polling
stations"..

tHe electoral

the

500 P° lm 8 stat ions represent about
16% of the country’s total
V
simple arithmetic
supports the PRD figure of 200.000
frustrated voters
nationwide. In the end. the JCE merely
ignored the committee’s findings
(Ferguson, 1994: 1 1; also Espinal,
.

’

1994: 11).

Balaguer's victory by 0.7 percent of
the valid votes in 1994 was even
more

contested than his victory four years
earlier. However, due to the crisis
in Haiti and
Balaguer's political savvy, Balaguer
the opposition finally

was able

Balaguer from running
lists in

was

to pass a no-reelection

in 1996.

PRD members

believed would sympathize with Pena

w here

two year presidency, while

amendment which prevented

The voters whose names were absent from

1994 were, not surprisingly,

poor and urban areas

able to negotiate a

or people that Reformista surveys

Gomez. Again,

Balaguer's support
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the voting

the fraud

was

limited primarily to

was weak and where Pena Gomez's

«

-

“—

T

-

w

scheme

vv hich

—r— «

recognized that the poor
Afro-Dominicans had

"*

fc!

«...

.

fraud simply negated
the P
political r,
riohts
AfW, n
ot Afro-Dominicans
s hts of

this

•

rights

were no, the only

ri ghts

of Afro-Dominican

altogether.

citizens that

The

political

were abridged durino the

elections.

Because Balaguefs
message of order and security
and national sovereignty
was
dependent upon his nationalist
discourse which denigrated
Haitians,
negros, Africans and

the

Ethiopian race” (terms
he used interchangeably),
the

Afro-Dominicans were also
abridged during these

civil rights

rhetoric that attempted
to challenge the
nationality of

campaign aimed

early as

985’ when Balaguer
published La

1

against Pena

Gomez

many Dominicans,
was

a,

some

racist

is,a

is

Balaguefs nationalist

Pena Gomez. The mass
public

a, reves.

Through.,

his

campaigns

and xenophobic rhetoric of, ha,
book. While

scholars, say that Balaguer's
attack

not racist but anti-Haitian
(Interviews, 1997),

differentiations

of

undermining of Pena Gomez's
do mMcanidad was evident as

he echoed the

including

liberties

electoral campaigns.

Perhaps the most clear and
documented case of this

relations

and

when an ideologue purposely

it

is

hard to

on Pena Gomez

make such

subtle

conflates the terms Haitiano,
negro, and the

“Ethiopian” race. For example,
even though his book

is

concerned with the presence of

Haitian culture affecting the
Dominican one. he writes ”[c]ontact with
the negro has
contributed, without a doubt, to
the relaxing of our public
customs” (Balaguer.

emphasis added). Thus, ”our” customs

refers to both

Pena Gomez’s dominicanidad was
often
immense resources of the office of the

1

985: 45.

Dominican and non -negro customs.

challen ged even prior to this, but not
with the same v igor, the
presidency, and without the same
consequences.
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which

clearly denrarca.es the
Haitian as other, while
also placing the
Afro-Don, inican in

an ambiguous position
vis-a-vis Dominican
nationality.
Balaguer's campaign

campaign attempted

was no

less subtle.

to call into question
the nationality

ctals [that showed]...
a gesticulating

drumming

or a

James Ferguson

map of Hispaniola

in

Pena

of Peha

Gomez

like

is

of his presence in the
riots

going to unify both countries
and then

we

elec, a ''real”

its

neighbor (the threat involved

of 1984

is in

.

who opposes

in order to protect the

in the subtitle

"Dominican

of Baiter's book),

is to

your hands... Defend your nationality,
conserve the

could "not be trusted.”

who was

believed in “satanic cults",” and

Another Balaguer poster read “Think:

“not good,”

We cannot

Pena

riots.

This sort of ritual, like Santeria, Gaga,
C ° nS dered dem ° niC by the Catholic
hierarch

y-
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”

of our country on a man

See (chapter 3)
in

attendance during a

Vodu and

'

^Haitians'

the country

as a

the border to Haitians.”

risk the future

Gomez was

spritist.

Gomez was presented

who would “bum

who would "open

im P !lcatl on being that Pena Gomez
fomented the
This was a reference to a videotape in
which
razihan

i0

the Haitian negro

peace, liberty, order, and the
progress of the country....'' Pena

ii

This was exacerbated

and sovereignty for over two
decades. One billboard declared

"Dominican: Your destiny

who

,2).

Dominican: the bianco, educated
president who has maintained
Dominican

security, stability

man who

frenzied

are going to be 'African'
and barbaric

them. The only protection
from Pena Gomez, and

destiny from

“TV

had a 'volcanic' temper, and

The message of Balaguer's
campaign was simple:

me

by using

Haiti gradually spread
over and

covered a bright green
Dominican Republic” (Ferguson.
,994:

Dominicans were reminded

Gomez

Gomez accompanied by a

which a dark brown

by the perception that
the dark-skinned Pena

reports that the Balaguer

The y

ritual

performed by

other Affo-spiritst and syncretic
also perceived as being the "cults' of

like

I

HIS

words

(Espinal, 1994-6-7}
7). All of these

for stereotypical
portraits

comments about Pena Gomez
used code-

of Haitians.

Although some may find
such blatant prejudicial
democracy. William Connolly
argues
pressures to

become

politics out

of place

in a

that “[electoral politics
con, a, ns powerful

a closed circuit for
the

dogma, ization of identity through

translation of difference
into threat and threat
into energy for the

the

dogma, ization of

identity" (Connolly.,
991: 2,0). This certainly
explains the "Haitianization/
etherization

of Pena

Gomez

during the

1

994 presidential

elections.

Yet

i,

is critical to

remember

that

identity can only be
'dogmatized' during specific
periods, such as elections,
if elements

of alienation and marginalization
already
possible to assert Pena

Gomez’s

exist in daily

life.

Therefore,

lack of Dommicamdad if
the

i,

would no, be

Dommicamdad of million!

of Dominicans, particularly
Afro-Dominicans, were no, perpetually
threatened,
challenged and negotiated
In the

in

everyday

life.

Dominican Republic, many children
of Haitian workers

poor Afro-Dominicans, particularly
registered. This

is

due

parents, and/or the lack

Dommicans do

in rural

to the shallowness

of money required

environments, are

of state

\

any person

As

bom

et the authorities

in the

Dominican Republic has

do not necessarily respect the

Dominicans...” (Martinez, 1996: 10
).
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unequivocal on
the right to

valid

of the

many

a result

not have documentation to prove
they are Dominican.

is

many

and never properly

institutions, the ignorance

for the birth registry.

observed that there "[t]he Dominican
Constitution
that

bom

as well as

Sam

Afro-

Martinez

that matter... states

Dominican

citizenship.

documents of Hatian-

,

ota

--

-»

“" “«”

r

ans. those
bifth

who

P °' iCe are reP ° rted

who

residents,

are

«*

i.

«fc »

hi,

»

,* „

„

are without papers
are deported
regardless of their
place of

t0 C ° nSiSteml
>'

“fficia,

sondes deported.

docun,..:s of iegal
Haitian

June of ,99,, Baiaguer
decreed

tmmigrants under the age
of 16 and over 60 be
expelled from the country 12

that Haitian

.

James

Ferguson writes:

§SS=~3=-'
~=B?l!Sassa
SRr

(Ferguson.

199^9?

“ ‘° ‘ C0Um,y they had never seen

There were no government
investigations

into the militaifys activity,
nor

preventative measures installed
to avoid future repetitions
of such ine, dents.
the

government ignored the

political rights

any

As

usual,

of dark-skinned Dominicans.
Dominicans of

Haitian ancestty and
Hatian workers, with or
without documentation.
Additionally, being

-strong" with the Haitians
has traditionally been
considered a means of increasing
prestige

among

politicians.

Baiaguer used the "threat of
Haitian infiltration" as

of justifying the brutal security
policies of his police,

a

means

his arbitrary decisions to
deport

Haitians, regardless of legal
status, and in the formation
of his "Hispanic” vision of

Dominican

nationality.

But Baiaguer

is

not alone in

entered into an alliance with
Baiaguer after the
alliance

was

called

"The

Patriotic Alliance” (El

Those between 16 and 60 were allowed

first

When

Leonel Fernandez

round of the ,996 elections, the

Frente Palriotico), a clear attack on
Pena

to stay since they
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this.

were considered workers.

*

GOmeZ S DOminiCanidad
DOminiCa "

mixed

'

teCt

" "" “ "**

°b

-

racial heritage
(Interviews,

— ~,y
-

consider this to Have
Heen a

Dominicans interviewed

for th is

1997 ).

O.Her than Baiaguer,
ihe most conspicuous
of the ami-HaHian
ideologues
invoived in the 996
elections were the
PLD S Mauricio Vinicio Casiiiio
,

(Hartlyn, I998:

2j9> 243)

seem

'

THe

re ‘ ired

ye‘

Sti "

aCtiW Bosch

'

wh °

oddly enough wrote some
of the

the least bit bothered
by his association
with Baiaguer.
iguer, or the rampant
use of anti-

H ’““”

*

“

““ >*.

".

praig(

,

Pena Gomez.

d^ai^f

th^DominicmTRe^^

^essssSt#The use of police repression
and
was nothing new

in the

the obstruction of basic
civil rights prior to an
election

Dominican Republic.

In fact. Baiaguer

Perez y Perez" the position
of head of the police prior to
the
for the express purpose

of browbeating would-be

international pressure, particularly
from

Jimmy

PRD

this role since
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firs,

voters.

I,

round of the elections,

was only with

Carter, and public statements
from

Fernandez himself that the repression
ended (Hartlyn,

See also (Hartlyn, 1998:
263)
General Perez Perez was
y
well-acquainted with

gave the ruthless Genera,

1

99 8: 265-6). What was new.

he was responsible for the
repression of

however, was tha,
violence, anti-Haitianism
and blataw violations

Dominican

citizens

Fernandez supporters,
inciuding some scholars,
justified

tHat) 35

that

^^

were being exp, oiled
by someone other lhan
Baiaguer.

be n8 P °' itiCS neCeSSary

pragmalic

^^

'

Fernandez would rule

transition to

(Interviews,

democrat, ly and

,

997). Ye, they were
positive

that bis election

would represented

democracy, since the
transitions of 1961,
1963, 1966,

somewhat disappointing
improvement over

(see Hartlyn,

1

998).

And

the Fernandez

the previous Baiaguer
regimes, although

it

is

,978 were

a true

all

government has been an

strongly aided by a

massive economic boom.
Fernandez has avoided the
authoritarian ruling behavior
of his
predecessor and seems to
represent wha, political
scientist Jacqueline
Jimenez-Polanco
considers a transition from
a “charismatic leadership
to contingent leadership(Jimenez-

Polanco, 1999).

However, the contingent and
lo his

weakness

less charismatic leadership

relative to a very
obstructionist congress

maintain even tenuous alliances.

In this sense, his

something new. may actually
be more

like that

where

governing

of Fernandez may be due
his party

was unable

style, rather than

to

being

of earlier presidents Antonio
Guzman and

Jorge Blanco whose lack
of caudillista prestige and party
majority and/or unity made

them weak
Fernandez
his party

1

presidents, not necessarily
democratic ones.
s

One

reason to believe this

is

resorting to the abuse of Haitians
to protect himself from
opposition within

(PLD), his

fragile alliance with the

PRSC. and from

the

PRD.

In

March of

997, Fernandez sent the police in
pursuit of undocumented Haitians,
especially

political opposition in 1966.

in

7
Sam, ago Where

.here

was rumored

to

'[« Dominican

be a ‘'Haitian beggar
network.” Wucker
writes

^^

„„

least these
'

authorities and that
efforts

were marip °

as possible.

“Nobody can deny
undocumented workers to

their

back, expelled from
Puerto
when the U.S. re

a

Do

the

Rim

S r

because they
xnou the
tne U
> know
U.S.
S ha
has ti?
the

^

Haitians as humanely

™ mem

T” Domm
™ ^ “y
’

h

by P ° intin out tha
< at
g
cooperation of the Haitian

8 ° Ve

count n'

^

5°™!^

right.”

___

day

'

s

ri

S ht

icans

t0

relum

come

anythin §- Every day,
border nobody protests,
'

(Wucker, 1999: 247)

Interestingly enough,
six years earlier
President Joaquin Balaguer
defended his

deportation of Haitians
saying that he had “the
right to treat the
Haitians the same
the United States or
Puerto Rico treat
Dominicans” (in Ferguson,
1992: 89).

way

as

The abuse goes beyond
periodic deportations during
moments of waning
pres, dent, al Popularity.
There

by the police.

It is

is

also an everyday aspect
of abuse, principally
perpetrated

well documented that
during the harvest, Haitian
workers are

restricted to the plantation

San Carlos, also ea.led

on whieh they work
(Wilhems,

Little Haiti, Haitian

1

994). In the neighborhood
of

and Afro-Dominican residents
ate regularly

stopped, harassed, and
forced to pay bribes to
police officers (Wuck...
1999: 89). This

harassment

is

not limited to undocumented
Haitians, bu, also to those
with papers, and

dark-skinned citizens of the
Dominican Republic.

If

Afro-Dominicans do no, cany

their

papers, they are often fined
(for a bribe) and can be
sent to a detention center
or a
Plantation that needs labor.
This repression has been
exacerbated by the growth of the

drug trade, especially
Directorate of

Drug

in

San Carlos, and the creation of the

Control).

It is

the

DNCD
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DNCD (the National

which has been actively involved

in

invasions of San Carlos nnH ,v«i, ^
other areas populated
by the darkest
society and

which has been

killnv people

who
been

cited
d repeatedly rlor

refuse to pay bribes

little

effort

prevent police from heating
those

t

human

(Human

to be

who do

1

is

1

civilians.

more

in

terms of limiting

it

because he

is

is

a

weak

respectful

of civilian

rights'

routine abuse of Haitians.
For example,

Dominican Republic

mistreatment of Haitians

^

impunity

president or because police

in

who crossed

Rights Watch, 1993: 100). In
1997,

1

I

little to

institutionalize a

5
.

he documentation of civil
rights abuses tends

Situation in the

to

be limited to describing the

luman Rights Watch wrote

992 continued

to be

the border into the

some 21,000

"the

human

dominated by

1

998). Again, there are no

Dominicans have been deported, just as

Haitians,

is

no evidence

documents were deported. Additionally,
Dominicans on
continuum predominate

in prisons,

where prisoners are

official

Dominicans of Haitian

numbers which can

there

rights

Dominican Republic” (Human

descent and Afro-Dominicans
were expelled from the Dominican
Republic

Rights Watch,

institution to

The Fernandez government

no, a primary concern
for him, Fernandez has
done

police force

^

998), although he has rhetorically
supported .indicia, reform and

ending police impunity.
Whether
Violence

Rights Watch, 1097, 199

not observe the unofficial
curfew, from

much of an improvement

(Human Rights Watch,

rights violations,
including beating

by the police or any
other governmental

accepting bribes, and from
torturing and

does no, seem

members of Domini*.

detail

how many

ofhow many

the darker

(Human
Afro-

Haitians with

end of the color

dealt with severely

(i.e.

torture

researcher was able to prolect various
Afro-Dominicans and 1 lailians from forced bribes,
onion,
potential
beatings and possible detention by pretending
to be an American reporter when he noticed
police
stopping people in San Carlos. The police
allowed the Afro-Dominicans and Haitians to leave
after the
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4

ath) for noting

await

trial

(Human

and where as many as
90 percent of prisoners

some of most imponan,
demographic information

down by

some jails

Rights Watch, 1997:
96).

The Nationa, Office of
Statistics (ONE) which
conducts

broken

in

coior or race, in

identify by co, or/race.

The

,

fact, the

in the

the census and
produces

country has no informat,
on

census docs no, even ask
individuals

994 Demos study represented
a change since

i,

to

included

questions about color, bu,
the overwhelming
majority of the questions
involved

in the

survey were differentiated
by sex. urban/rural,
and class factors, and no,
color/race. As of
the writing,

One

some

ol this data is being

statistic that

was included

broken

in the

down by

ONE'S

color/race

16

evaluation of the Dominican
census

of 993 and was a chan
which broke dow n the number
of suicides by race and
1

The

sex.

information was provided by
the National Police.
The National Police have not

responded

to several letters
requesting

access to their data, and

similar data will be published.
In the absence of other
data,
statistics for suicide, the

In the

b!mC°S
them

When

’

Dominican Republic,

101 f° r mestizos, and 171

to national

the

only available

the

forties. The numbers

demographics (16% blancos,

1

mestizos, and 2

1

.2/1

among negros

(1.6/1

00.000 negros). Thus, the suicide

993 by race are 20

1

are

racial

and

11% of negros).

categoiy are tabulated, the

negros

1

is

.8/1

00.000

more than

“reporter" said he
aC

was unaware that a curfew existed
(Turits, interview).
0 'Vle< Smenl “ °'Ved “ l$is Duarte
and
Brea who are

recon?erol „
reconversion
off,h
these

l
statistics.
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for

oau when one compares

00,000 blancos,
rate for

speculating on the

by "race."

73% of mestizos,

number of suicides per 00,000 people
of each

rate ot suicides is incredibly
high

in

unlikely that other

is

wonh

is

i,

statistics differentiated

number of suicides

i,

facilitating
* the

1

„

,imeS ,ha ‘ ° f WanC0S

^

ThC

ra, '°

Additi0na11

-

—

^

"

,t

,s

Any

7.42 ,o

1,

and for

Wgros ,o negras

explanation of this isolated

above discussion

there are probably

^

i,

were not indeed

** Hfe

is

3,

is

,0.61 to

t0 2

,

skewed by

two

possibilities.

— - - -h

The

while for mestizos

first,

However, given

the

being that Afro-

^^^^

more depressing, confining
and

suicides.

In 1997.

30 civilians were

flings were reported

in

hilled

by police

in “self-defense,"

and 35 extrajudicial

,996 (Human Rights Watch,
,998. ,997). “Dominican
police

routinely ignored due
process, such as providing
access to lawyers and
observing the
forty-eight hour limit

on holding detainees

detained criminal suspects'
family

themselves in"

(Human

disproportionate

it

in

members

Rights Watch.

1

police lockups.

would seem

998:

1

self-inflicted.

to be an indication that

They

also arbitrarily

as hostages, to entice the
suspects to turn
3).

Reports like these and the

number of negros (men) who
committed

Whether the deaths were actually
bias,

suicide bring into question

,f other police records
indicate a similar

Afro-Dominicans are more

likely to be

harassed, abused and killed
by police, and. therefore, that
their civil rights are, indeed,

abridged v is-a-\

,o

1.

statistic calls for
speculation.

Donrinican. particularly
negro, suicide rates
are so

DOmi " iCanS

U a, so

° WanCOS ,0
suicide

mestizas

g ,0 gender

is

Euro-Dominicans.

statistic for suicides

In the defense

when broken down by

of the National Police, the same

nationality

by Dominicans, only 3 were
by Haitians and

1
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shows

that

almost

all

suicides were

was Asian. The low number of Haitians

suggests that using suicides
to cover up murder

mayy

not account for the very
high

number

of negros.
The National Police

is

no, the only

Dominican

institution that is reluctant
to

make

information available. In a
report to the International
Convention on the Elimination of
All f orms of Racial
Discrimination, the
ractal discrimination
exists,

14 Oct, 1988). In the

Dominican government's position was

no legislation has been enacted

1990 Report

to the International

in this

"since no

connection" (IERCD,

Convention on the Elimination

Racial Discrimination, Mrs.
Bonetti Herrera gave a very brief
repo.. „n the lack of racial
discrimination.

Members of the

advisory committee expressed concern
about racial

minorities and asked for an update
on this in the next report filed, which
would be due

1992. In their analysis of the
condition of human rights
1998,

Human

in the

Dominican Republic

in

in

Rights Watch noticed

[a]t this

writing, the

report to the U.N.

Dominican government still has not submitted its
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,

which was due

in March, and the committee
considered the report
excessively overdue.' The Dominican
government, which is obliged to
submit reports to the committee every two
years last satisfied this
requirement in 1990 (Human Rights Watch, 1998:
15).
1

As

ol this writing in the

summer

ol 1999,

no such report has been

filed.

Brazil

I

here

is

a very long tradition in Brazil of legal protection
of rights and negative

However,

liberties.

legal protection

law, but not actualized in practice.

i
I

of

]

n Brazil, every
1

of rights has remained something

As Caldeira and Holston

democratic constitution since the

that

is

elaborated in

write:

first

Republican charter

891 has contained adequate provisions for due process and the

fundamental rights

ol life, liberty,

and property

inspired, in fact, by the U.S. Constitution.
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—provisions

In reality,

directly

however, Brazilian

° nl> C °" si
'

that
thar (Caldeira

What

is

interesting

Brazilians face

is

few

f

ntl >

that while rights to vote are
guaranteed to all Brazilians,

official obstacles to political
access,

political hierarchies essentially
marginalize

Afro-Brazilians

political

and

who do

most

means and time

in

Brazilians. This

and/or the perception that political
institutions
to mobilization

which

may

to

and

socio-economic structures and

not have a 'racial consciousness’
which

civil rights, the

examine obstacles

P«V«y and only certain kinds at

P rotecled

and Holston, 1998: 275).

is

is

connected to their

approach

actually help.

especially so for

political institutions,

The next chapter

will

of and expanding political rights of Afro-Brazilians.

This section, however, will concern

itself

with violation of the

civil rights

of Afro-

Brazilians, as well as recent low-profile
denunciations of racism. Understanding the

condition of civil rights lor Afro-Brazilians
requires understanding the hierarchy of
personal value in Brazil, and the society's relative
indifference to homicides

among

its

“marginal” populations.

Former Sub-Secretary of the Military Police of the
da Silva explains that police, in any

country',

State of Rio de Janeiro Jorge

have two responsibilities:

law enforcement... and the maintenance of order... [The former may be
clear, however, the latter] is more ambiguous... What if the

somewhat
order

is not equal? [what il there is a savage order which
undermines the
law?]... Will the police maintain an unequal order or execute the law'?...

A unequal society does not want an egalitarian police force
30

th

The police
skinned,

(Interview,

of October, 1998).
in Brazil

seem

to consistently maintain a hierarchical order in

more educated and wealthier

which

lighter

Brazilians occupy a higher place than darker

skinned, less educated and poor Brazilians. Brazilian military police, and to a lesser
extent civil police, routinely arbitrarily arrest or pull over potential suspects,
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who

they

°

'

a,er find

8Uiky ° f S ° me Crime

'

Tte two

P^Ple groups that suffer from police

harassment, groups which
overlap, are the poor,
particularly residents
offavelas, and
Afro-Brazil ians.
Ph efmelm are
C0nsidered 10 be “li-ninel
types of social spaces:
they are
residences, bu, no, -proper'
residences” (Calde.ra,
,992: 83).

or brown skinned

(a, .hough

be dark

no, necessarily
negro/prelo) and/or from
the „ ortheas(

although^ are inhabited by Brazilians
is

Favelados tend

from

some animosity between
Afro-Brazilians and

all

over Brazil and of all
colors. There

northeastern migrants, and

skinned northeasterners
do not consider themselves

to

many brown-

be itegru, bu, rather caboCo,
India

or bianco. However,
their location within
th efavela "darkens"
(the opposite of

"whitening") them, and they
are seen to be

The

ratings cited from

American countiy where

civil liberties for ethnic

militaiy regime coincided
with

is in

urban areas

During the

1

980s and

although no, the same

Freedom House show

democratization. However. Brazil

/

like,

is

particularly

economic

and

as, the

negro.

that Brazil is r.:‘ the only
Latin

racial

exemplary

crisis as well as

Others have worsened during
in this area.

The end of the

massive penetration of the

by drug dealers, as well as by
the considerable growth of
favelas.
1

990s, a virtual war has raged in

many favelas

at night

between

police and off-duty police and
citizens, police and drug dealers,
drug dealers and rivals,

and drug dealers and

local residents.

Among

the various groups, the violence
of the

This section will focus on police
responses lo urban violence, especially
u-,in» Rio de Janeiro and Silo
Pau'o; Police violence is no,
limited ,o Ihese cities, or ,o urban
areas for lhat
H„w e «r

nST

in

Pe ° P S $eemS 10 be somellli
"S
‘l
the cmf
center-west squatters, often
associated

often

"“T

with the Landless

removed from property with considerable

™™'
Human

Rights Watch"

that pervades throughout Ihe

faZendaS

'» Brazil -

violence.
r

Movement (Movimemo Sew

Also, ihis will no, address

Polte

couMrv

For example

hZJZe

dai™ of

<* forced and underage prostitution

'

)
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in Brazil

(see

means enlightened

"imina
the

^

^

^

.

'

no
despots.

S

'

S

'

-

Band “ S Wh0 d °

40.4% of informants
confession (Carvalho

—
—“

marSina Pe0Pk

BraZU fOT

"

felt it

et al

was justifiable

in

1997-10 20)

T
The

some

'

hwefore

-criminals.-

^

When

** sho„,d no, have

cases to use violence
in older 10 get
a

,

-

° f,e " dark ' Skinned
° r PerCdVed

human.

of repressing

" 0t reSPeC ' the
H8htS ° f ° thCT -

'

'herefore. less

and as a

t0

use of violence

be

'

-

is

justifiable because

considered ,o be less

civi,i zed and.

one moment of political
bravado, former
governor of Rio de
Janeiro Marcelo
Alencar exclaim^ri
exclaimed "mi
[t]hese violent criminals
have become animals
In

^

•Hem
ha\e

can't

->

be civilized. These
people don', have

to be treated like

The

statistics

animals"

wi , h
to

(in Cavallaro,
1997:

of number of citizens

1991, the Military' Police
alone killed

1

killed

be treated

1

in a civilized

way. They

).

by police officers

is

staggering.

104 P
peode
opit in Sao
San Paulo
p
a
during
‘confrontations
,

with criminals’”
(Caldeira, ,992: 159).

February of ,996 the
militaiy police
tants.

The number

in

See (Spanakos, forthcoming

killed,

Janua^ of ,995 and

on average, 3.65 people
per 100.000

Sao Paulo was 2.68 deaths
for every 100.000

(Fagundes and Aquino. ,997:

18

Rio. “...between

,

8 ).

inhabitants.”

,992. Sao Paulo military
police killed 1.470

a).

159

—
civilians.

In

1

QQ9

a~>a

.

•

.

4 stree t ch^dren
were killed in Rio
Kl0 1iic8 n
more than the year
before
luman Rights Watch.
1993)
’

m
(

,

’

Cem
Public Securi

^

m aj ° Uma

^ m R'° dC Jane r0 '”
'

R, ° de janeir°
kn,ed

;7

police
forces of the United
p

-

'

°" " 0rgani2ed
Crime and ,he Cities
of

'

——

8naci0 Can ° Shows

m ° re

1

that iu

99

1

1

*

*
tates olr America

ns than the combined

(Cano
no, 1998V98. 2 08
)
V

the police force
of

aa
addUlon
severaJ
-

i

i

In

^

acres stand out.
mcludtng the killing
of

fam0US Cand£,aria
ChUrch th later,

and the ratd on

the

1

10 inmates a. the
Carandiru Prison in
Sao

“- —

th ejavela

Nova

Brasilia in

of thereto of Vigario
1

994 which

Rio de Janeiro (Human
Rights Watch, 1993,

killed

1

3

Oera, one

drug

994). These deaths are
often

1

implicitly supported,
if no, explicitly
funded, by local
businessmen, residents
of

apartment complexes
and others,

who encourage

private security

f_

t0 protec , the ,

businesses and residences.

No, only does the
bUt

“

"

3lS0

dear ,ha

'

‘

level

of police violence show
a blatant disregard

here are Cenain Pl3ces

has

little

troubling par, of da
Malta's relational citizenship,
since those

or are

the "absolute" bottom
of a relative scale have

a,

protecon. Brazilians of all
colors responded
rigorously than a bronco
for the

70.9% of

/w, Carvalho

e, al,

that a

little

who

for

value. This

human
is

the

life.

more

are "absolutely poor"

recourse to rights and

negro would be treated
more

same crime (64.5% of
Broncos, 67.2% of Pardos,
and
1

997: 49). Responses are
no, surprising since the
coups

are believed to have
a bias in favor of the
wealthy and powerful, and
Afro-Brazilians are

general

among

the most poor and
powerless. That Brazilian
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coups do no,

treat Brazilians

Of d lffcren, colors the
same
Brazilian culture.

The

is

very

much

a result of discourses
that are

-criminal,” for example,

is

embedded

into

conceived as generally
poor. Afro-

Brazilian, a migrant from
the northeast, the
son of a single mother,
a drug user, and a
resident of a favela
(Caldeira. 1992- 84- 1996- oni i e;
-84,1996.201).

Since anywhe.c between
40 and 60
,

percent of Brazil's
population could be identified
as Afro-Brazilian
(Idles,

December, 1998), and
h

is

i,

is

unlikely that any state
would ever have such a high
crime rate.

clear that Brazilian
police interrogate, and
often torture,

assuming a priori
de Lima,

that they ate criminals.

As one

is

guilty" (Kant, 1994:
40).

The

many

Afro-Brazilians

police officer bragged to
Roberto Kan,

the police use torture
to extract confessions

•he suspect

I8'V

when

they are already certain
that

Brazilian police gain their
certainty not

through Promethean visions,
bu, through access to
thick cultural and stereotypical
discourses which are validated
by

some experiences

that the police officer has

been told about. As Jorge da
Silva writes, "the police
produce

P

fantastic explanations

a

oii to later look for
evidence that conforms with an
imagined reality" (Silva. 1996:
3)

The combination of a
crime

is

police that

is

aware of who

Rio de Janeiro found

37.1/o were pielo
racial

that

a criminal, often before a

“

are pardo, ”

A

1997 report on police violence

of the victims, 34.7% were identified
as “bronco," while

and 28.2% were "pardo" (Fagundes
and Aquino, 1997:

breakdown of Rio shows

34.55%

is

committed, and the discursive
depiction of criminals lead to
routine police

violation of the rights and
liberties of Afro-Brazilians.
in

had or has

9.36%

a very different set of numbers:

are “negro,” and 0.

1

55.96%

19).

The

are -broncos:'

2% are “amarelo ” or “undeclared”

(Silva, 1998: 164). This suggests
that Afro-Brazilians, especially
those considered

-prelo" are over-represented

among

the victims of police violence.
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1

hese deaths often

^

dUnn8 “ COnfrOMati0nS ’”

T"

"

COnfr0ma,i0nS ” H

W0Unded

^

P0, Ce n
'

‘

S- Pauio, is on, y

hTO

C°

m

“' ^

^

s,i ghtly

“^—

o„ ly one out of eve

PhUadelphia

less

challenge the idea ,ha,

«* Chicago dies, three ou, of

deadly , as the rate

js

"

7

73%

””

So

”"

.

*.

C

of the Sao Paulo
population

while 22.5% of the
population

is

four peo ple

^

^^

. striking

1998:211).

“h°

, four peop]e

whJ .

branco
fio/
onlv 47
°* onl>
47.6
/0 nf
of prison population
•

pardo or preto,
57° nf
nreto 32%
of pr.son population

is /

is,

and

•

is

(Caldeira.

'992, ,23). Similarly,
in the s,a,e of Rio
1988, “2/3... of the total
126,, 52 prisoners

-e b.ack or mulatto”
880 PaUl °’ S ' r8i °

(Silva, 1998: 53).

Ad ° m °

And

in

** ^ three blacks [Afro-Brazilians]

f° Und 3

white [Euro-Brazilians]”
(Caldeira and Holston.
International organizations
such as
International

have been able

to

^

a study of -, 97

1

Human

is

Rights Watch and Amnesty

pu, a significant amount
of pressure on the Brazilian

generally focused on the
abuse

Some

small

NGOs.

among

particularly those identified
with the
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to eliminate

of«os, reports do contain

infonnation about the
disproportionate presence of
Afro-Brazilians
police violence.

one

998: 275).

government, especially with
Cardoso as president. A, though
the pressure
police violence

to

the victims of

Atovimemo

•

ha\e also served

to pressure

government from a more

local level 19

This

is

especially significant
since poltce are
controlled by state
governments

President Fernando

Hemi q ue Cardoso

has been

ve,

receptive to

human rmh.s

groups, and has been
very
active in
.
tn proposing
various measures to
limit police
prerogatives and impunity
a
f uuy. InIQQS
IW5, Cardoso
created a commi«in
ommissiOi. -i
•

m

numan

introduced legislation
to compensate
family
the dictatorship.

l

O' courts to

allowed

civil

Elution

is

members of those who
disappeared

n 1996, Cardoso
invited various

try

couns

military police

NGOs

and

during

to participate in
the

was eventually passed

1996 as a

in

bill

which

to try military
police for homicide,
bu, no, manslaughter.
This

significant since homicides
are often written

evil couns would no,
be allowed

proposed the use

rights

w itness

ol a

to

ay

up as manslaughter,
and because

cases of harassment
or torture. Cardoso
later

protection program in
order to protect those

who

testify

against police violence^,
the elimination of
al, militaty courts,
as well as the possibility

eliminating the military
police altogether

—

C ""°

activist Cardinal

1

However, as much
important as
rights, his

i,

)

Nta -«h „«

Paulo (Pinheiro, 1997).

Cardoso has introduced
important

government has been unable

5 f° r 3 n

The

as

Rights Watch. 1995; 1998

legislation

and as

has been tha, he has opened
significant public space about
the violation of

po>“^ T“
20

—

N“”“ *» *.

Ams of Sao

(Human

NCoTh

6)"

federal level (Cavallaro,

to

end police impunity.

^

1

998.

Human

Rights

detai,ed account of their
success and failures

aUth ° ritieS

'’

^ **

protectlon pro ram
2
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in

was

vital to the

construction of

Recife which was being
considered

at the

Watch reported

that in an appeal
trial, all the police
officers accused of the
ntassacre at

Candelaria were acquitted,
despite the testimony
of the one
kill

(Human

Rights Watch, 1998).

accused of the massacre

Grupo

in

On

the 9'"

man who

they

of December of 1998. police

w ere

unable to

officers

Vigario Geral were also
acquitted. The coordinator
of the

Cultural Afro-Reggae,

which

offers services to the

community of Vigario

Geral.

explained that he was no,
sutprised by the verdict given
the historic protection
of police

by the courts (Interview,

10,

December, 19 98 22 ).

These acquittals were only a
small
Janeiro the

las,

and criminality

few

years.

The

part

of what has been occurring

city invited the military
to panic, pate in

in th efavelas as
part

its

Many

number of civilian deaths caused by

officers accused

of murdering

and when

it

is

clear that the victim

generally closed. This

is

of police violence

are generally

who

war on drugs

led to a

marked

police (Cano. 1998; Cavallaro.
1997).

civilians receive

months of the homicides (Cavallaro,
1997:
neutral,

Rio de

of a program called Operation
Rio. Military

involvement coupled with a
generous incentive system for “bravery"
has
increase in the

in

bonuses or promotions within

40-1). Internal investigations are
hardly

was a "marginal,”

the investigation

is

a serious obstacle to allowing
justice for Afro-Brazilian victims

In contrast, the police in

assumed

to

be “marginals.”

Sao Paulo have made incredible progress.

A very

progressive series of policies in Sao Paulo
has led to a massive decline of civilians killed

by military police, from

1

1

90

(Cavallaro, 1997: 51). Police

removed from

in

1

992, to 243 in

who

1

993, 333 in

1

994 and 33 1

are found to have killed a high

in

1

995

number of people

active duty and are provided psychological
counseling.

Even though

are

it

is

Curiously enough the interview was given the day
the after the verdicts were announced, on December

164

difficult to fire
police officers

ot Public Security
took

because they are part
of civil service,
Sao Paulo's Secretary

200 police

officers Off of
active

duty because of
their role

in

homicides.

Afro-Braztlians are the
immediate beneficiaries
of the progran,

l0n8

^

effeCt

" ^ S3° **

—

- -e,y

to

in

Sdo Paulo and

improve, slc,- tbe
relations

between ctvthans and
police, and perhaps
also the justiciary
system. However
vo'ence of the poliee in
Rio, as wel, as other
urban area, encourages

the

anti-police and

senttmems among
•bat is often
quiescent if no,

the marginalized
populations,

completely

suppose

and engenders an
environment

of local drug dealers
(Ungar, ,998,.

That son of situation
reinforces Afro-Brazilian
use of informal
channels rather than
forma, institutions,
thereby weakening the
latter, while also
alienating themselves
from
the official, legal
political system.
Pol, eng the pol.ee
will obviously improve
the condition for the
primaty victims
ot Pol.ce violence.

general

racism

However, there have been

demand among

23
,

and

to

activists

efforts to no, only limit
police violence, a

and scholars, but also

to raise

consciousness about

encourage denunciations of
racial discrimination.
Titulo

of the 1988 Constitution
guarantees

“life, liberty, equality,
security,

I

Article 5 and 6

and property...” , 0

Brazilians regardless of
race, and Article XLII
declares that “the practice
of racism
constitutes a [terrible]...
crime [for

which there

is

no

bail], subject to

imprisonment,

according to the terms of the
law” (Fundacao Cultural
Plamares, 1995: 39). The Cao

0
2j

’

the international day
of human rights.

See chapter

5.
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all

—
u";"“

*

—--

™

«...

racial discrimination.

raC1Sm

make

thClr

Way mt °

of Anna Flavia de
Azaredo

(Pa86 ’ 1995: 60)
since the

-

The inddem

—

manager assumed she was

daughter of the Governor

a

the Brazilian
public. Perhaps
the most

who "was

Wh “

insulted by an
apartment

was

main

tu-is

enraged Flavia,

who happened

•

Who claimed

in a social

woman was

Cub

this

saying

a result,

(Mendonca and Benjamin.

called

i,

who

has been’

1997,.

were only three cases of
racism

them “monkey,

was

has always

(Globo>

the children

who were

My children are all

H

harassing them.

arrested for cursing a,
and biting a mi.itaty police
office

she called him "monkey,
shameless negro" (Globo, Oct
20. 1998

accused denied the use of
any
Japanese.

and«n, and as

field research for
this study there

The couple denied

In another case, a

be the

•

woman

repeatedly called "monkey"
and "crioula"

Oct, 1998).

to

HiaF
ntwn
8 ' P fi e Cntlcism of racism
has also come from
former
•

Positively identified
publicly as

claimed that a couple

manager

told to take the
service elevator,

senator and current
vtce-govemor of Rio de
Janeiro, Benedita da
Silva,

During the

„

racist slang saying

mixed.

“My

How could

1

father

is

be racist?

mulatto and

I.

like

my

),

The

husband

almost the whole

world, have a foot in Africa”
(Globo. Oc, 2, 1998). In the
third case, a nanny decided
to
press charges against the
Metropolitan theatre because she
was not allowed to enter a
children’s concert.

The Metropolitan’s policy

is
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that children

under 14 could only enter

is

with their parents. The
nanny was ashed whether the
children she was accompanying

were her own. Metropolitan
reported

was too young

to be the

that the guards

asked her because they

mother of the two children. She
claimed

she

felt that

that they asked her

because of her race since she
saw Euro-Brazilian nannies inside
(Globo, 27 October.

199 8

25
).

Pushing aside the truth claims,
the cases are interesting because
they point
certatn places

where the

civil rights

to

of Afro-Brazilians are abridged
occause of

stereotypes and cultural discourses
of negritude which are similar to
the “informal” and
'social” discrimination that
Afro-Dominicans experience. For example, the
children of
the police chief

likely that the

walking

were

in

a social club, an area that

is

considered socially exclusive.

It is

couple would not have found the
children so rude were they simply

down

the street, a public space.

However, since there are

certain spaces that

Atro-Brazilians have been historically
denied access or been given limited access,
often in these areas

where

racial discrimination is clearest.

children of the chief of police were

It

is

it

is

also likely that the

more aware of racial discrimination because of their

position in the club as a "minority" and
because of their relatively high degree of

education (Guimaraes, 1997)‘ 6

.

Further, because the children

were the children of a

B raz ’l s most popular daily which tends to be on the conservative
side.
These cases are culled from issues of O Globo
between August of 1998 and January of 1999. It is
probably only coincidental that all three incidents
were reported in October, the month when presidential,
congressional and gubernatorial elections were held.
Claims of racism in Brazil are highest in cities with the
lowest percentage of pretos, which also tend to be
,5

the cities with the highest literacy rates
(Guimaraes, 1997). For example, die

number of cases of
00,000 preto inhabitants demonstrated that the number of cases was highest in
Brasilia
(11.51), Curitiba (9.87) and Sao Paulo (6.50) where the
percentage of the population which is preto is 3.7,
2.5 and 4.6 percent respectively. The rates of
illiteracy for those cities are 9.12, 7.97 and 9.15 percent
(Guimaraes, 1997: 64, 66). The number of cases for the cities
of Recife (2.43), Salvador 4.23) and Rio de
Janeiro (5.55) where the percent of pretos is much higher
(5.6, 15.6 and 10.5) was much lower. Similarly,
the rates of illiteracy in the three cities were 15.42,
1.60 and 9.08 percent.
discrimination per

1

1
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“ fc
p.pi.1

and

.ha, ,hey

had the

ability ,o enforce
it

an anomaly in
Brazilian law

The couple was jai.ed

™

Certainlv
Certainly, no response

•

for

, he

would have been

offense of racism.

that fast

were the

mother not a chief of
police.
I" .1.

““ h "
shopping drea.

domonarates .

among

!l

c. .
" ” Uld “

„ hllt , ubllt

,

“

rtice
•” “'«*'

>» »

ta». of. ohoppi,,

cpM,

-it „

^

,
6).

The woman

from doing what she
wished by a person who,
she believed, was

w as prevented

clearly her social

This led to her setting
him straight by reminding
him of his lower position
on

the S0Cial t0tem
POle ’ Simi,ar t0 ,he

da Matta

„„

^^

„

the lower and lower
middle classes (see chapter

inferior.

^

TOn

|M

comedy

"

d0 *>“

associates with putting

^

who you

someone

are talking to?"
phrase which

in his or her place,

while

simultaneously establishing
his or her own.

Her response

is

also vety interesting
because

it

mimics much of the

national

urse on race in Brazil,
or the Dominican Republic
for that matter. She
claims there
is

no way

that she is racist since
her father is a “mulatto”

However, she does no.

identify as mulatto and she
married "up" in terms

hierarchy, consistent with
"whitening" ideology. This
that

and her husband

most of the Brazilian nation
(and

ancestor, loved one or friend

who

is

is

Japanese.

of Brazilian

no, to say her claim

practically the entire

is false,

only

Dominican one) can claim an

dark-skinned or mixed. Bu,
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is

this

does no, mean that

race

c third case
demonstrates t h e power
of discourses.

were allowed

“—--

to enter wit h
the ch i ldren

of t h eir employees,
but

-cu rity guards asked

because of her skin
color she claims

n
They

•

mot h er 0 f th e

children.

expensive,

is

An

W

Afro-Brazilian

assumed

woman

•

ifshe were (he

this particular

Afro-

namy onhe two chi|dren

•

insist that

Re g ard less,

policemen, and others
make judgements
percept, ons.

Euro-Brazilian nannies

i,

was because she
looked

too

security guards,
salespeople

and decisions everyday
based on
at a concert for
children,

where

their

tickets arc fairly

be a nanny, whereas
a Luro-Brazilian
with the same

doubt. Here, Brazilian
culture reinforces
these beliefs since
other areas that are
considered “exclusive^
also show a dearth
of Afro-Brazilians.
for example,

the foreign

service,

businessmen and women,

members

ol the cabinet

should be

made

social

Cubs, high

political officers, the
president,

and

and eongress are highly
disproportionate* Euro-Brazilian.
So

clear that

i,

is

Afro-Brazilians. although
they

no, merely the police

may do

who impinge on

i,

the citizenship of

so in the clearest and
most quantifiable ways.

Comparative Analysis
Procedural and Institutionalist
claims about Liberal
democratic citizenship focus

on the importance of
institutional structures
and
articulation.

27

.

Ih.s

I,

officially prescribed
channels for interest

has been argued that
relational and particular
conceptions of identity

.

is

particularly relevant in the

Dominican Republic where
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the

Dominican nation

is

considered to be

“

«

iP
-

.ir«,,d ,h,

»„

Cil

- ft* I-**

Ii<h

„

« „,

orpcive,

ni

iJt4 inJ

hierarchies of citizenship
have persisted during
democratization.
Political rights,

understood within the
neo-liberal tradition,
involves voting and

•he expression of
political preferences.
Elections are regular in
both countries and
officially recognized
victors

is

of elections enter into the
positions for which they

significant considering
the vast

governments during

this

century for both governments

Republic, and approximately
28
electoral results

number of years spent under
explicitly

have been

in Brazil).

reliable,

(at least 5, in the

In Brazil, unlike the

ran.

This

authoritarian

Dominican

Dominican Republic,

and losing eandtda.es have
had

little

opportunity to

claim fraud. Perhaps certain
candidates suffer from media
bias, as da Silva did

in

,989

against Collor. However,
voters for the Worker’s
Party (PT). or any other party,
are no.

systematically denied the right
to vote.

Voting

in the

Dominican Republic has been highly
problematic,

1990 and 1994 elections.
Electoral
system and undent, ined the

irregularities

political rights

of Dominican

Dominicans. The relatively clean
electoral
municipal elections

may have

restored

weakened

results in the

some

especially in the

the legitimacy of the electoral

voters, particularly Afro-

1996 presidential and the 1998

faith in the electoral system.

It

seen whether this was a result
of Balaguer not being a candidate or
whether
represents a

to the

new

transition (Hartlyn,

1

998).

Regardless,

some

criticism

second round of the elections, Fernandez’s
party benefited from,

one of mixed

race,

and

that therefore there can be

no racism.
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is

if

remains

to

be

this

due since prior

not

was

COmP

'

'a 0 '' 0

iCit

'

° f lhe

'

hat

^ ^ P0

*

r r ' Sht

iCe

'

Afr°- DOminiC

10 freC

and Haitians. This was
a sea,

--

Haitians, and

CXerdSe ° fp0li,ical

seems

he a c,ea r infringement

Fernandez also used the

problem" as a means of
salvaging his popularity

.'Haitian

after less than a year
in office.

Despite the generally
positive picture of regular,

and the success

to

in in, proving
political rights in the

if

no, institutionalized,
elections.

Dominican Republic and

Brazil in

rccen, years, the
quality of political rights
for Afro-Dominicans
and poor Dominicans

worsened during

this decade,

although

Idee, oral fraud, a
perennial thorn in

although political round-ups

still

° f ‘ he

continue.

to protect the civil
rights

D ° mln,Can

and the courts

shows some signs of improvement

Dominican democracy's

building deep universal
political rights

governments

i,

is

More

996.

1

been limited.

troubling than the ineffectiveness
in

the inability of the

of their

side,

since

citizens.

Dominican and

Worse

still is

Brazilian

the fact that organs

and Brazilian governments,
most obviously the President, the
police

in the

Dominican Republic and

the police and the courts
in Brazil,

seem

to

consistently violate the rights
of Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians.

What has been demonstrated

here

Dominican Republic have encouraged

Domimcans, and even

if

is

that the

the violation

two most

recent presidents of the

of rights of Haitians and Afro-

they claim to have only dealt
with undocumented aliens they

never placed any limitations on the
National Police to protect Dominican
negro*.
also be

shown

that the nationalist discourse

of Dominican

identity

constructed in large during the Trujillato
and by Balaguer,

espouses a

racist

is

It

can

(Domimcamdad),

not only anti-Haitian, but

ideology which denigrates Afro-Dominican
influence, culture, and

people, while presenting itself as
Hispanic and “Indian.”
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It

can also be shown that the

it

National Police and
the

skinned Dominicans
’

DNCD are employed to

m general

which these
organizations

Afro- n ommicans

mUS

‘

'

adV

The
'st.es

tareet for th~

r ' 8h,S

° f Afr °- DOmi

m

"

tha ‘

'

-- *

—

beyond the "informal

vtolat.on of the evil
rights of
Afro-Brazilians

abound, S, at, st.es
cited

earlier

'

,m8 SmCe

among

P0PU

'

ati0n ° f Afr

“'ians

the prison
population. This

tvtl rtghts

is

natural proclivity for
crime

is

a

which include

Police results

(Department of State,

easier to demonstrate

is

The Sdo Paulo example
so low

in the state,

W

make up

is

particularly

and ye, very high

determined

among

a larger part of the
prison population

based on discourses
tha,

Afro-Brazilians, the poor,
migrant,

offavelas, the question of
racial discrimination
becomes more
methods

little

and

not enough to prove
that Afro-Brazilians
have

abridged, only that they

Bu, when the criminal
population

assume a

is

-tined

barriers to social

demonstrate the
^proportionality of Afro-

Brazilians relative to
Huro-Brazilians in prisons.
te

highly pr0 iti ous
for racism, which
p

is

^

he

which darker

° Pera " 0nS are
also Populated
principally by

and Haitians. The
situation

“

he C V "

in

are ^legated to
the bottom rungs,
and that the areas

.

.

'

'

maintain an order

clear.

When

arbitrary arrest,
harassment, and torture-are

res, dents

police

combined with

signed confessions or
civilian deaths in
'confrontations'-^ne can

speculate further on a
systematic infringement
on the

civil rights

of

*

^-Brazilians.

Brazilian police brutal
methods, interrogation of
people they ‘-know” are
guilty

and impunity from
investigation, are similar

to tha,

.he poor and marginal
sectors of the population
rights

and are the

leas, likely to

of the Dominican

who

Both

targe,

are leas, capable of
asserting their

be defended by a lawyer,
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police.

le,

alone receive a hearing. The

difference for the purpose
of this comparison

is

,ha, sla.islics

show

that the

poor

in Brazil

and the majority of victims
of police violence are
disproportionately Afro-Brazilian.
The
government of the Dominican
Republic has no data which
breaks down economic class
by color or race. The Nattona,
Police of the Dominican
Republic
that

is

would

unlikely.

information

correlate race to victims
of police violence, but the release
of such information

From

a

more

qualitative perspective,

months of direct observation of

“soctety” sections of Dominican
newspapers shows an almost

Dommican

may have

homogenous Euro-

or very light-skinned
population. These are the citizens

whose

consistently recognized, and this
reinforces the idea that
Afro-Dominicans,
typically appear only in the
sections

on “crime” and “entertainment,

citizenship

is

whose photos

are not proper

members of society.
During the summers of 990 and
1

Dominican Republic,
media.

I

1

997 when

field research

there w-ere no cases of racism which

w ere

was conducted

in the

reported by mainstream

here are also no cases as high profile
as that of Ana Flavia. nor are there

politicians, like Benedita

da Silva,

who have

publicly reported racial prejudice

encountered. During follow-up interviews
with Bienvenida Mendoza, coordinator
of an

NGO which teaches against racism (see chapter 5), she indicated
running lor office.

It

she were to do

this,

that she

had considered

denunciations of racism would likely be part of

her campaign. In the meanwhile, victims
of racial discrimination in the Dominican

Republic do not report such

An

activities (see chapter 5).

area where civil rights protection has improved
in Brazil, albeit slowly,

the area of denouncing racism.

denouncing

As Antonio Guimaraes

ol these attitudes as racist

writes

"

the publication and

by the press constitutes a sign
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is in

that the times are

changing,

though

sM, (Guides, .997: 68 ,

^^

Whether peop ,

time as a result of
racial discrimination,
or whether a case
of racial discrimination
can
survive a trough
tria , remains
l0 be seen

jail

In the

.

meanwhile „
,

'

hat raC

T

^

" t,le

'

Sm n
'

abS,raC ‘-

‘

C ° nS,itU,eS an

m ° re

amount of protection

l

„^

n °‘ 3 8 °° d ,hin
* «** *a, one should be
agains, racism

imPr° Vement

legal reC ° UrSe

many of the

"

„

” the

ofAfro-Brazilians

who now have

a

° Pr° ,eCt themselves fro™
arbitrary abuse.
However the

offered on a practice,
,eve,

is

minima, because

i,

is

rare, used since

police officers violating
rights are also
Afro-Brazilian. and most
Afro-

Brazilians do no, see
violence or discrimination
committed agains, them as
racial,
especially

"

hiSh£r

when

the aggressor

in BraZil ln
’

Dominicans tend

is

also an Afro-Brazilian^

8eneraL ' han

to see prejudice

in

*

he

Dom ™-n

Although

racial

consciousness

Republic, Afro-Brazilians
and Afro-

they receive as a result
of their class, and not their

race”. This does,
however, change

among

the

more educated and those

in

more highly

“skil!ed”/”white-collar” positions.

Conclusion

Political

ideal.

point

and

civil rights in the

Institutional structures

where

the

Dominican Republic and

fall far

short

and democratic procedures
have been undermined

most marginal people have the

procedures which are designed
to protect and

government-such

Brazil

least recourse to the

fortify their rights.

to the

very institutions and

Worse, organs of the

as the police, judges, the
military-are complied, if not the
actual

aggressors, in the abridgement
and violation of those political
and civil rights. The
28

of the

See (Spanakos, 1999a)
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enforced hy the courts.
As Pinhero writes
affects the equality

governments

of citizens before

(Pinhero, 1992: 271).

The Sao Paulo

arc half-hearted

Santo

in the

he failure to enforce
ti, law no, only

makes

and perpetuate the

military police

killed,

seems

to

i,

ntore difficult for

illegal circle

of violence"

have made headway

however police

and the growth of the
"war on drugs"
area which

two countries,

effective system

which

in

in

internal investigations

Rio de Janeiro and

has increased, due to
incentives for "bravery" and
the involvement of
the

A second
power

at least three
preconditions,

and police impunity
continues. Police violence

Dom.ngo

military in Rio.

[t]

the law. but also

terms of decreasing the
number of civilians

improve democratization

-a, would he guaranteed
hy police and

"

to strengthen their
legitimacy

certainly

would need

to be

in

improved

Santo Domingo.

is

the hierarchical structure
of

particularly punctuated by
the presence

of clientelism and

relatively

hollow

institutions.

of a small

elite,

an

Democratization has

no, weakened clientelism
and strengthened institutions
across the board, contrary
to the
29

Sec chapter

5.
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r

K

„ ^,,„, vl umk
,

horizontal organizations”
(Weyland. 1996 70).
:

n,,,

“

,l

T ««—

lo* » . U.ird
“

condition,

**

*

oonno.M

«»*..h,p

““ -

» „„ „ Ubml
,t is

,llic| ,

^

th, n

.nd

.

»'.»« «»,»,* con,,,, of

*„ „

in!

neutral institutions.
But

.

- r~v v,„ „„„

,W"“-

"

„ c |« nreli=m

clear that

some

^

„„„

institutions are not
neutral

and

,

jtl8

^

that rights are

not universally
recognized and protected,
therefore privileging
the wealthy, those
with
powerful family and
personal connections,
and those with more
European features over
.he poor, those
without connections,
and those with more
African features.

countries

where ghettos and
shanties contain poverty
inhabitants of these
spaces are

much

that is considered
"absolute,”

and where the

"darker" than the
inhabitants or

more wealthy
netghborhoods, the relational
citizenship has an
"absolute" bottom. The
bottom of this
hierarchy

is for

"marginals" whose political

hnough government sponsored
less fonna, discourses

policies, primarily a,
the

which continually

status as persons,
citizens,

civil rights are
routinely

.ocate

and human beings.
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them

ignored and violated

hands of the police, and
through

a, the

vety bottom of a hierarchy
of

CHAPTER

5

Pl l!UCAN cit
>zensiiii>in
mi. iw/», K
AN
^PUBLIC
AND brazil
p'^
POL
>U flCAL
,
ENGAGEMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS
•

Republican theorists
find minima, is,
visions of citizenship
and Lib e ra, democracy
troubling. They
argue that democratic
citizenship must be
constructed through
active

participation

CU ZenSh P
'

'

mforma!

and they focus on

political

agency and positive

a S0 COnSiderS
,hat 3 Cili2e
"

political rights.

Republican

'

structures

of domination.

substantivis, perspective

democracy. They argue

make
that,

<*

Scholars

similar

who

from domination”

LPetit.

,997) and

study democratization
with a

comments about

Libera, and institutional

by themselves, the
institutions of Libera,
democracy are no,

pros ,ding a democratic
political environment
because they do not give
enough
attention to the
hierarchization within
societies

made
is

political

agency weak,

if no,

where

identity

and Cass

politics

have

nonexistent, for large portions
of the population. This

especially true in areas
such as Latin America,
or in other areas outside
of the

“developed world,” where
there

is

a highly unequal
distribution

of wealth and power

across elements in society.
Republican concepts of citizenship
which focus on the depth
Ol citizenship rights

and commitments are
particularly important

Republic and Brazil, where
rights have been so

in the

Dominican

difficult to institutionalize,
especially for

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
This chapter

will

examine effons

to politically

mobilize and consciemize
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians,
the strategies employed

bv

activists

and Non-Governmental
Organizations, and the success and
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failures

encountered

in the effort to construct
a political identity,

community, and

a

Republican

form of citizenship for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians

Civil Society, Political Activity
1 his section will

and Democratization

examine some of the

Latin America, particularly
in the

Dominican Republic and

perspective. Perhaps the most
clear

Guillermo O'Donnell.

In 1996,

literature that analyzes
democratization in

Brazil,

example of this perspective

is

from a substantive
the recent

he writes “the definition of polyarchy

important but elusive themes such as

if.

how, and

to

work of

is silent

about

what degree governments are

responsive or accountable to citizens
between elections, and the degree to which the rule
ol

law extends over the country's geographic
and

social terrain.” (O’Donnell, 1996:
36).

Polyarchy provides minimal requirements
for a democracy, but
blank political slate prior to the transition
to polyarchy,
hierarchies have not

become so imbedded

it

it

assumes a reasonably

also assumes: that traditional

as to obstruct the rule of law; differences in

socio-economic status will not be so stark as

to

problematize the universal legal rights of

the poor and marginal; and the norms,
expectations, beliefs and behavior of the people of

the

new democracy can

will be given

sufficiently be constrained by democratic institutions or that
they

enough of a “payoff'

’

to

behave democratically (see Rustow, 1970).

Challenging these assumptions, O' Donnell writes “[institutions are

when

the)

have deep historic

permanent teature

ot

institutional sites, has

human
it

roots; particularism

no exception. Particularism

is

society; only recently,

resilient, especially

and only

in

some

is

a

places and

been tempered by universalistic norms and rules” (O’Donnell,

1996:43).
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Many of the
social

“

scholars

who

study Latin America,
particularly
y those

movements, Non-Governmental
Organizations ,ind

,l ”"* 1 “
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study

micro-politics, challenge
the
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democratization.

As Joseph Foweraker writes
“[wjhere

the public sphere,
social

movements

aauthoritarian

asserted their right to
expand

it”

regimes compressed
(Foweraker, 1995:

93).

Mass

protests in Brazil in 1984

which demanded

direct elections (dlre,asja),

and

therefore the hastening ol
democratization, were not only
successful in their goal, but

constituted the most large-scale
and inclusive political ae,
of citizen politics in Brazil's
history.

There was quite a

hi,

lhC mililary S,ate
’ indudinB

of political

activity before

P ressure from new labor unions,

(Landless Movement) and even
the

later a fragile civilian

the

Movimento San Tara

Movimemo Negro Umficado (Unified

Movement). These groups were
successful
and

and since then which pressured

in pressuring first a declining
military

regime, both of which faced
legitimacy and economic

Although the Dominican Republic
experienced no protests similar
during

its

Black

transition to democratic

government

regime

crises.

to Dire, as

1

,

popular resistance and small-scale

organizing was growing during the
1970s. and activists as well as popular
sectors
increased their activity during the

PRD

governments, which they believed would be
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Jd

9

s\

mpathetic to their
causes

R pubhc

mos ^gmficunt

acts of protest
in the

Dominican

•

dur,n « the

«0s also occurred
in

1

1

m

984 i„ response
984,
to the Jorge
Blanco

government’s ne otiation
g
of an austerity
package with the IMF,
While

activity

wh,ch suggested

the idea

of a somewhat
engaged

'

S

time Pen0d f° r
haVing

economic decisions, an
increase

"a'

fr°

m hUman n8htS ,0 ri8h

-

in associational
activity,

*S

yclin,

1

in social

and a movement

997).

radically transforming
the societies in
in general,

and the

ments allowed

for

MNU

America

which

i,

It

was

in

in this

discourse

context that

movements, nongovernmental

organ, zations and
other forms of
political activism,
wrote

movements

in Latin

-testation of political
and

ntany scholars, some
of whom were
involved

was

was

citizenry.

Neither Brazil nor
the Dominican
Republic were exceptional
U "" 8 th

this protest

how this new

was taking

in particular.
Flores, an

form of politics

place. Writing of
social

Fernandes believed that

self-emancipation” (Fernandes,
1989:23). While

some

authors focused on
the idea of civil
society, as a democratic
alternative and a separate
sphere from an
authoritarian state, others
emphasized

movements and other new
Tilman F\
secondary to

ers

work which argues

movements

but the centrality of
the

clearly the role of social

actors within a
democratic society.
Emblematic of this
that "these

new

poltttcal parties, but
at least parallel”
(Evers.

farther writing "social

'

more

are not questioning
a

power criterion

1

political actors are not

985. 48).

He goes even

specific/,™ of political
power,

itself (Evers, 1985.
61).

There was, however,
significant p„ pular response

the perceived electoral
fraud foliow
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i„

g
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K

ore recent studies
of democratization

nave
have been

f?
far

more

sobering. For
example, although
n,
A1Varez Dagnmo
8 Alvaro
and Escobar write “r<w;
m ° VememS " 0t ™'>'
have sometimes
succeeded in translating
,
their agendas
into public
policies and in

"
P

'

i

•

,

b0UndaneS

and

"

inS,itUti ° na

'

POli,i

“

“ 3 C ° nSeqU “-’ democracy

'

Alvarez and Escobar
explain “

‘social

-

**

itself (Alvarez,

movements

movements played

“

l'P

“

° r h ”'
'

"*

“

pv)

1

Dagnino and Escobar.

Rllth
ixuth

elite

democrac.es,

.

Cardoso explains

that

a critical role in
the transition to
democracy in Brazil she
'

">»'

-

«-

Joseph Fowe.ate,

-Ml. Jo. eiheenship
»
promoter of legal and

moved from

poJieica, tights”

'» «*

» OePendeis ,„ d

(Foweraker, 1995:

the civic to the
constitutional sphere,
bu,

i,

05>_ Citizenship not only

1

became

increasingly defined

through institutional
terms
ms. which
oave »
Which gave
a ,,,,
comparative advantage,
Political parties

and

The obvious
America, when

i,

to

more formal

more

many

seemed as though “new
actors" were of a,

in Latin

cases, to

structures.

importance to more traditional
ones, and more recent
work

taken by

in

difference between the
enthusiasm of the early to

democratic government

to

are unlikely to
radically

transform large
structures of
domination or dramatically
expand
certainly not in the
/ r
me short
snort nm”’
run
( ln Foweraker, 1995-

—

America.

leas,

is

980s

in

Latin

of comparable

of the

new actors was

became more democratic and
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1

the predominance of

Much of the agenda

traditional actors as
countries

mid

elections

become more
on the

institutionalized.

Some of the new

Left, while others
entered into

actors

government or

funding, mostly international,
dry mg up as

were absorbed by

civil service.

much of their raison

political parties

Others found their

d'etre challenging
,

authoritarianism,

seemed

to

be gone. Yet, some social
movements have survived and

Non-Governmental Organizations
and these new actors

limited,

What contemporary

common
social

is its

1

can affect

still

even

if their

scope and resources are very

politics.

scholars and scholarship from
the early 1980s have in

belief that through
participation and conscientization
in civil society or

movements, individuals

(Evers,

proliferate,

are capable of constructing
their

own

political subjectivity

985. 59). 1 his ability of citizens
to engage themselves within
the politics of

collective action allows
citizens to

become

actively involved in both

sions, as well as shaping the
system that

making

political

makes those decisions (Dagnino. 1998:

51).

Tins offers the potential for a
radical type of subjectivity
which could seriously transform
the discursive

norms and power networks of even very

(Spanakos, 1999b)

I

.

otential.

however, should not be confused with

potentially transformative capabilities

contingent on

many

hierarchical political systems

of the "new

citizenship.'' as

reality, since the

Dagnino

calls

it.

is

factors.

Another appealing aspect of this
concept ol citizenship

is

sort

that citizenship

is

of participatory driven u^d associational

constructed, at least in theory', from the grass

roots level. Bryan Turner writes that

when

public spaces are open, citizenship

active, while

is

and public spaces are limited, citizenship

is

citizenship

is

when

developed from below and
citizenship

is

“handed down”

passive (Turner. 1993). In her analyses of
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“

P

m La in AmeriCa
'

’

E " Sa RdS ar£UeS

a in America have
been essentially
citizen rights

and agency

,ha ' CitiZenShi
‘’ a '’ d

elite ,ed projects
(Reis,

at local levels,
as

t

-'-on projects in

1997, ,998).

h e obverse of
previous incremental
and

trickle-down theories,
wou.d therefore he able
to contribute to
the dee e„i„
P

e of

democracy.

At the vety

least,

grass roots activism,
associational

NGO service providers are
y thClr fce ° 8raph,C SeXUa1
’

life,

raC,al

’

-

ethnic > religious, class,
etc, identity.
Foweraker notes

can serve both as
“schools of d~mcracy”
where

norms of deliberation
and contestation

are learned (Foweraker.
,99 5: 9 ,r,

serve as watchdog
organizations which keep
vigil over the State,

tire

In this chapter,
the

A caveat

examined.

politics

in

advance. Even scholars

tha,

should be

made

is

that

1

998:

1

7;

among

the poor.

in

life,

its

who

are sympathetic to

to

1

998).

as well as high degrees

abundance among the most

As Laurence Whitehead

democracies the main attributes
of civil society tend
sites;

and

Lehmann and Bebbington.

dense associational

or political consciousness,
are most likely to be
found
wealthy, and lacking

policies,

a|so

actors, recognize that
the politics in civil
society are no. always

democratic (Alvarez, Dagnino
and Escobar,

Another point

its

They C£m

“school of democracy"
idea will be more
closely

should be issued

of these new

movements and

abie to perform various
functions for specific
people, targeted

^t these small-scale organizations

institutions.

social

writes “[i]n most neo-

be highly concentrated

in specific

are often reserved to
a minority of the population;
and are no, infrequently derived

from privileges conferred
by a pre-demoeratic structure
of power” (Whitehead.

ulSSSS."'

The idea of a citizenship which
involve
space through
There has recendy hee„ a trend

for

N0 Os

1

997:

^

P«

10

'

>

overnment.
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102).

It is

and no, to

important to consider these
points
sin, ply

in

order to view the role

endorse any action on the part
of NGOs because

i,

ot'NGOs

seems

critically,

be more

to

“genuine,” “organic." or
“grass-roots based" than other
actors and institutions.
Social

NGO service provision can serve to contribute

movements and

Republican form of citizenship
in their

ability

to a

channel individuals with similar

political

goals and interests for the
purpose of improving the political,
social and economic

conditions for their constituents.
There are limits to the effectiveness
of such social

movements and NGOs, which

are

due

to their strategy, the conditions

of their targeted

population, and the willingness of
the government to cooperate and
assist,

among

other

things (Foweraker, 1995: 102).

Republican Citizenship

in

the

Dominican Republic and Brazil

Republican forms of citizenship pose the importance
of positive forms of liberty,

and particularly the

1

citizens' ability to define

and create his or her

he freedom to vote has by and large been
available

Brazilians during the last decade of democratization.
their inclusion

rather than a

and exercise of

freedom or a

Dominican Republic

their vote,

right.

until the

to

community.

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

Compulsory voting

which as a compulsory

act

actually forces

becomes

Voting fraud and problems with registration

1996 elections were

express pieferences through voting.

1

common

their

a possible return neocorporatism (See Wiarda, 1995).
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a duty

in the

and obstructed the

hus, even though voting

Dominicans, particularly Afro-Dominicans, often found

which suggests

political

is

ability to

compulsory, many

names missing from

voter

.

registration lists or
there

names were

«

registered
8 ered a, poles
t

on

the other side of
the city 4
This clearly impeded
them from exercising
their most basic
political right
Afro-Brazilians and
Afro-Dominicans are hoth
ahle to enjoy an
environment in

<

,ey

be free to express
opinions, those opinions

may

no, he well received
or

be taken senously.
Second, should an
assembly of dark-skinned
Brazilians acquire large
enough numbers or

make enough

pressure from pol.ce
.ha, aims to silence
or coopt
silence about ractsm
in Brazil, and
those activists

noise,

may

no,

Dominicans or
i,

is

likely to receive

5
it

There has been a very

.

who have attempt

to

traditional

-break the

silence'"

have no, always been
well received by
Brazilians of all ends of
the color
continuum (Marx. 998
,

conscientization has

:

250 ). Despite

occumed

M° Vmen,° Nes

''°

•he

the reluctance, quite
a bi, of movement and

in Brazil in the
las,

two decades, due primarily

as vve " as other groups.
There

Dominican Republic, however,

a small group

is

no similar “movement-

There

groups and institutions
that they

One of the

features

is little

may

w hich

coordination

among

and Dominican

these individuals and
the

represent.

differentiates Latin

American

racial

systems since

abolition from that of the
United States “is the absence
of shatply defined racial
groups..

[T]here

" "°

SUCh thing

“3

group or a white group. .never
the A^-oes nor the
.

4

See chapter

4.

d

(wtdIt9 8 l).

COmmeMS °"

^

r ° le

°f

^

““
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Sla * e

in

of activists, with the help
of

intellectuals, arc attempting
to revise national
fictions about Haiti,
Africa,

identity

to the

*

development projects

in

La, in America

nnxetl or mulatto
types or the whites
u i,;.

—

entitlable, significant
sociel

i

racial mixture,
clear

I

hts also does no,

mean

.a, in

in skin color,
physical features, etc.

C0,0rC ° nSC:
USC

*

m

bUSmeSS

,:._ dvcs

my

and singular

racial

c

cy ,

'
"'

*»•

by

develop
dll re

•

said to cons,

segments” (Harris, I9
7 4: 54,

ted0U ‘- dlKIOCei

mCTiCa

may be

'

* common
,0

WSS

W

lK l' ce across
groups, or

nican Ke,

«/»„,

positive self-identification,
except

11,8 V1IS|

cry

Typically, the terms

among

,y

and

added

/;rtoo//;) ,,„

commonly

as a

„

means of

the darkest segments
of society, Color

consciousness, however,
does no, translate into
collective identity font

When

differences

and Brazi, are

e or superlatives are

traditionally reserved
for other people,
and have no, been used

around the idea

even

someone's nickname, often
the same name they

words

,

i

a "‘"'

bC "

Prk '°'

(-v«/rr«0

P re

America, t societies

The

Tor

n<>1

particularly

of* race.

asked to identify themselves,
to identify

mi' i0rily HrDominicans and

their ancestry, or

even

their race,

-gardless of color, respond
"Dominican”

° r “ HraZilian -" DominiCanS
and Brazilia '« of .11 colors
no, only primarily identify
thcmscivcs by heir
I

mil identity

(Dominican or

Brazilian), but their secondary

and

aiy identities are micly
related to race or color.
Dominicans ana Brazilians will
regularly choose regional,
class, and religious
identity as secondary forms of
lon * before

'heir color/race.

Additionally, immigrants as

well as second and llmd
generation Dominicans and
Brazilians (generally Jewish,
Asian,

I

xr*

"d
° nl>
Zil

‘" d

«d

« ** » “»«

““ P "

found that When asked
"what

is

^

75-95 percent responded
Brazilian.

^

identified as Brazilian
than

(Schwarzmann,

>

„ h„

lit , in

A

in

your origin [background]?”
(Qual e sua origem?).

What
and

is

ntore interesting

is

that

morels

morels identified as Brazilian thanks

of December, ,998,.
This indicates wha,
Gilberto Freyre and ntanv

Brazilians believe
themselves to be Brazilian,
and no; Afro-Brazilian
or Black. This does
not.

however, mean that they

and work

live

Statistics in Brazil
clearly

show

in

environments free of prejudice.

that Afro-Brazilians

have lower

life

expectancies,

fewer educational
opportunities, and are more
likely to have lower
paying jobs, than
Euro-Brazilians

(Wood and

Lovell,

1

998,. Ye, Afro-Brazilians,

who

are generally poor,

believe that their
socio-economic conditions are
caused primarily by their class.
Statistics

about poverty

in the

Dominican Republic

-race.” Bu, unlike in
Brazil,

Afro Brazilians

when

live in poverty

and

inevitably leave out the
category of "color" or

nearly half the population

is

Euro-Brazilian and where

in favelas alongside
Brazilians

of various shades

(although Afro-Brazilians tend
to be disproportionately
represented), the slums

in the

urban centers of the Dominican
Republic have few to no
Euro-Dominicans.

some

areas,

however, there are poor Euro-Dominicans.
Bu, here

W

difterence between a country,
like Brazil,

considered

and one,

percent of the population
the

is

like the

w here

it

is critical

48.9 percent of the population

Dominican Republic,

in

rural

to note the

which some

considered -bianco." The smaller
percentage

Dominican Republic, and

In

is

5 to 16

of“blancos” in

yet the maintenance of a primarily
light-skinned elite class

187

of politicians and television
personalities could be
capable of contributing

t0 a racia
consciousness. However.
Dontinicans tend to believe
tha, since anywhere
between 70
,

and 90 percent of , bent
are of clearly ntixed

racia, heritage tha,
there is a

son of racia,

equality.

Bu, perhaps the Brazilian
example shows
in the

Dominican Republic.

why there

In Brazil, the regions

is

which have

no, a ‘racial consciousness
the lowest percentages

of

Afro-Brazilians are also the
ones where Afro-Brazilians
are the most marginalized
and
conscientized. For example,
Afro-Braziltans in Sdo Paulo.

where the percentage of
Afro-Brazilians
of racism,

w hitest

area of Brazil, and Sao
Paulo

meanwhile, the
population,

is

elite class of

Brasilia,

quite low. disproportionately
repon incidents

relative to other regions
(Guimaraes,

"racial consciousness."
Afro-Brazilians

the

is

Pono Alegre and

1

997), and are

more prone

have been elected governor

now

to

assume

in the south,

which

has an Afro-Brazilian mayor.
In the

Bahia, where brancos
constitute 20.2 percent of the

almost entirely Euro-Brazilian.

I, is

very possible tha, the condition
of

being a minority increases the
likelihood of racial consciousness.
However, the

p pulations of Sao Paulo. Porto Alegre and
Brasilia also are much more
educated than
those in Bahia, and there seems
to be a clear connection
between education and

awareness of racial prejudice (Guimaraes,
1997). Nevertheless, the Dominican
Republic
and Brazil make interesting
comparisons

to

examine

the relation between demographic

presence and racial "consciousness.”
The evidence seems to supper: the idea

consciousness of racial identity and
discrimination
are better educated and

is

that

sharpest in areas where populations

where the "disadvantaged” group occupies
a position of

demographic minority.
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One of the most

significant

problems facing the expansion of
the citizenship of

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
in Brazil, the

US

the construction

I

he

of group

identity

of identity. In examining black
movements

(Marx,

995:

1

'in itself

before

it

"In Karl

can engage

movements and

depend on

Marx's terms, a

in collective

group must be evident before

59). Political

1

political results

and the building of solidarity.

'object' ol a self-conscious

to its situation"

that

and South Africa, Anthony Marx
notes the

group must be conscious of existing
Itscil.

is

it

can act

action 'for

strategics require self-

conscious groups which can articulate
policy proposals based on their position.

groups are struggling
collective identity

that suffering

I

to

expand

which

is

their

own

rights they can generally unify

he problem

to aspire to

ol creating a collective identity is
particularly acute

it

is

quite

common

Whiteness.

traditionally sought individual

markets,

around

their

can be alleviated.

Brazilian, and since

lighter oi

When

based on suffering specific to that group, and
their belief that

Dominicans and Alro-Brazilians since they invariably

and

response

in

means

them

to

Afro-

Dominican and

ignore or deny any African heritage,

Additionally. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have

means, lightening hair color, straightening

more wealthy person,
etc, as

for

identify as

among

attaining high levels of schooling,

ol negotiating their racial identities.

hair,

working

marrying a

in certain

Such negotiation of

individual racial identity seems a rational strategy for mulattos to pursue,
given the color

preferences and racial ambiguities (in certain circumstances) of their respective countries.

1

lie

process, pejoratively referred to as “whitening,”

their position

is

one

in

which individuals

by accepting society’s stereotypes. Their individual success tends

reinforce the stereotypes, since

il

better

to

educated morenos arc no longer morenos but arc
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~ ^
Chr0S

'

society to be

e ' C ’ " ,iS

meanS

that lhose

"»o

more “brown." By connecting
success

education, family background,
ability to consume,
llK.sc

of darker skin color are invariably
seen as

notions of social Darwinism.
This

is

I

ke, place, as well as

failures

of skin color,

and marginals, which reinforces

of the Haitians and

the darkest

live in favelas in Brazil.

he idea that negros constitute
a race onto themselves, separate
from the

Dorn, mean or Brazilian race, or
that
constitute the

and

who

in a capitalist

etc. to the lightening

particularly so

skinned Dominicans, as well
as the people

are less educated are
considered by

same

race

is

mgros and

all

quite controversial, and

their selected following,

people

it

who

are not hlanco/brcmco

has been accepted only by activists

some academics, and some educated
Euro-Dominicans and

Euro-Brazilians. Afro-Dominican
and Afro-Brazilian activists sec

it

as imperative that

Alro- Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
see themselves as constituting a
culturally rich

community, which

is

conscious community

nonetheless discriminated against. The idea
of constructing a
is

considered to he a primary goal, and any
efforts

at political

lobbying and applying pressure on a
democratic government requires the perception

an “Afro-Dominican” or “Afro-Brazilian”
vote
countiies, a politically conscious and
unified
significant

rigid

demands upon

exists.

Since voting

community has

the political system.

I

is

compulsory

the potential to

lowever, such potential

schemes of activists whose use of essential “Black”

identity

is

that

in

both

make

blocked by the

and issues limits

popular support for their programs.
In the

the bulk ol

raise

Dominican Republic, challenging racism

work has been by very small groups and

is still at

individuals

a very nascent state, and

who have

awareness about racism. The section on the Dominican Republic
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attempted

to

will, therefore.

—

"

" *“
"h'ch h 1S bee "
‘

-

,n

».

«.

—

ralSing CO " SCiousness
for twenty-years,
and which, a, times,
has been

successful a, pressuring
the government on
behalf of -black* issues.
Brazi, wii, therefore
ana.yze efforts to

community and

to deliver

open

conscience individual,

politic

The

section on

to font, a se,f-conscious

space and expand the rights
of Afro-Brazilian

citizens.

Dominican Republic
There

is

an adage that “in the
Dominican Republic, only the
Haitian

ameMe “ haU,an °

(S°’

“

'

KSr0f Frank
-

mica negro

negro"

M™o Hernandez suggests that there

group of people who are
"negro." “Here, the only
negro
another negro" (aq,n. fe

is

is

is

another

the one standing in front
of

es el que esta enfrente de
otro negro)\ In other

words, Afro-Dominicans only
notice the color of other
Afro-Dominicans, and do no,

recogmze

their

negrdud."

own

color.

Dominican

society clearly associates
Haitian identity

as well as a host of very
negative discourses. But, since
color

along a continuum, dark-skinned
Dominicans identity people

more "negro"
Th.s

is

features than they

based on the idea

categories, into

which

do as “ negro.

that there is a

w hich

who

therefore

is

w ith

conceived

they consider to have

makes them “not negro."

continuum of color, rather than

strict racial

the population can be classified.
Although the majority of the

population can hardly claim to be
bianco, they can very easily claim to
be no, negro. One
investigator reported an experience
that the author shared on separate
occasions.

In bis

When

genealogy of Pena

Gomez. Campillo Perez writes “in the Dominican
Republic 'negro'
8
regularly for the native of Haiti"
(Campillo Perez, 1996: 24).
(Interview, Hernandez, 23, June
1997).
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is

reserved

„

,

mte

Wh

‘

Ch

^

8 $0UrCe ° f

:r

«

Tk

w
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~

r

O."— n. » 1*

I«

their color in the

» , ami
"

fcil

'"•>

r

,

»—

.«.»

D„

,

„„

*° nV
its

*
4rl!r ina otfc

«

“”»»

told

what would carlos

”

Bionvcnida M.ndo,,.

organ, 2a „on. concentrates

mo „ g Do minicans

Dominican Rep.llic.
When

-

,h

spta.

criticism a

—- — ^

Dominicans asked what
would b e
d be

“* »“

h,

^

di,„

„
^

*

„„

among Afro-Dominicans.
When Miss

interviewed for this study,
her organization had
recently changed the

Biack Women).

When

she explained that

might be able
negras

who
One

CW, * Idemidad de Mujeres

asked about

“many people do

to attract

^^^

why the name of the

name
y

organization had been changed

no, identify themselves
as negro,” and that
“Afro”

more people (Mendoza. 25*
of June.

,997). For example, non-

have African ancestry
might be more receptive to
their message.
activist criticized

Miss Mendoza's decision
since the term “negro,”
which

very political and assertive,
was replaced by the softer
“Afro” (Interview.

However, given the reluctance
of Dominicans

grateful to Richard

Turks for

this

1

it

may

appeal to ina,as and

anecdote which quite succinctly
complements

is

997).

to identify as negro, her
decision

be no, only pragmatic, bu,
also inclusive, since

am

blil

energies on speaking
ou, about Dominican
style racism

while also attempting
to promote
se.f-esteem

of .he organization from

^

my own

seems

to

Her

participant

r--"-*—
comments made by
identified by color

a Brazilian
anthropologist

and not ancest^
(da

T "'

who comp|ajned

" Ml “ “™to "" “

f

-

were quick

“

-

to find
'light-skinned

- *•

wives and

to

piesidential candidate,
former

““

—_

™ »*.

deny

.

.

He

,s

a

coward

«

.. „«

their background.’

When

mayor of Santo Domingo,
and

“• ““* ”»«
African.

^^

Silva, 30, Oct,
1998).

-

”

^

*».

for not accepting
his

courage.” She also
noted that his wife.
Peggy Cabral,

is

„ ,« »

asked

secretary

id

„,„ „

idemity-a leader without

“almost white” (Mendoza. 25'"

of June. 1997). Her
anger was no. jus. directed
against Pena Gomez
because he did no,
positively identify
himself as
racist

silent.

‘

bu, because

and anti-Hatian attacks
from his opponents

He had

when he was

in the

PRSC

the opportunity to
take a stand for
dark-skinned

Dominicans of Hainan ancestor,
scholar reported. "Pena

Gomez

and

U, of all sorts of
PLD

he remained

Dominicans and

for

yet he passively avoided
the attacks. In fact,
as one

denies his Haitian ancestry”
and "he paid for the

genealogy”’ commissioned
before the 1996 elections
which proves that he and his
parents

were

bom

in the

Dominican Republic

(Interview, 1997).

While the Casa de Idemidadde
Mujeres Afro
Govemrnental Organizations

is

one of the very few Non-

that expressly deals with
racism, other organizations are

sympathetic to the idea of the creation
of a positive Afro-Dominican

observation.
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identity.

Prominent

- -» «.
.1.0

.'ill.

Iho

»™™.l i«.o of

„

Thoi.

„
p

is

0mM^

Haitian ancestn and they
work primarily in two bateys
(plantations). While the

of Identidad primarily give
lectures and
businesses and other environments,
efforts with social services
in

facilitate discussions

CEA

two bateys, where they pay

which

women

in schools,

for occasional visits

by nurses,

MUDHE maintains a pre-school,

(the state sugar agency)
only pays (very

as a general store

of

MUDHE complements their consciousness raising

doctors, and medical supplies.
In one of the bateys,

since the

on racism

t

little)

for primary school, as well

offers reasonable prices.

Sonia Pierre, the director of
MUDHE, explained that growing up on the batey
she
noticed that

many

laborers were not allowed to
leave, plantation owners chose
young

women/girls for sexual partners, and they
were forced

become pregnant

(Pierre, 19

,h

to

have abortions

if

they were to

of June, 1997). Conditions have improved,
but Haitian

workers are often prevented from leaving
bateys during the zafra (cane-cutting
season),

and they are arbitrardy transferred from
one batey

to another

(Wucker. 1999:

95).

Conditions were so bad that various international
anti-slavery organizations criticized the
conditions of workers in the bateys, and
academic discussions raged over whether batey
labor could or could not be considered
slavery (see Martinez, 1996).

Sam

Martinez’s

astute observation that although the workers
in the bateys are not slaves they certainly are

not free

is

particularly useful, because although Haitian
workers

do not have recourse

9

to rights.

See (Campillo Perez, 1996)
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may

not be slaves, they

™
MUHDE aUCmPtS '° imPr° Ve
for the

many

ri

g ht to

babieS b°

"" b0m

‘

hiS C ° ndi,ion

through their

-

have a nante and na,
iona.it,- which
entphas.es

m °" the

" ,e

^

D° miniCan

workers, since ,ahor

Wh °

is

of Dominican as we„
as Haitian

no, exclusively foreign.
Documentation

important gtven the
constant threat of
deportation, which

dark skin

who

Even
abtlity

donation for the

documentation nor proof ,
ha, they

RepUW -

toe,s

in the

campa™

is

is

espeeiai,

directed against people
with

are believed
likpiv to u
u
ueved dkely
be Haitian
(see chapter 4).
•

st, II,

there

seem

of Afro-Dominicans

to be

•

advances for those

to participate in
their

who

are seeking to improve
the

government. Although
66.43 percent of

the Dominicans believe
that “Haitians bring
problems to the count,,” and
58.30 percent
said that

Negros

will cause

problems

[la

hace] either

in the

entrance or the exit," 63.62

percent said that there was
no problem with a “negro
in an important position”
and 52.27
percent of the population
agreed that “the count,,

acknowledge

.ha,

racism exists

in the

trying to improve the
citizenship

However, recognizing
Identify

it

is

racist” (Brea e. al, 1995:
227).

Dominican Republic

quite an important step in

and socio-economic conditions
of Afro-Dominicans 10

that racism exists in the
abstract

in the specific, a

is

complaint

made by

does no, mean being able

to

Dominican Republic

against racial discrimination
against Haitians, not Dominicans

who

are

not considered negro anyway.

Domii cans A

Dom

co™

n

cal

“Zr

t
a

h

T?

^

eXamine

'

% ''"

Pre, " eSt a " d

7

m ° St

,he political

by Ashi " di
in,elii
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.

Brazilian anthropologist Jorge
da Silva (da

Silva, 30, October, 1998).
Additionally, being against racism
in the

may mean being

To

*ent

co " di,i<>" of contempt™, Afro-

M “°". demonstrated that young
dolls are the

»"« with

the lightest skin

But speak,
ng of racism has, slowly, become easier
over the past decade or

Miss Mendoza explains
‘-Dominicans can express
deal with racism in the
to express the

Dominican Republic

that there is

(22, June 1998).

so.

racism”

in

They

however “afraid"

same sentiment outside of the
seminars where they

are

seminars which

are silenced by a society

and a culture which denies
the existence of racism,
while simultaneously supporting
discourses and stereotypes
which negatively depict Afro-Dominicans.

Mendoza began

her work of conscientization,
most Afro-Dominicans neither
identified as

•'Afro-Dominican” nor “negro " She
believes

propaganda

When Miss

that insisted that Haitians,
not

that this

was due

to Tnijillista-Balaguerista

Dominicans, are negro

(el

negro es

Haitiano), and that simultaneously
demonized Haitianidad (Haitianness).

A

el

similar

understanding of a national myth serving
as an hegemonic identity to silence
protest

assumed by Movimento Negro
However,

in the safe

activists in Brazil.

space of seminars which concentrate on
African

Negritud and racism, Afro-Dominicans
narrative,

and

is

to challenge the racial

feel

myths

more comfortable
that underlie

identity.

to sp:,:l: to a counter-

Dominicanidad.

In these

seminars, Afro-Dominicans not only are
able to acknowledge their experiences with
racism, they are able to compare their
\er> limited scale, the potential for

Every day,

community and

more people

However, the majority prefer

Identidad

s

experiences with those of others, and.
collective identity

Miss Mendoza explains, “there

Identidad. and "there are

negro.

own

is

more

in

is built.

receptivity" to the

work of

identifying themselves” as Afro-Dominican or

to express their identity in the safe space

of

seminars, and are not willing to transform their experiences and
personal

identity into a public

and

on a

political “racial consciousness.” After
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Miss Mendoza’s

natl0nai, y aired
te eViSi0n
Pr ° gram
'

ommican
positions

Republic, she -has
been approached by

who

more informal

Dominican Repub, ic
-hiec, was abie

as par,

to introduce the

The program was

theme of racism

of pubiic and popular
discourse. Through

to reach a large
nationa. audience.

aired

in the

television the

Addition*, through

the

medium of

Afro-Dominicans eouid watch
the program and
empathize with Miss

Mendoza-S organization,
without having
Dominican or

that they

y important since admitting

confession that the story
Prior to Miss

were limited mostly

Dominican

teller is

NGOs

to

ias,

point

is

being a victim of racia,
prejudice tends to no,

iisteners, as

i,

might

in the

United States, bu, instead

is

a

“negro.”

Mendoza's
to

to pubiiciy affirm
their identity as
Afro-

had simiiarly been
victims of racia,
prejudice. This

chc. sympathy/empathy
from

to

.

spaces.

The , decision
program was able

particular,

many peop ,e of a.,
socio-economic

share their
experiences and solidarity”
with her 11

spaces, as well as

•elevision.

discussed racism in
, he

television appearance,
challenges to

with limited resources,
and

scholars. For ui,e
q

some

time,

still

more

Dominican racism

limited success, and

Dominican scholars have denounced

anti-

Haitianism, particularly as
pan of the nationalist ideology
that they identify with
Trujillo

and Balaguer’s

nationalist projects.

racism has been building,
although

ommican

the las, decade and a
half, academic
i,

work on

has mostly focused on the
treatment of Haitians

Republic. Harr)' Hoetmk,
one of the pioneers of studies
of race

Dominican Republic, notes
“we see especially during

(Interview, 22, June,
1998).
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the las, fifteen years, a re-

in

the

in

9

1

of studies of slavery
have increased,
particularly those

r

that study the
“slave
resistance” of the
cimarrones (runaway
slaves) (Deive,
1980, 1989; Dipp:
1992 ). The
{// icons cinci
Our isiana
Island h\ail
by Celsa Albert
(1989)), Larlos
&„a
CArlnc Andujar
^
s study of AfroDominican re„ gion (1
999)
?

,

fUnml

rUeS

(

'

and Carios Hemandra
Soto ,

W) ~

^

These works, neverthe.ess,
are

by a small and very
educated

elite,

most of whom were
already conscious of

racism.

'

^ most influential works

in

mainstream Dominican
scholarship

attacked racism and
anti-Haitianisn, have
Pichardo.

Cass*

for

examp, e. has used

criticize the deportation

critical

racist

of Haitians

in

have

that

come from Roberto Cassd
and Frank,* Franco

his position as a
preeminent

pubhc

intel.ectua, to

newspapers, and his histcy
books have been vety

of the Truji„is,a-Ba,a
g ueris,a concept of Dominicanidad
which

he considers

and anti-Haitian (e.g.1991:
308). Franco has written
hooks e-*, ed Negr0
^

Mulattos and the Dominican
Nation
other essays)

mulattos

in

(

1

(

989 ) and

On Racism and anti-Haitianism

(and

9 7). In these anthologies.
Franco analyzes the role
ofwgrar and

Dominican

Dominican Republic.

histoty, as well as elitist

In both his

and

Myth and Culture

racist ideologies within
the

in

The Era of Trujillo and

his regular

contributions to Dominican
newspapers. Andres L. Mateo
regularly attacks the
I

iispanicist

and

racist vision

them (Mateo, 1093, ,996).

of Dominicanidad, and often

A

more

partisan collection
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criticizes Balaguer’s use

of essays. Against a Racist

of

:

Ideology* in Santo

Domingo Two Campaigns
for Pena was
,

written by Diogenes

Cespedes (1998).

1

written

his literature is not
without

numerous essays

its

opponents. Federico Henrique
Gratereuax has

that assert clear

demarcations between Dominicans
and lai.ian,
I

I

le

explains “[w]e are

1997).

I

le

I

lispano-mulato, Haiti

is

Afro-French” (Gratereaux,

30'". June,

denies that Dominicans are
“Spanish-Hispanics” and he .cognizes
the

Dominicans have been mulattos
since the middle of the

Manuel Pena

Batllc before him. Gratereaux
argues that

front race, but culture,

which though mixed,

17'" century.

Dominican

However,

identity

like

does not come

primarily Hispanic. Another writer

is

who

recognizes racial mixture yet
privileges the Spanish part of
Dominican cultural identity

Carlos Dobal

who

writes

Africa and America
ol

in

"we

are a racially

much of our

mixed people; we have

is

the predominance of

physical presence; and of Spain in the
basic structure

our temperament and our very being.

values and those things most
precious,

If

we

we

will

insist serenely

more

likely

upon our most cherished

approach our Spanish

heritage” (in Cambeira, 1997:
46).
In a

Nunez

more concentrated

attack

on Cassa and

his brand

writes that Cassa’s anti-Trujillism forces
Cassa to

that his interpretation

writes that Cassa

of history shows

makes

culture

Hispanic, even

il

is filtered

In the end,

I

a Haitianophile, and

bend (Nunez, 1990:

189).

He

later

through

its

he concludes, like Gratereaux, that since

linguistic expression,

they are not racially European.

attack by an increasing

become

the mistake of associating Hispanophilism
with racism and anti-

Maitianism (Nunez, 1990: 306).

Dominican

this ideological

of revisionism, Manuel

laitian population.

I

le
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And

Dominicans

this culture,

writes the

are culturally

he believes,

is

under

“Dominican population has

doubled between I960
and 1989 while,!,
theam

^

1QO
(Nunez,
,990: 37).

a 1997 presemation
on

hyeu
thesis in

La

isla al reves

C ° nSiderS

- 'Migration has sex, up, ed"
'

C “ Uural Su bs,
stence,” he made

s

government has supported

D ° mini -"

cultural

*-

tliy

“ the Other
ther and a PPealin

tourists ’

it

d0SS mean m0re

more areas from which
pride can be drawn-

visibilit

Increasing

commissions and a

—

— —

done from a position
of romanticizing
European and American

.

While

this is often

g to the eroticism of

y for Afro-Dominicans and

visibi%

for

Afro . Dominjcans

•Hough, must no, be
limited to the realm
of popular culture-such
as

^

,hCy

clear his

(1985)

es.dent Fernandez

^

° Unt0fHaiti

-

“

a „d

re P res ented. bu,
to positions

which do no,

contribute to stereo,
yP es. Such stereotypes inform
wha, Gratereuax calls the
”c,v„ war in
the hear, where the
mixed racial heritage of
the Dominican leads
to a personality

dance we want

want

to

to

be negros ; and when

we

study or investigate

The
Dominicans

State, for

its part,

seems

to be

in their tourist
brochures,

more open

and

cultural

attention to the contributions
of Afro-Dominicans
efforts towards

promoting more positive

to including darker
skinned

commissions have given greater

to

identity for

Dominican

national symbols. Bu,

Afro-Dominicans

relies

on

certain

stereotypes, such as their
contributions are purely in the
area of popular culture, and

|3

we

be blancos ” (1995:
10)

(Interview, 24, September,
1999).
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al,

of

the$e eff° rtS mU$t be
Pr ° CeSSed thro
“S h a culture which has for so long
denied and
discrintinated against
Afro-Dotninicans and Haitians.

progressive efforts

become

A

clear

example of how such

interpreted can be found
in an interview with
Selenes

Mendez, Miss Dominican
Republic 1998.

When
asked? What

asked "What question
would you
is

the answer?" Miss

emotionally about being a
woman?'

I

feel like a universal

It

should

first

that

you have never been

I

feel spiritually

and

am made up of three

the boundaries of my

be noticed that she believes she

earlier,

Pena Gomez's emotional character
as one

The idea

woman.

They go beyond

something complementary. Only
four years

country.

that

own

dignity of the Indian, the strength
and courage of the African,

and the culture of the European."

to present

answer

Mendez responded '"How do you

races with their beautiful
characteristics.

country— the kindness and

like to

Balaguer employed
that

would

is

saying

racist stereotypes

lead to the razing of the

Miss Dominican Republic offers a
somewhat more palatable and

progressive vtew than the nonogenarian
many-term president, and former chief ideologue
of

I

rujillo, is

comforting, yet not entirely praiseworthy.

Rven while

trying to be politically correct, she
defines role<

races that have inhabited the island 15

Dominican Republic, what does
culture, or did the African

that

.

If the

mean

European contributed culture

for the African?

Was

Her statement seems

it

makes sense

to suggest that

to the

the African devoid of a

have a culture which was considered inferior?

contributions are strength and courage, then
plantations.

traits for the three

If the African's

that the African

worked

in the

Africans are most capable of doing

become adopted into mainstream music (see Austerlitz, 1997
Pacini-Hemandez, 1995 ).
These comments equally apply for Brazil which makes
similar assumptions
;

native influences.

It

about European, African and
should be noted that there are Asians and people from the
Middle East in the
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Physical work, as opposed to
the Indians and Europeans.
This re fl ec,s well the roles
that
are distinguished in

Dominican

workers, whereas culture
inequalities are sharp and

is

society.

Afro-Dominicans are believed

seen as Euro-Dominican.

where

civil

and

In a society

to

be better

where economic

political rights are not
institutionalized for the

majority of the population,
the civilized Euro-Dominicans
will be assumed a priori
to be
citizens,

and the Afro-Dominicans are
more

likely to

be recognized as workers,
beggars

or thieves.

Brazil

The primary problem
that

of those who aim

to

for

members of Brazil’s Movimento Negro

improve Afro-Dominican self-esteem,
increase Afro-Dominican

participation in politics, and expand
Afro-Dominican citizenship,

bulk of Afro-Brazihans are unaware
of the existence of the
participants in

been able

its

political struggles.

to garner

Unificado, like

Yet, unlike the

MNU,

is

that

let

of identity. The

alone active

Dominican Republic,

the

MNU has

enough support, primarily among small NGOs,
often with foreign

financing, and academics, in order to
serve as, at times, an efficient pressure group.

Therefore, in this section, not only will the
questions of consciousm^ and communitybuilding be addressed, but so will the various
political efforts of the

MNU as well as the much lauded

Chapter j examined the genesis of the
protest to the centennial celebration of the

the

the

MNU has had
\

little

Golden Law. Since the mobilization

success with national efforts

at

arious groups and individuals associated with the

Dominican Republic and

MNU.

mass conscientization.

in

1988

Instead,

MNU have continued their local

Brazil, but nationality only refers to three races (African,
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1988

European and Indigene).

activism, their rese

,c , or their Aching.

DespUe .

potentially sympathetic
people in Brazil, the

been

c, ted

t>

^^

MNU has no, been able to consolidate

by numerous authors,
mostly from the US.

which does not appeal

1998. Burdick. 1998),
and

forthcoming

to the Afro-Brazilian

may

^

of

be inappropriate

is

the

MNU's use

mass

of an essential,,

masses (Hanehard.
1994; Hasenbalg

in Brazil altogether

(Spanakos.

a).

Tltere has been

much ado

about the “lack of racial
consciousness”

among AfroBrazilians (see Hanehard,
,994; Winant, 1994).
Afro-Brazilian activists are
quick to
consider the failure of many
Afro-Brazilians to identify
as such to be a classical
case of
false consciousness.

ideological

firs, to

16

This “false consciousness,”
they argue,

hegemony

is

seen as a result of the

ot the idea of racial
democracy. Florestan Fernandes,
one of the

challenge the idea of racial
democracy as a “myth,” argues
that racial democracy

was used

to "hide reality

consciousness”

among

and to simplify things,”
while also

become

criticized

by Afro-Brazilian

and Gilberto Freyre. the
anthropologist most associated with
the concept, has

the object

of much

scorn. Freyre’s historical
analysis of Brazil found .ha,

colonial and independent Brazil
racial tensions

was a place

in

which no

were almost completely absent
(Freyre,

"False consciousness"

is

1

racial identities

934 ). Bu,

i,

were

is less

clear,

and

Freyre's

associated with certain strains of
Marxism. It explains that workers do not
" leir COnsciollsness as Proletarians
is no, sufficienlly develop,;

One Sample of lihsTsVCT

War Mnsiead^ of rl^Ivino
hlh H
lymg behmd
cond itions

of “false

Afro-Brazilians (Fernandes,
1989: 14 ).

The idea of racial democracy
has been unanimously
activists,

instilling a sense

'T*

TT'common"

1
the,r

real

S‘

pa

Eur0 P e su PP orted t^ir nalion-slales in Wor
Merest, improvement of workins and living

ies in
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of Brazilian society
than the simplified
version of “racial
democracy” which
CCame "" d ParCd
° f nati °" aliSt
employed by the

portrait

“

»da

governments of Brazil
during

NOVO{mi -' 5) a " d
im0

na,,0na,,S,

mili

mo d e miz a

ti

„„

-

»

P0 "' iCal Pr° Pa8anda

o. prolonged
cultural encounters,

-

authoritarian

that the

MNU attacks.

During , he Es , ado

^-85), facia, democracy was turned

WWch

«* -he “Brazilian,” the pr„duc

,

was something of a
meta-race, one

that surpassed its
predecessors. Thts
interpretation eliminated
the presence of the
Portuguese, Indigenous

and African peoples
(Motta Mauds;

1

in Brazil,

997: 284)

raca, groups because

al,

.

and limited them only

to

^^^

being cultural influences

Wore, there were n0 longer cleavages

in

Brazil

Brazilians were successfully
integrated into one
cultural unit.

This notion of racial
democracy,

when employed by

the nation-state. has
been

used within developmental
discourses which deny the
salience of race as an
indicator,
focusing instead on
broad based social,
economic, political and
technological

development. But scholars
and activists challenged
the notion that Cass
was more
important than race.
Statistical data from the
Silva,

1

979,

1

992),

<han blancos in

shows

all salient

and negros published
Brazilians earn

9b).

In

is

categories.

in the

A

newspaper

980s and

1

1

990s (Hasenbalg and

pardos and pre'os,

national survey

fare

of average wages

much worse

for

brancos

O Globe indicates that on average, Euro-

more than double what Afro-Brazilians

sewn years

Wood

earn (Oliveira,

1

998: 2 1

).

an

find that the life expectancy
for Euro-

higher than that of Afro-Brazilians
(Lovell and Wood, 1998:

other studies, while

education, only

970s,

that Afro-Brazi.ians,
both

examination of the 1980 census,
Lovell and
Brazilians

1

1

0% of the broncos population completes

2.5% of pardos and

1

.9% of negros do
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(Telles, I8

,h

university level

of December, 1998).

In a survey

of students

in undergraduate.
master’s or doctoral

between the ages of 20 and
24.

85%

were branco, 13.6%

programs

we«,

in

Rio de Janeiro

and 0

.

67% were

ne g r°, and 0.68% were
amarelo (Silva, 1998:165).
The racial breakdown of Rio
shows
a very different set of
numbers: 55.96% are branco
, 34.55% ar e panic,
9.36% are negro ,

and 0.12/o are amarelo or
"undeclared”

Acm ists claim
Euro-Brazilians, even

denying the truth

if

that the conditions

when

class

its

held constant, that Afro-Brazilians
can only be

romantic and integrationist ideology
gives Afro-Brazilians

to block out the reality

that Brazil is “[t]he

is

of Afro-Brazilians are so clearly
different from

they deny the existence
of racism. The “myth of racial
democracy,"

they argue, through

means

(Silva, 1998: 164).

which discriminates against them.

world’s most racist country!

[It

has] the

MNU activists argue

most

effective type of

17

racism’

(lvanir dos Santos,

under Apartheid and. and the

6'"
1

US

of October, 1998). They argue
South under Jim

distinctions never existed in Brazil
because they

Crow Laws,

continuum. Carlos Hasenbalg writes

continuum of shades

of color,

had led

‘'the social

that unlike

such formal legal

is

characterized by a color

perception of race according to a

to a fragmentation

of racial identities” (Hasenbalu:

1996: 165). This, in turn, limited opportunities
for political activity
Afro-Brazilians, thereby weakening their political agency
and
it

difficult for

South Africa

were unnecessary'.

Scholars also criticized the idea that
Brazilian society

makes

a

ability' to

solidarity

mobilize.

among
It

also

MNU activists to mobilize lighter Afro-Brazilians who may not feel

as though they are in the

same

position as darker Afro-Brazilians.

It is

true that brancos

These

sort of statements irritate more moderate people who are
sympathetic to some of the goals of the
but are unwilling to support such hyperbolic situations. Two people very
involved with AfroBrazilian activity both expressed their disagreement with the “most

MNU,

racist...” statement.
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8

are statistically in a

more advantageous

position in society than
both

par,os and pretos,

but pardos and pretos do
no, often believe that they
are discriminated
against, and pardos
generally do no, believe that
they are victims of the

The MNU's

means of attempting

effort to construct a solid

to construct solidarity,
to

same type of prejudice

and positive

open

as pretos.

identity is clearly

political space,

and

done as a

to increase the

political capital

of a potential lobbying group.
This explains the constant
preoccupation of

members of the

MNU with identification and the attempt to market

In a recent

seminar presented by the

MNU and the Centro de Estudos Afro-Asidtieos

(Center for Afro-Asian Studies),
Marcelo Paixao outlined four
to

improve

order to address

in

notes that the primary problem

a -Black" identity.

“How to deal
is identity.

area*- -.'here the

MNU had

with social exclusion and democracy?"

After

that,

He

education-the inclusion of more

pro-Africa information on curricula
and better preparation about the issue
of racism and

about Afro-Brazilian culture of
teachers, increased economic potential—
better wages as
well as

more space

critical to the

The

advancement, and

success of the

visibility in the

effort to try to

which

among

combat
is

the

was among

are

1998).

the principal messages that

MNU conveyed in interviews and at conferences'

this, the

supposed

media of communication

MNU program (Paixao, 2 of December,

lack of control of self-representation

various leaders

identity

for

8
.

In an

MNU has created counter discourses, a form of "negro"

to replace the

image presented by mainstream media. To

counter dominant, marginalizing discourses which
degrade the Afro-Brazilian, activists

attempted to create a positive discourse of negritude. The
creation of such a counter-

1

Interview with Ivanir dos Santos, Jorge da Silva, and Conference
on "Neoliberalism and the Question of
coordinated by Beth Vieira, 2 nd of December, 1998, sponsored by the
Movimento Negro Unificado
and the Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiaticos, Rio de Janeiro.

Race

,
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discourse involved the
creation of a set of heroes,
of which Zunrhi was given
a prominent
Place, a

revision^ approach

religion,

integrate

to official history, the

and a continuation of
activity from the

symbols of the “African

symbols of Black Power

in the

many newspapers and magazines
is

artists often celebrate the
cultural artifacts

MNU’s counter-narrative

(Brazil Race), and

musicians, such as the Racionais

and propaganda. Popular musicians
are

Nacao Zumbi (Nation of Zumbi).

MCs. Rappa, and Carlinhos Brown,

more emphasis on "Negro" themes,
including racism, than ever
The more unified and

that

increasingly racially

increasingly adopting Afro-Brazilian
identity, including groups
like Cidade

Raca Brasil

and

.

"conscious.” Similarly,
Afro-Brazilian

City),

to

19

an Afro-Brazilian middle-class,
which although small

consistent with the

official

1970s and 1980s which attempted

diaspora.’' such as rap,
reggae, braiding of hair,

These images have been
promoted

now cater to

late

advocacy of candomble as
an

Negra (Black

Brazilian popular

are also placing

before.

consistent the union of Afro-Brazilians,
the

more

effectively

they could resist racist politics,
could challenge police violence, and
attempt to

promulgate laws that would benefit

their

community. Their discourse has been

essentiahst and radical. This facilitated
the political coherency of the

and also was able

to valorize

Movimento Negro

elements of Brazilian culture which were seen as
having

roots in Afro-Brazilian culture, or

where the contributions of Afro-Brazilians were

fundamental. Coherency also tacilitated localized
victories on the federal

Movimento Negro generated enough

Zumbi was
community.

a

runaway slave who

in

political pressure to force the inclusion

-

Candomble

is

The

of an

article

the seventeenth centuiy formed a quilombo, or
runaway-slave

MNU leaders celebrate the day of his death on the 20

Black Consciousness.'

level.

a synchretic religion with
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th

of November as the day of “National

combines

Afro-spiritist traditions with

,

in -he

the

gU

"

Brazilian Constitution
(.988) which criminalized
racism and

Cao Law
lty

pr„ mulgation of

(1989). which provided
for punishments to
be assessed for those
found

° rraCiSm

(FUnte °

CUl,Ural Pa

‘— *«=

„ also opened up significant
pohucal space for
discourse on racism, and
for self-affirmed
“negro” politicians. and
39).

ft

community. Ivanir dos
Santos’s Center

for Marginalized
Peoples

ractsm can be considered
a success. Another
success

which began as

in the

influential in

Northeast, and lateral! of
Brazil (see Yudice.
1999;

to include race in the

recently. President

suggested that Brazil

Cardoso admitted

may need some

sort

eves that Cardoso
recognize that Brazil

s

sympathy was due

was

racist (Lucia. 2"“

However, despite these successes

1979 census.
that Brazil

was a

to

action.

MNU activist Vera Lucia

MNU pressure which “forced" him to

of December. 1998).

for the

MNU and the campaign to improve the

conditions for Afro-Brazilians.
the most significant success
of the

with

the tern, negro in

it.

racist country,

of measure resembling
affirmative actions, and

convened an academic
conference on affirmative

NGOs alhed

was very

of December, 1999).
Another area of success has
been applying pressure

on the Brazilian government

More

is

the social program
of Olodum

a Afro-Bahian
musical troupe in the
northeast and

re-Africanizing carnaval
Oliveira. 10*

is

(CEAP), which

MNU.

all

as well as a reasonably
committed artistic com,., unity,

common

parlance. John Burdick reports
“[u]ntil the

generally avoided as a
self-referential term....

Iberian Catholic Saint worship.
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Due

to the influence

1

of the

is

local

the use of

980s, negro was

of the

Moximmo

8

but also to the growing
presence in Brazilian
markets of U.S. black
popular
especially h.p-hop,
negro increasingly
became a

term of self-affirmation
and

(Burdick, ,998: 19,
use of the term

nonces

"who

italics in original).

Similarly, Livio
Sansone notices that the

for self-identification
has tncreased in Salvador,
although he also

that these

people are better educated
and more likely to be
unemployed than those

define themselves
with less ethnically
assertive tenns of color,
like pre.os,

Pard° and

(SanSOne

for the increasing
use

neighborhoods

'

'

"

7:

471

The

of the term negro.

^

,n his study

must be given some

responsibility

of several poor Afro-Brazilian

Rio de Janeiro, John
Burdick found

in

mo reno.

that several

people

“r “'r=:s

~

‘*er-con,t„uum
lerm, but had finally
opted definitively to call
themsdves^
recent past, during the
last decade, due to
the influence of the
media the
e " dS
amily
°
r
re
' i8i ° n
y*
(Burdick
' 1998:1
ita
cshTori gi rml
‘

^

'

'

’

1 i

j

But the
°n*

MNlTs

Ma,X UnteS

was and has remained

success

comes

at a relatively

high cost.

^ he stre,lgths ot ibe MNU also suggest
relatively intellectual,
elitist,

thousand active members. At

its

height in 1988. none of the

to gain broad popularity”

dogmatism and
Euro-Brazilians

its

essentialist vision

who might

principal problem

(Marx.

is

grass-roots support.

1

998: 258).

of Afro-Brazilian

MNU

An example

still is

it

Its

its limits.

The movement

MNU’s candidates

was too

elitist

coherence,

many of then

a very small and

elitist

for

and too

its activists’

identity alienate

otherwise be sympathetic to

that the

political scientist

and middle-class, with fewer
than two

public office were elected,
suggesting a general view that

advanced

As

many Afro and

causes.

group

One

that has very

little

of this elitism and lack of connection
with the masses.
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-

when one academic,
activist

re,at ‘ Ve

PerCema8e ° f ° r

to non-activists

insisted t0 the
author that so

~ ——
S

was verv hioh
m^h

-

Th;J hls

affiliated

a

•

indicates the

of Afro Brazilians.
What

is

few

NGOs and

other

MNU activists

*•
low level
evel n
°*fmrt,v
participation

perhaps worse

is

that the

among

march was seen

the

as an

liberalism and
President Cardoso.
Considering the presence
of many directors of
NGOs

which provide service

to “Afro-Brazilian"

communities, one would
think

that

organizations would set
up tables promoting
their services to the
few people

such

in

attendance, instead of
simply grandstanding
against neo-liberalism.

Another problem with the

MNU

is its

veo> stereotypical portrait
of Afro-Brazilians.

of the

MNU

s

essentia, ist identity.
This has produced a

Michael Hanchard has been
q ui,e

anthropologist John Burdick
that the Afro-Brazilian

Mass

critical

use of what he refers
to as 'culturalisms.’
Several informants told

drumming during

the Inculturated

20

bothered them, and they
did no,

drumming

there (Burdick, 1998).

Afro-Brazilians like
dancers, etc.

any

i,

is

and praying

like the

activists insists that

stereotypes by a group
attempting to combat racism and

de
spirits,

negro because they did no,

African, that Afro-Brazilians
are good

increase the political agency
of Afro-Brazilians

elemenlal

less

However, the dogmatism of
MNU

drumming because

The use of these

feel

to the deities

T

is

d by F

ofAMca as
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puzzling. Especi*..y since.
30 percent

f

well

David

“>

TzumbT’

Samos, which
'“h 5 '™ drUmmi " 0fre
g
-

™ gS

,0

Of Brazilians agreed

totally,

and another

1

3 percent

agreed in part, with the statement.

"the only things a negro does
well are music and sports"
(Datafolha

more troubling

is

that

1

995:

1

Even

29).

while 28 percent of Broncos agreed
completely, 31 and 32 percent

of pardos and pretos agreed
completely.

Another problem

many people

MNU

that

“Movimento Negro

in their targeted constituency

(Burdick, 1998:

of the

is

is

5).

who

activists adopt stances that alienate

otherwise are sympathetic to their goals"

For example, the essentialist identity that

considered radical, alien and unacceptable
to

is

fundamental

many

Afro-Brazilians.

Carlos Hasenbalg explains that one
of the principal problems with the

employs a system of categorization

that

mimics

that

to the logic

MNU

that

is

it

of the United States. He writes:

in this dichotomous system there
are blacks and there are whites; there is
nothing in the middle... Racial prejudice in
Brazil is not ... [H^ar, neat,
nor bipolar]... and the Movimento Negro in
,

polarity white-black,

their rhetoric, insist

on

this

when

the majority of people between white and
black think ot themselves neither as whites nor
blacks (Hasenbale 1998-

28).

Ignoring the tact that "Brazil

is

multiracial, not biracial” (Skidmore, 1992:

activists adopt the idea ot hypodescent,

Brazilians

who

experience

pardos and pretos

tare

life

which

alien to

worse than broncos, pardos
is

Similar to the

US

show

that both

fare consistently better than pretos.

As

often "not between white and nonwhite

but between pardas and pretas ” (Burdick, 1998: 45,

the sake ot unity and coherency the

MNU

most Brazilians, especially Afro-

quite differently. Although statistics clearly

John Burdick notes the greatest difference

women,

is

1),

MNU insists that

understanding of race.
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all

italics

added). However, for

non -brancos

are negro

21
,

and

,8*
.his position alienates

as negro,

and

Many

andpc,,^ who

this is no, necessarily

due

to

exper|ence

shame or

^ ^
^^^

false consciousness.

mulattos consciously
reject the black-white
scheme of the

MNU,

does no, accurately
represent their social
position. Additionally,
as mentioned

since

i,

earlier,

there is a quite rational
reason tor mulattos to
accept the idea of color
being perceived on
a continuum since i,

gives them relative
advantages in

many

areas.

For the same reason,

they are often unlikely
to believe that the
discrimination and segregation
that they face
identical

topmos. This

racism. In fact,

panhs

is

no, to say that they are
unaware of their color, or
unaware of

are statistically

more

likely to be

aware of racism and

likely to identify as
Brazilian than ar epre'os
(Datafolha, ,995;

December,

more

1

998).

I

is

lovvever, they also recognize
that in

many

are less

* of

Schwarzmannn,

situations they are in a

privileged position than are
negros.

There
their ancestry

is

also the

problem with Afro-Brazilians who
are aw are of their skin

and yet they identify as
“Brazilian”(Carvalho, 26 ,h of August,

MNU activists have a very hard time convincing these

1

998).

color,
22

people that they should be

‘•conscious" and politically
committed to their negro identity,

when

they do not have

similar consciousness to other
facets of their identity, such as
religion, class, sex.

etc.

Jose Pereira de Oliveira Junior,
the director of the Cultural
Group of Afro-Reggae

(GCAR), has been

reluctant to associate with the

of identify ing as “ meslico

*

S

ar81nallZ

n8 0 br

since he says that

is

T

MNU.

what he

Additionally, he commits the sin

is.

In several interviews he

° r dark skinned nordestinos, particularly those
who are not from Bahia.
S <* a °' The -racial- identity of Ihese people is
more clearly aniculated
'i7
,
as being Indio, C aboclo,
or Blanco and not negro.

whn<^l
!,w
'

"7

',

,!
J
re llnked
10 ,he
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explained that he had
aneestrv
St • that WaS

tw

should say he

is

in C o

mmu „ ity education

the massacre in
Vigario Geral in

“

•o -he

'«*>, and then asked

why he

negro.

OCAR began as a newspaper

involved

»*">

youth of the neighborhood.

1

1

that focused
especially

protects and in

"J
qq->

m
GCAR

on culm-,

AIDs prevention

particularly

progrants. Following

\ r>

-

GCAR se,

“ ***-

0, "“ d

Set

up a

“P a

center and offered
classes

perforate

*>

troupe, consisting
alntos,

PH-

”” “

as

Oli'.it. e.plaiiKd,

i,

„ t, M

self-esteem, especially
through the use of
Afro-Brazilian culture.

The

MNU and

it

dealers, into

cultural focus

has been very effective

community

into the favela

condition for

of GCAR has avoided
some of the excessive
dogmatism of the
in

bringing youth,

participation and activism.

of Vigario Geral, contributing

many

residents in the process.

interview, Ol.ve.ra recounted

how

to

some of whom

are formerly drug

GCAR has been able to insert itself

a community, and improving
the

One anecdote emphasizes

earlier that

day he was called down

this point.

,n

to Vigario Geral

because there was a run-in
between police officers and some
members of GCAR 33
police invited Oliveira’s
participation and encouraged his
mediation. This

is

.

The

a

particularly positive sign given
that only five years earlier
off-duty police officers

murdered 21 sleeping residents
because of the/m*/a ’s reluctance
about a drug dealer

who

killed a police officer.

Interview with the author 10 th
of December. 1998.

one

to give information

The
Self-esteem

results for Afro-Brazilian
activism and

among

Republican citizenship remain
mixed

Afro-Brazilians remains a
serious prob.em.

When shown -white- and
"black" figures, primary
school students overwhelmingly
identified the -black"
figure as
stup.d

(83%), -ugly" (85) and only

compared w„h
61

).

1

7%, 14% and

94%

6% recognized

respectively for the "white
figure” (Hanchard. 1994:

Similarly, n a study of
racial prejudice in Brazil.
,

racial prejudice exists
in Brazil, bu,

.he victim of prejudice
(Datafolha,

only

1

lowever, the idea of racism

is

32%

89%

of Brazilians admitted

of Afro-Brazilians claimed

to

995). This awareness that racism
exists

positive sign, considering
the extent to
1

the "black" figure
as “wealthy”,

which the idea of 'racial democracy'

something that

is

that

have been

is

is

certainly a

accepted.

rarely transformed into
a personally

experienced event. Jorge da Silva
reports that informants noticed
racism only as “isolated
incidents, never practiced by
suffered... (in the case

them

(in the

of negros)" (da

Another problem

is

that

case of broncos) and rarely
personally

Silva, 1998: 31).

even while the idea of racism exists

affirmed, old stereotypes and
discourses persist.

and music

is

The

statistics cited earlier

is

also validated by the

same

study.

whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement

"A good Negro

branco soul" [Negro bom e negro de alma
branca],

35%

agreed partially

.

Interestingly enough,

W'ere almost identical

12%

being

about sports

exemplary of this. More poignantly
Brazilian, and particularly Afro-

Brazihan, acceptance of “whitening”

and

in Brazil is

(35% and

1

1

% for brancos, 36% and
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a negro with a

agreed completely, while

when broken down by

for pretos, Datafolha, 1995: 129).

is

When asked

1

racial category, the

1

12%

numbers

% for nmlalos. and 36%

Despite the increased number
of self-affirmed “Black”
politicians, the passage
of

key legislation, and the growth
of NGOs
"it

would be rash

that targe,

some of the needs of Afro-Braziiians,

to argue that Afro-Brazilian
protest has

had any significant impact

either on the prevailing
assimilatiomst ideology or social
behavior" (Skidmore. 1992).

Or

as former director of the
Center for Afro-Asian Studies Carlos
Hasenbalg explains, "the

Movinwnto Negro has

far

more influence on

(Hasenbalg, 12* August, 1998).

w hich

is

inaccessible to the

Much

the government than on the
masses"

of this

is

due

to their adoption of a discourse

mass of Afro-Brazilians who

are

aware of their skin color but

do not identify as “ negro .”

Comparative Analysis
In

comparing the experiences of activists and
academics who

silence on the issue ot race in the

that stand out as

Dommican and
sustained

Dominican Republic and

are challenging

Brazil, th.re are several issues

groups and individuals attempt to broaden and deepen
the rights of Afro-

Afro-Brazilian citizens. The Movimento Negro
Unificado

"movement" and even

less a “unified”

one

at that.

hardly a

is

However, there

is

a

remarkable amount ot consensus among members over certain
fundamental

ideas, such as

hypodescent and the idea that Brazil

The

Movimento Negro's presence, even
states allows tor national

is

if

the

most

small and

racist country in the world.

elitist, in all

of Brazil’s major

cities

and

campaigns. The Movimento Negro also serves as the central

point of nexus for people concerned with racial issues, with activists and mobilizers,

NGO service providers, academics and artists.

There

is

a central institution to filter anti-

raC ' St POl “' Cal aCtiVky
'

^

WHiCh Can giW

and which can pressure
national govemntents,

in

the offices of ,den'i
dad

tod

organizations

addition to JU st local
ones.

The Dominican Republtc
has no such organized

Combining

actions of

^^^^^

anti-racism campaign.

wd MUDH£ there are

^

perhaps another ten
volunteers and academics
that are somewhat
regularly associated
with the organizations.
While the Dominican state
without Balaguer a, its
helm seems

more

likely to

legislation, or

S

very low.

existing,

be sympathetic to
preventing racism, the likelihood
of any anti-racism

any policies aimed towards
improving the conditions of
Afro-Dominicans

As of yet,

and so there

is

the government

no debate

to

still

has not recognized racial
discrimination as

promote policies

The area of identification
remains perhaps
Of Afro-Dominican and
Afro-Brazilian
clearer, since Brazil

community of citizens.

In

to accept the

perceived to be Haitian,
citizens.

citizenship.

prevent

most

The

it.

difficult

one

in the

situation in Brazil

is

all

other words, while

in the

Dominican Republic, Dominicans

poor treatment, and abuse, of Haitians
and people who may be
of the Afro-Brazilians

who

are mistreated are clearly
Brazilian

Dominican Republic. However, the

their race, those

who do

lighter-skinned peoples, and those

Additionally, the

not

who

MNU claims,

MNU has consistently employed

veiy extreme and essentialist
discourse. Afro-Brazilians (pardos
and pretos)

recognize

only slightly

of racism are always members of
the same national

This should contribute to a slightly
more sympathetic audience for

as opposed to in the

promotion

does not have a significant
population of foreign dark-skinned

nationals. Therefore, the
victims

seem willing

the

to

who do

not

employ the term “negro" those who date/marry

straighten their hair are often considered
traitors.

MNU discourse insists that non-brancos are negro-
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an assertion which

maJOnty

Wh °

be " eVe ° therWiSe

hatred for Evangelicals
cuts

it

Fina ”^

'

MNU <***> for the Catholic

Church and

off front ntany
potential sympathetic
Afro-Brazilians

(Burdick: 1998).

W
,n ,he

than

'

constitute

D ° miniCan
is

RepUbliC

-

Mi - M^doz...

choice of the word
-Afro'- rather

symbolic of an attempt
to be inc.usive.
Since Afro-Dominicans

anywhere between 75-95
percent of the population,
bu, negros

percent of the population,
Afro could include

many more

people. Additionally, the

choice of Afro highlights
the role of culture
and a heritage, which

Dominicans, and which
therefore could be used

Dominican

elites.

ye,

is

shared by

may

is

complicated because many

exhibit very anti-Haitian
views. This

complicates strategies towards
building self-esteem and
racial consciousness

Afro Dominicans. The
successful,

however

As mentioned

the

earlier,

strategies

most

employed by Idemidad and MlJItm'
seem

difficult logistical

problem

is

strategies

employed by

the

heroes has had only limited
success,
like to think, given

fetish, zed the

t0

be fair|y

without national institutions
through which they can link
and
to local activism.

MNU can be more thoroughly evaluated since

has existed for more than two
decades. The

would

among

the scale of their campaigns.

without large and reliable
sources of funding, their efforts
are limited

The

all

to forge useful ailiances
with Euro-

Bu, the issue of combating
racism

Dominicans may be against
racism, and

are on,y 5 to ,5

in that

MNU’s

i,

attempt to create Afro-Brazilian

awareness of Zumbi

is

not as high as activists

twenty years of organizing. Also,
focusing on Zumbi has

runaway slave and has

Surely, an organization of so

many

led to a romanticization of
Zumbi and of Palmares.

people, including scholars, could
find and promote
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o.Her figures in
figures such as

B razilian Hi***

for

A bdias do Nasc im e nt

MNU strategy has involved positive

examp, e, Afro-Brazilian
„,

stereotypes of
Aiio-BtazQian

Raimundo dos Santos which

(

,

brines
to

" African "

A

,

,

so

tdent,,, but

994) has issued harsh

the Afro-Braztlian
Catholic

is

and politica

Benedita da Si.va and
Ivanir dos Sant0
,

stereotypes nonethe.ess.
Michael Hanehard

ssue, bu, perhaps nrore
telling

activists

crittctsnts

over

this

mass of Fre, David

n
culture
into the Catholic
•

Church

(see

Burdick, 1998).

Afro-Dommican
a

activists

have not given much
pursuit

mythology of their own
heroes, or

closest character to
Zuntbi in

whose

specifically

Dominican

history

to the tdea

Afro-Dominican
is

of constructing

historical accounts.

probably the runaway slave
Lemba

statue is alongside
Bartolomd de las Casas and
Enri q u,„o in front of
the

of the Dominican Man.
Despite the prominent
placement of this

statue.

w htch

,s

even though no,

all

is

certainly full of prominent

of them, such as the mulatto
dictator

Dominican nation and Afro-Dominican

Where

the

governments
of the

1

95

1

mass of support,

at the elite levels

is in

successful,

sister’s

in politics (Cassa.

Afro-Dominican

25

figures.

Trujillo, contributed morally
to

identity.

MNU has been extraordinarily successful, especially

lack of a significant

is less

of the three Miraba!

used as a means of encouraging
the participation of
women

June, 1998). Dominican
histoty

the

to the assassination

Museum

Lemba

well-known than Zuntbi.
However, the idea of propagating
heroes may be
given the vast amount of
coverage given

The

considering

its

pressuring both dictatorial and
democratic

of society. Although the Cao Law
was mostly a revision

Afonso Arinos Law and

it

has only rarely been used, the
inclusion of a policy

against racism in the Constitution
and the passage of an anti-racism law
the following

218

year

is

is

significant.

Again. President
Cardoso’s declaration
that Brazil

a very significant
step, as

of adopting a

sort

was

however SO

MNU protest forced Cardoso to

MNU pressure was no doubt involved

briefly,

on the

the military

which attached

On

a

more

local level,

agenda, but activist

member of the Sao Paulo

the notion of racial
democracy, and one of the
reasons

government removed him from

because of his investigations

political

recognize racism in Brazil
seem completely

exaggerated (Lucia.
1998), given that the sociologist
was a
revistonis, school

a racist country
c

opening of an academic
convention on the possibility

of affirmativee acton
program.

ln putting affirmative
action, for

claims that

his

is

in the area

his post at the University
of

Sao Paulo was

of race.

GCAR has been immensely successful

in raising self-

esteem as well as opportunities
for members of one
of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas.
able to insert itself into
a community, draw

and

its

GCAR can

serve also as a

State and the residents of
Vigario Geral.

since

1

993

it

is difficult to

However.

that

has been reasonably successful,
although

it

limited Republican ci.tzenship
that

whtch means

that they tend to

GCAR

As

means of mediation between

GCAR has only

evaluate the long term effects of

community, or even on leadership
within

was

leadership primarily from the
community

to raise educational
levels while raising
sell-esteem in a very depressed
area.

in the incident cited
earlier,

It

its

'

seen

the

sen in Vigario Geral

program on

the

community. CEAP’s anti-racism program

has no. created the sort of community
and
has.

These programs are small and targeted

have a concentrated influence on a

fairly small population.

This contributes to deepening
citizenship for very narrow communities
and as of yet.
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these efforts remain
primarily localized and
their success
of the individual
leaders

Another

and

The

directly linked to the
qualities

24
their ability to get
fundin..

significant difference

activtty is historical.

is

between Afro-Dominican
and Atro-Brazilian

historical roots

of challenging racism

in the

Republic are reasonably
shallow, while an actual
organization, the
the Brazil for

significant

more than two decades.

amount of Afro-Brazilian

Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro,
a
can history.
existence at a period

activity

MNU,

has existed in

MNU was ab,e to build on a

between the 1920s and 1940s,
principally

historical legacy

In addition to the

when

Additionally, the

Dominican

of activity

that really

number of years of existence,

civil society activ ism

was challenging

has no analogue

the

in

in

MNU came into

military governments,
4

and therefore earned a more
receptive public audience.
In a

review of the conditions for
consciousness of racism,

community formation and Republican
Brazilians,

i,

seems as though

all

will follow the path

and Afro-Brazilian

and unsuccessful
In

of these conditions are slightly
more developed

mean

that the condition

of Afro-

activists could certainly benefit

from comparing notes on successful

strategies.

terms of consciousness of racism, a
considerable number (52 percent)
that there

was racism

Brazilians (89 percent) recognized that
there

227; Datalolha.

1

in Brazil

of that of Afro-Brazilians. However.
Afro-Dominican

Dominican Republic acknow ledged
all

,

citizenship for Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-

than in the Dominican Republic.
This does not

Dominicans

political identity

in their countiy,

was racism

while almost

in Brazil (Brea et al. 1995:

995: 96). Both numbers are certainly impressive,
given the

"4

See chapter 6 on both accounts.
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in the

many y ears

al

1"

of racsm. However,
one continually hears
both Dominicans
and Brazilians

° f inf0

™

antS

hat racism

persistence of color
COlleCt ‘ Ve

activists

•he

^

rada

'

^

is

ab0W

understood

carries

—“
in

terms of concrete

acts.

The reason

*" «• ** Afro- Dominican

have had limited
success, since the
problem of political

political participation

racist, tha,

for this

is

does

the

a,on g a continuum
and an absence of
any large-scale

identifiCati °"'

most fundamental
problem

to collective
identification,

and

A fro-Bra zi ,ia„

identification remains

community budding and

of a self-conscious
-group.”

While Identidad-s
scheme of identification
'.self to

-r countries were

more of a mass-base,

the

MNU’s

strict

is

far

more

inclusive and will ,end

dichotomies create verv
dogmatic ye,

vety few, sympathizers
and activists. Neither
group has been altogether
successful
creating Afro-Dominican
or Afro-Brazilian
communities tha, are self-conscious.

in

this

successful in contributing
to an actual community,
which already existed, and
attempting
to raise self-esteem
there.

Judgements of Republican
citizenship could range
from harsh

to

very generous.

Considering the amount of
political agency and
participation of Afro-Dominicans
and
Afro-Brazil, ans,

No

i,

would be very easy

to argue that positive

freedoms are veiy

limited.

doubt discourses tha, demean
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians,
as well as other

discourses that deny the
existence of racism, limit the
possibility for active,
participatory

and associative citizenship.
Additionally, the
Brazilians also occupy

low ends of very

rigid

fact that

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

socio-economic hierarchies impede the
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citizenship.

However, given

the generally

Dominican Republic and

anomic position of almost

Brazil, there is reason
to be

more

all

citizens in the

optimistic about the
relative

anomie of Afro-Dominieans
and Afro-Brazilians.
Most Dominicans and
most
do no, enjoy Republican
citizenship. Few
Dominicans and Brazilians
are

Brazilians

involved i„ any

associative activity in civil
society, and
identification

is

vety low

lower classes and
few

women

for Brazil.

still

fewer aim

to

among Afro-Dominicans, and

among women

(Duarte

enter, while civil
society

Dominican and Brazilian

hierarchies in -which people

know

is

e, al.

1

994 ).

i,

expand the public sphere.
Party
is

especially

Politics

low among

remains an arena which

over-representative of women.
This

societies are based

their place.”

I, is

a

the

is

true also

on subtle ye, recognizable

common

expression

among

Brazilian scholars of race
tha, -Brazil does no,
have a racial problem, because
the negro

knows

his place.”

The same could be

said of other groups

who occupy

social hierarchy, such as
migrants, labors, the poor,
homeless, and. in

women. Republican

lower rungs of the

many

instances.

citizenship for these people has,
like tha, of Afro-Dominicans
and

Afro-Brazilians. also been abridged
by hierarchical societies and
degrading stereotypes.

But public space has expanded

in

both countries over the

last

two decades and

this

has increased the area in which
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians could
organize.
Also, activists have access to
a

much more open media and
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to

more competitive and

free

elecnons. Afro-Brazilians
have formed groups
within various

B raz llian

parties

(

PT. PFL), and both
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
have increased access
and Western European
resources. assistance and
support.

, g pDT
.

to

US

Conclusion
There are cenain elements
of racial tdentification
Brazil that

seem

to be

example, the idea
or that

"[t] 0

his study

that

be black

race.

1

998:

1

Dominican Republic and

affected by Afro mobilization
in the las, twenty
years. For

Negro

is

in Brazil

a term reserved for
Haitians in the

means

to

that

devoted to Anastasia “often though,
about her

54).

They

Dominican Republic,

have no white ancestors"(Eakin.
1998:

of the slave -Saint Anastasia ”
John Burdick found

women who were
(Burdick,

little

in the

identified with her

more

as a

I„

15).

most Afro-Brazilian
in nonracial

terms”

symbol of suffering, than by her

Yet, as noted, both countries,
particularly in the past two decades,
have seen an

increasing use of the term negro.
While
racial

dynamics may be

m°da,

shifting towards

as Carlos Hasenbalg puts

it

it

is still

useu by a minority,

one which

critically,

is

more

it

does suggest

assertive and public,

in

more “a

is fairly

both countries, there are clubs in the
Dominican Republic where Afro-

Dominicans cannot
their skin

of their

that

of the United States.

Despite the persistence of the mass
belief that racism does not exist or

mild

1

enter.

Also, in both countries, children are regularly
recognized by

and hair color and are often treated

own

family

2.

Employers

better or

in professions

worse as a

where workers

result,

will

even by members

have

to

be seen

This

still

is true even of Euro-Dominicans
and Euro-Brazilians with dark hair who report that they do not
receive the same attention as blonde and blue-eyed
members of tneir family (Interviews, 1997 1998 1999 ).
,
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,

implicitly, if not explicitly,
expect
hoc,

employees of -‘good appearance"
(buena

aparencia ), which means
the more European
the

As

whether these be public,
commercial or

Domimcans and
Brazilians with

As

better.

Marshall Eak.n writes
"racial prejudice seems
to intensify as one
moves up

the social scaIe"(Eakin,
,998: ,17). This

open.

apm

is

largely due to the fact
that certain spaces

private,

remain

fairly

closed to

many Afro-

Afro-Brazil, ans. Access for
lighter skinned
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

more European and Indigenous

features

a result, consciousness
of racial identify

most educated who are most
capable of seeing

is

better, but still not
entirely

and racism seems strongest
among the

that burners presented
against

them

are no,

related to wealth or
education.

As
developed

Livio Sansone has pointed
out, a
[in Brazil] as

"new openness

to cultural diversity has

a result of the increased
acceptance of black cultural
expressions

by government institutions
and

official culture,

in addition, the leisure
Indus, fy is

interested in black culture than
ever before” (Sansone. 1997:
467). This

Dominican Republic with

also true of the

the growth of merengue-house
music and the increased

consumption of rap music. Yet there
are two things
awareness of Afro culture.

is

more

First, this

that

should be noted regarding the

often contributes to the propagation,
rather than the

contestation, of stereotypes. Second,
cultural awareness of Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-

Brazilians contributes to socio-cultura!
identify, and does not immediately
translate into a
political identity.

This

is

particularly salient because participation
in politics, challenging

racism discourses, and trying to expand
Republican citizenship
in

both countries, although

be argued

in the

it

seems

slightly

more developed

is still

in Brazil.

very

limited

However, as

next chapter, participation and Republican
citizenship, for
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much

all

will

groups,

in

~—

*0 be seriously
obstructed b
y authoritarian

centered economic
model and the growth
of neo-liberal
Finally, there

e

wbo

is

a

new

are actively

promment of these groups

is

a group of

m0S ‘ Pr0mment

SCh °' arS

^^

activists within

political issues.

Among

and outside of
tbe

more

Sao Paulo based
Afro-Brazilian lawyers
who

have held conferences
about affirmativte
-

„^

hegemony

generation of Afro-Brazil
ian

P usbin g Afro-Bra.ilian

and

aC, ‘° n

which have

attracted

some of the world’s

”d
distributive justice and
minority

rights (Telles,

adVen,Sing

'

l/’ September,
,999). They also have
been active

THe

i$SUe ° f

members over who should
are rea "
y

'

f a‘

«*>"

in prosecuting

underscores the difference

racism

among

benefit from affirmative
action, and whether
a„

U remai " S

t0

^

h0W ** "

adjust affirmative action
programs

a "’ t0 C ° nf0mi t0
BraZ ’Ts Pa, ' em ° f co,or
classification. In the
meanwhile, they are

actively advocating
Afro-Bra Z i,ia„ rights and
are addressing
to Afro-Brazilian
citizenship.
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many

issues that are relevan

PART

IV

sssas.'is
IN

Hav,n g argued
citizenship

^

in part 3 that
neither the Lihera,

seem vety we„

'

UmS

Wh3t

t0

COMPARATIVE perspective

institutionalized for

“

nor Repubiican
notion of

Afro-Dominictms and
^-Brazilians the

°f

*ese group, and what
are the
consequences of such a
conceptualization of
citizenship for
democratization. Chapter
6.
The Privatization of
Citizenship in the
Dominican Republic and
Brazil," follows
the

conceptual alternative ,o
the Liberal and
Republican models that
was

-lying upon the construe,
ion of nonns and
values

which have

examined

in

democracy

historically

pan

in the

developed surrounding
citizenship, race and
the

Dominican Republic and

The following chapter argues
the privatization of
citizenship.

The

Brazil

that there are three

firs, is

(hat

in

1

society

polilica, system.

pan

and

3.

fundamental components within

power remain

external to public

procedures of policy-making
be denatured by extra-ins,
itutional

such as membership within
a

clientele.

consistently understood in
terms of a status which

universal and public. Being
a citizen

and

pan

in race, citizenship

which appeared

atrangements, and that the
public agency of the citizen
identities,

Dominican an u Brazilian

and the ponraits of
contemporary issues

2,

institutions, that the

in

se, ou, in

racial stereotypes

which privilege

the poor and the
dark-skinned.

The

is

is

undefined by

The second point
is

distinctive

is

panicularistic

that citizenship

is

and private rather than

vety intimately linked to class
politics and ethnic

the wealthy and the
light-skinned a, the expense of

third

is that,

following neo-liberal economic
dogma.

If

““ “***-

COnCemra,ed

“ - »« *

S0Clal s end n
P
§
'

which has

„„

traditionally constituted

.

21
^n,

S0UrCe 0f aSSiStanCe
f° r ,He

Ic ant

change

m ° St margina

'

iZed P ° PUla,i0nS

>

”d

- State to mtegrate citizens

'd

—

privaljzatjons

’“

politically, socially

«.*
the

and economically.

if

TWs -P-en,s

,n state-society
relations particularly
since the State in
Latin

7* "• “ “ “““ — —»* " "S

-

some, even

a

American

^

„

„„„

CHAPTER 6
HL PRIVATIZATION OF
CITI7FNSHIP
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
AND
1

IN

BRAZIL

The most fundamental
work on
"Citizenship and Soda,
those

who

are full

Cass"

in

citizenship remains T.H.

which he

All

respect to the rights and
duties with which status

to

who
is

available to

endowed”

bestowed on

(Marshall, ,950: 28-9).

be a means of expanding
the privileges of the
wealthy

form of equality. Yet the
construction of a citizenship
which
all

on

possess the sl.tus are equal
with

•he working Cass,
thereby enfranchising the
latter and ms, nationalizing
a
tial

lectures

states that -citizenship
is a status

members of a community.

Marshall intended citizenship

Marshals

and which provides equal

rights

and duties

is

to

more

is

a status

continually frustrated,

especially in electoral regimes
where clientelistic practices and
hierarchical notions of
status prevail

is

particularly

The

lack of-full

membership”

for

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians

exemplary of how the construction
of citizenship

particularistic behavior

In chapters 2

and such socio-economic

and

j,

is

thwarted by such

disparities.

evidence was given to suggest that
social and

political

structures that prioritize privilege
over equality have negatively effected
the
institutionalization of

democracy and democratic notions of
citizenship,

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

In these chapters, the notions

and citizenship were traced through
different
continuities.

While the

legal definition

of the

especially for

of racial

historical periods, noting shifts

citizen

and

expanded during the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, the percentage of
the population that could claim to have
ot citizenship consistently recognized
remained small.
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identity

The

elites in

its

exercise

Dominican and

Brazilian -'democracies'- resisted
opening public space to the masses, and
often sided with
authoritarian governments

which limited mass entry

into the political sphere.

The

resistance to include popular sectors
expressly limited the political agency
of the Afro-

Dominican and Afro-Brazilian
ensuring political and

citizen,

civil rights, as

who

often found democracy to be

little

better at

well as political agency and access, than other
forms

of government.
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the extent to which
Liberal and Republican citizenship

have been institutionalized,
Brazilians.

exist and/or are possible for

The Dominican and Brazilian governments,

have been disappointing
their citizens,

in

many

successes,

to

many

as efforts at participation and

face serious challenges. This has practical and direct implications

tor the quality of citizenship of

Dominican

despite their

terms of institutionalizing and protecting the rights of all
of

and government remains inaccessible

community building

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

politics, the State has implicitly,

it

In

contemporary

not explicitly, supported the violation of

the civil and political rights of Afro-Dominicans. In a similar vein, the
Brazilian national

government has had

little

success in ending police immunity and in preventing wide-scale

violations of civil rights of Afro-Brazilians, particularly in urban areas.

Two

of the most

significant challenges towards constructing a robust and deep form of democratic

citizenship

lie

within the limitations imposed by traditional societal beliefs and political

culture as well as by

new dynamics of neo-liberal economic

adjustment.
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policies of structural

The

Priv atization of
Citizenship

Despite approximately
two decades of'
“democratizatiion,
political cultures in the

two countries

authoritarianism. This does
no,

demonstrate significant
strains of

still

mean

the political arena
and

tha,

Dominican and Brazilian

political culture is

exclusively authoritarian,
nor that Dominicans and
Brazilians have no means
of

understanding democracy,

what

is

much

less

implementing

understood as political culture

Escobar. 1999). However,
there
historic social

and

is

is

static (Alvarez,

of highly unequal

of, he poor, uneducated,

Europeans which was normalized
within

mixed with

also should no, be

I,

homogenous and

a persistence

political exclusion

it.

political culture.

assumed

that

Dagnino and

relations, based

on the

women, and non-

This political culture has

the restructuring of state
and society relations tha, result
from neo-liberal

plans and structural adjustment
packages that often are emergency
stabilization measures

designed to cu, (hyper) inflation.
The privatization of state ow ned
industries and the
decrease in state spending
in the area

in social areas

of civil society (Yudice,

that the State has

1

has forced citizens to seek
assistance and charity

999: 49). This

been the most central

political

is

especially significant considering

and economic insfi>-: on n Latin
j

America since

at least

World War

II,

if not the

Great Depression (Cavarozzi. 1993:

Vellinga, 1998).

One should

not lose sight of the

decades in both countries. The

any other time

in

modem

military'

history

many democratic advances
seems

to

in the last

two

be under civilian control more so than

1

.

Legislative bodies are

becoming more

active and

willing to challenge presidential prerogatives.
The media, with probably fewer
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at

restrictions thnn ever lnvp>

m0re

^

k->

i

.

n able

uncover many scandals,
and elections are

-

mStitUti0nali2ed and

pobucs, nor have
democralic

politics

democracy has no,

integration, there is
an undemocratic

institutionalized within

in State

•

how

n„,
Due

inio every

to a uhterarchical
,

involvement

form of politics

changes mentioned above.
Examining

down

normalized ,o rhe extern
tha, they are
expected

and constdered the
only legitimate form
3
of P
politics
t^s
of ,he ordering of
society and a decrease

trick, ed

fairer '

in tenats

tha, underlies

citizenship

is

understanding

of social

a„ of the praiseworthy

conceived, maintained
and

contemporary Latin American
democracies allows the

investigator to see the
gap between forma,
electoral politics and
informal, evetyday

marginalization.

I

argue that citizenship

in the

Dominican Republic and

contemporary Latin American
4
democracies

,

is

Brazil, like other

neither based on Liberal
guarantees of

individual civil and political
5
rights nor a Republican
notion of robust participator
politics

and community, 6 but

is

rather a largely "private,"
rather than "public;'
matter.

This chapter will examine
the “privatization" of
citizenship by analyzing:
privatization

and

first,

the

of power; second, the
association of citizenship with
socio-economic

third, the privatization

of services. Since the

consider the persistence of
political patterns tha,

role

make

of the citizen

is

a public one.

;

5,°

me

“

n ° ta ble exce tions include
P
Peru. Colombia and Mexico
L
nica " Repub,ic ' ,his

See Spanakos (forthcoming b)
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1

public space less accessible
to

ordinaiy citizens, such as
clientelism. deleterious to the
construction of democratic

2

status;

is

no sma "

fea ‘-

citizenship. understood
in tenns of
horizontal

d

‘

ffiCU,t

Ci ' iZenShiP

accountabi% ,

--

^

—

^

^

^ __

es and not Public
righ
a result, the
wealthy are
disproportionately trea,e d
as citizens, and
the poor and

,

As

marginal

often seek to
compensate for their
peripheral socio- (
-economic

position through

conspicuous consumption.
Finally, social
services and advocacy
become privatized as
market reforms have cut
down the size of the state,
ushering in a more
prominent role for
NGOs that provide direct
services. While these
organizations can often
offer
specialized

support services for
marginal communities,
they cannot offer a
viable independent
form

of cmzenship. They
can only

serv e to

complement and make more
robust

the citizenship

offered by the State.
Additionally, neo-liberalism
shifts the entire
perception of what
titutes a

policies

Power

public good,

more

difficult to

which makes attempts
towards state-based

distribution

implement.

as Private

Citizenship requires power
to be a public good
that
Citizenship

is

limited

when power and decision-making

is

contestable and negotiable.

are private and thus no,
placed

within a domain that the
public, particularly ordinaty
citizens, can access. This
has long

been the case
historically

in

Lat,n

America where public

institutions

undermined by private individuals,

or clienteles (Alvarez,
Dagnino and Escobar,

1

and Liberalism have been

dictators, caudillos/caudilhos,
networks,

998:

9).

This tendency

is

worsened by the

diminishing public and political
space resulting from the adoption
of neo-liberal

Habennas,
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neural

adjustment programs that
have further institutionalized
the privatization
of

Power. The privatization
of economies, particular.,
ones where the State
has ,ong played

unit*
of distributor of welfare,
services and unemployment,

and private space which
radically affects

how state-society relations

liberalism constructs the
individual as the basic
economtc

away bonds of solidarity

the State. This

is

shifts the notion

*

and

of public

are conceived.

in

so doing

i,

Neo-

strips

across groups which
weakens their bargatntng
power relative to

particularly relevant as the
ontotheological acceptance
of the

Washington Consensus’ vision
of government efficiency
hich would typically

sene

as

much needed

aid. relief or

cuts

government programs

patronage for the more

marginal sections of society.

As

has often been noticed, the
growth of the developmental

bureaucracy

in Latin

(Vellmga, 1998:

5;

America did not

As

and the

lead to the creation of neutral
publie institutions

Smith. 1998). Instead,
patrimonialism was employed

chentehstic networks, as well as to
construct
to be a particular

state

new

ones. This allowed

and private possession, as opposed

to

to reinforce old

power

to continue

something universal and public.

Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar write,
the privatization of public
political spaces

"normalizes favoritism, personalism,
elientelism. and paternalism as regular
practices." (Alvarez.

Dagnino and Escobar, 1998:

9).

political

These behavioral tendencies,

particularly elientelism, tend to reinforce
existing socio-economic and political

7

*

See (O’Donnell, 1998).

As opposed

to the group as the economic unit which
was critical to Latin American corporate and Import
substitution and Industrialization models
(see Wiarda, 1981).
Coined by John Williamson, the “Washington
Consensus” represents a consensus among money lenders
and financial experts in terms of improving
economic

performance and ending economic

Appendix”

in

Williamson, 1994).

crisis (see his

inequalities,

and

to subvert legal
notions

of equality 10

.

This

is
i

particularly dangerous in

areas where inequalities
of power and resources are
so deep and trenchant
(Vilas. 1997;
60).

Active and independent
media
spaces and exposed

many

in

both countries have opened

many

political

scandals since the 1980s",
most obviously the corruption

surrounding the Collor presidency

in Brazil.

It is

not unimportant that the
scandal

surrounding Collor led to his
impeachment. Similarly, following
the very problematic

and fraudulent presidential
elections of 1994. Balaguer
ended up serving a two,
than four, year term. This
represents an improvement on eras
entirely unaccountable.

However, many

non-mstitutional spaces,

made

in

critical political

back rooms,

far

although public contestation has
increased during
democratization,

many

politically significant

efficient arenas than those

of the

resisted institutionalization

private form of clientelism.

margins of democratic

in

which

politicians

citizenry.

In fact,

most recent period of

groups are aware that there are more

official political institutions.

This

is

because power has

and democratization, and instead has
crystallized

Or

were

decisions remain enshrouded in

from the gaze of the
this

rather

in the

as Lechner writes ‘“really existing
politics’ occurs on the

institutions,

which often

are limited to ratifying extra-institutional

accords” (Lechner, 1998: 32).
Clientelism

is

certainly not a political practice that

However, while the practice of clientelism enforces

is

limited to Latin America.

the idea that certain individuals are

patrons and others clients, the difference in pow'er between
the two groups depends on

10

See chapter

4.

This does not
accountable, but

mean
it

that the Latin

does

American media

is

at least report scandals.
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capable of holding the government and others

economic

cautions,

societal values

and political cultuce.
While p„, lti c ians

favors in other countries,
what has been institutionalized
in Latin America

wealth, and the vast
majority

n a region
ol

income within

.ike Latin

its

who do

the

not.

America, which has the
world's most perverse
distribution

countries, the unequal
relations between
patron and client

the possibility of
democratic citizenship.

government has

is

may trade

rarely been able to

And

ye,

it

weaken

should be stated that
democratic

improve the socio-economic

cc:t

Ltions of poor and

marginalized individuals, while
local patrons have
historically provided for
their clients

through jobs and the
distribution of food and
resources. These sons of
relations hardly
contribute to the normalization
of democratic behavior or
even economic mobility,

however, they explain quite a

about the politics of survival,
political inactivity and the

hi,

quiescence ot Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-Brazilians.
In a

survey conducted

in

1994

in the

Dominican Republic, 88.5% of those

interviewed agreed with the
statement "when someone arrives

should help those

who

claim was even higher

93.6%

supported him/her" (Duarte
in cities other

respectively, Duarte et

normalized since fundamental

al,

1

than Santo

996:

1

87).

to Balaguer's

et

ah 1996

at

:63).

Domingo and

The expectations

power has been

an important post s/he
Support for

in rural areas

this

(89.9% and

for pay-offs are quite

his ability to personally

distribute patronage. Jonathan
Hartlyn notes the very high budget for
the office of the

presidency, through which most of the
government’s construction projects are funded
(Hartlyn, 1998: 194-5). Although current
President Leonel Fernandez seems to be less

233

amount

of budgetary
discretion (Hartlyn,
1998: 272-3).

Elections in rural Brazil
are often characterized
by. and satirized
because

amount of free food
available

to

populations

who

food and alcohol have
traditionally been
given

of. the

ordmarily are quite
poorly fed,

Monev

to voters at election

time in order to
«he support of the
most poor. Political
supporters-, „ a„ of
Brazil-believe that a

Imk Sh0U d eX
'

'

St

betWeen he
'

am ° Um ° fw0rk

gamer
direct

that the >' "volunteer"
for a candidate,

and

•he position they receive
after the election
(Interviews, ,998).
Although these traditions

seem

,0

have waned

to

some

extent, the lack of
discipline of Brazilian
political parties

and the lack of majority
parties forces

Fernando Henrique Cardoso's

PSDB

political coalitions, such
as the

has

conservative parties. Coali,
ion-building

made with

the

in Brazil, as

PEL and

one President

other mostly

one might expect,

is

less influenced

by ideology or party program
than by the amount and
the type of patronage
offered

members of the
members and

coalition. Again,

when

parties are

to

weak and incapable of providing

constituents with necessaty
relief and protection,
patronage emerges as a

very rational survival strategy.

Access

to the political sphere is
very

much

effected by patron client relations,
not

legal status or birth-place,
the traditional prerequisites
for citizenship. This

antithetical to both the Liberal

I

•

seems

and Republican notions of citizenship
outlined

in

chapter

Liberalism requires that individuals
be universally and unequivocally
recognized as

legally equal, but the recognition

primacy of private over legal

of an individual's

status.

legal equality is

Republican citizenship

existence of an abridged public space
that

is

is

undermined by the

also limited by

tile

not the only, nor even the most important.

234

.he citizen the Republican
notions of participation,

responsibility and
membership.

Citizenship becomes private
because the public and
political are perceived
to be the
distant realms of a foreign

and isolated group,

Private, as are the
negotiations

which

to

the citizen

is

an -alien.” Power

is

and exercises of it. This
excludes the immense
majority

from observation and
vigilance, to say nothing
of participation.
Th,s

is

especially true for

from the public sphere due

Afro-Dommicans and Afro-Brazilians
who

to their

weak

reasons

bu,

i,

and

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians

,

Not only does

also

Dommicans and

still

do they

political rights.

For a variety of

ability

of groups

,o

improve

their

of any participatory oriented
citizenship,

monitor and prevent violations of
civil and

Afro-Brazilians are agents

in distant places,

that they are subject to the
arbitrariness

The

to

an attempt

Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian
communities. Afro-

profoundly concentrated

which they

rarely identify their lack
of citizenship

politically organize in

this limit the possibility

impedes the

political rights within

in

civil

12

with their -race,” and rarer
status.

agency and the inability/unwillingness

political

of the State to ensure and
guarantee their

are alienated

in

an order where they

where individuals are

of police

officers

who

know

that

power

far lighter than

is

them, and

invade the neighborhoods

live.

privatization of power

means

that not only is

it

embedded

in private

networks

accessible only through patronage and
exchange of favors, goods, and support, but also
that

decision-making

is

external to the public realm. Thus, not only
are political

institutions (often) alienated

from power and

politics, but so are citizens.
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In the

survey

cited earlier

-

49

-

2%

fcd
never or

of influencing those

“ nW Wha

‘

i$

imPOr,am

"

power (Duarte

in

D°n

i$

ave hm.ted or no
means of affecting

et al,

beli

a, most

1996: 64). Whether
this

- *

never have
is

the ease

majority of their
compatriots

politics, indicating
that there is a
sense tha, the

majority of citizens are
incapable of asserting
their legal rights
and civic
responsibilities 13

In the

.

same

survey,
56 ? percent
net-rem n
.
otfn
Dominicans said that political
parties only
•

served

in

order to participate

defend their

own

and 42 5 percent said

interests (Duarte e,
al, 1996: 70).

52% ° f BraZi " anS

beHeVed

,hat " POliti

-Parties only defend
interests

make

in elections,

political participation

-

of politicians,” and

more

•

A survey in

Brazil in ,990 found
tha,

°»'y divide people,”

1

difficult”

60%

v

that politicians
only

61% agreed

that

believed that -political
parties only

(Dagnino. 1998: 56). This

is

a serious

indictment not only of
political parties, generally
considered the most effective
means of
democratically integrating

of the
to a cleaner

See chapter

common

political class as a

people (Peeler, 1998:

1

form of politics, but simply

to

more

efficient

forms of corruption, suggests

5.

j»

*•

WW

Stales of America (see

C
a

I

C

°^
'r?-.rt!are n? ^relyTn S

immediate

™Z

anS
'

P

r

\

righTs)

*

S

0

P„, nam

^

'

“

1

ly,

I

Elation

could have

Afr°' DOmm CanS and Afro-Brazilians
(see Becker, ,999 on ,he
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.

0
c v
i

^ asec on ntorma property rights
which are

Pal1icipa ' ion and

'

propf?

t

Roben

?epubl ic aod BrS', spectfica

not guaranteed by the State
withdrawal f

informal

Scully,

whole. That the impeachment
of Collor did not lead

19W)“
fndpolfdca

Mainwaring and

65;

issue

of

i 1

•ha.

such skepticism

is

well-earned.

it

a, so

brings hack the idea
of patronage serving the

poor, where parties can,
or do. not.

Economic reform programs and
necessaty by

privatization

many of Brazil's governments

schemes have been deemed

during democratization,
as well as by

Fernandez's government in
the Domintcan Republic-

Cuts

in

budgets and privatizing of

state-owned companies have
received continual protest,
from both the Left and
Right.
since these policies cu, the
traditional cash-cow of the
state.

As

the

amount of money

available for patronage
decreases, the need and
competition for patronage becomes
steeper. This

is

not only true of patrons
but especially also of clients

who

suffer

increasing rates of unemployment,
downsizing and devaluation.

Citizenship

is

matters which society

won

through public struggles and

may

politics.

is true.

Citizens

may choose

which

citizens can petition.

to articulate issues that are

considered private,

but they will only be able to
guarantee these issues, through political
means,
are publicly debated.

Laws

public sphere. But this

is

that

consider ‘-private” or “social.”
as opposed to “public” and

"political,” such as racial
discrimination, are not rights for

The reverse

This does not mean

when

they

against racial discrimination are
negotiated and written in the

only

when

the public sphere

advocates for such issues the opportunity
to articulate
funds, to petition legislators, and to effect
policy.

is

porous enough

their

When

view

tc

allow

points, to access state

political spaces are less

accessible and/or cut off to large sections
of the population, the construction and
institutionalization of democratic citizenship
faces very difficult odds.
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Citizenship as status
Citizenship

mentbership

in

is

also “privatized”

when

the distinction

a community of
rights-bearing individuals,

of being .

is

citizen,

of

based on private resources,

no, on birth or
naturalization. Roberto
da Matta has written that
in Brazil there are
no
citizens, only sub-citizens

Dominican Republic

and super-citizens
(1991);

as well. There

is little

this is certainly true

notion of rights being app,
.cable to a

universal categoty. since
the idea of rights, and
citizenship in general,

of status.

of the

is

linked to the idea

Unlike the contractarian
notion of ‘'bearers of equal
status” upon which

modem, Western democracies
countries has always been
a

are based, the status
implied by “citizenship” in the
two

means of exclusion,

rather than inclusion.

The

citizen is

recognized by his or her
distinctive, rather than
common, features. This understanding
of
the “status” of citizen

is

considered with the increased
possibilities for consumption

offered by liberalization of
markets and import restrictions,
increased differences between
classes resultant from neo-liberal
austerity programs, and the
fatalist belief that

citizenship cannot be achieved
through political activity and
education.

becomes

cut off,

The

political

and ~[t]he role of the consumer...
replaces the notion of the citizen”

(Lechner, 1998: 33).

The
privileges,

association of wealth with citizenship,
and therefore with rights and

is

a dangerous one in a region where
relative and absolute poverty affect
so

large a percent of the population.
Again,

how GDP

is

it

is

not just a matter of

distributed across society. Additionally,

it

is

GDP per capita,

but

worsened with the

Balaguer remained very consistently against
neo-liberalism, and generally maintained a very
economic
which was used to grease the political machine he
depended on
See chapter 4.

nationalist position,
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dehumanization of meters
ofmargina, groups, particularly
the

i„ digent

.

Those vvho

bear marks of social
s.a.us are considered
super-citizens, whi.e ,he
majority of poor.
semi-literate, racially

and ethnically marginalized
are

classified as sub-citizens.

privileged are often
capable of stretching, or
simply ignoring, the Law,
are harshly subjected
to

its

democracy. Considering
events
'

it

seems

likely in either the

support and interest

become

in

is

suppon

in

for institutional Liberal

the popular sectors.

Dominican Republic or

1992 and his

democracy

is

not

While neither a coup nor an
Brazil, low levels of popular

in

.

Licit

government can

increasingly inaccessible,
unaccountable and alien.
identity

arena to a socio-economic one.
cultural disparities reach

As

extreme

of the citizen

in Latin

America

levels, effective inequality
tends to

to

status.

shifts

from a

legal

Carlos Vilas writes, “...when
socioeconomic and

(Vilas, 1997:60). Brazil represents
perhaps the clearest

being undermined by social

Belinda

that

America, such as the

coup

democracy can engender an environment

The negotiation of the

equality'

terms of citizen support
for

in several other
countries in Latin

always high among the
demos, that

amogolpe seem

in

m Peru in Fui™°ri and Chavez’s failed

electoral success in
1998,

the marginal

excesses.

This has significant policy
implications, particularly

aUIOS°'Pe (Se f' C0UP)

w hile

The

Some

dominate

legal

example of citizenship

Brazilians have referred to their country
as

demonstrate the vast cleavages between two
Brazils, one

the former resembling Belgium,
the latter. India.
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The

Brazilian

rich

economy

and one poor,

is

among

the

fifteen largest in
the world, yet

it

has one n
otf th»
the most uneven
distributions of wealth

world (Page, 1995: 16
6 ).
'

"3

’

BraZiHanS

-

Wh ° W

<*» and

in the

entrepreneurs responded

overwhelmingly that they
believed they were
treated as citizens
(63 and 75%,
respectively).

same

Of the members

question,

90%

of social movements"
and unions

answered that they were
not (Dagnino, i998:

who were
55).

ashed the

When

ashed to
demonstrate “evidence”
of their citizenship,
“middle-class interviewees
and entrepreneurs
stressed activities such
as -paying taxes,'
'having a profession.’
-voting,' or even
-having

money'-- ( Dagnino, ,998:
55). This

been attached to the
privileges of a

Although similar

is

no, surprising given
that -cittzenship has
generaily

class, rather than the
rights

statistics for the

Dominican Republic

of a nation.
are no, available,

interviews with Dominicans
implied a cenain hesitance
about using the word
"citizen" for
non-elites,

and

i,

is

clear

from Dominican responses

has a very powerful class
element.

to the

Demos

When Dominicans were ashed

survey, that citizenship

whether there existed

equaiity before law for poor
and rich people, 75.3 percent
of the popuiation responded
•ha,

such equality did no, exist
(Duarte

e, al,

1996: 54). Widespread lach
of

faith in the

judiciaty system and the
police support the claim that
citizen rights are percetved
as
particular, rather than
universal rights.

Citizenship, then,

becomes a

sort

of commodity which

amounts. The greater the capacity
to buy or spend

For an idea of income disparities

other countries

% in wnezuda

-

in the

possessed

in relative

an individual has. the greater the

region the poorest

“^LT" " “

rs.
predomlnandy m^ddlfand

in

that

is

40% “°et

S 70/

t

u„-

in

6
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status,

and the higher the libel.hood

have asserted

this citizenship

,ha, his or her rights
wiii

through the creation of
spaces that can be controiied
and

monitored privately. Large
shopping mails, private

condominiums
clear

becoming incorporated

is

security- forces

into Latin

examples of the construction
of private spaces

citizen

is

are

be respected. The wealthy

American

for citizens

and guarded

culture.

Brazil offers

whose recognition qua

dependent upon their financial
status (Caldeira, 1992.
337). The shopping mall

an open space where through
the medium of consumption,
rather than

politics, citizens

can be distinguished and
recognized. Similarly, private
security forces and closed off

condom, mums guarantee
.he poor.

The poor may

safe spaces in

which

the

w ealthy

enter only to provide services.

are. literally,

walled off from

As James Holston and Teresa

Caldeira explain:

The walls not only separate residences
but

also create semi-public
enclaves, such as shopping centers
and office complexes, where entrances
can be controlled and social homogeneity
guaranteed. In thR cense, fear of
crime legitimates practices of segregation
and considerably

chances the

character of public space. In a society
where people from different social
groups tend not to interact or even encounter
each other in public, the

chances for propagation of democratic
practices are surely diminished
(Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 279).

Although segregation through malls, closed
off condominiums and gated
residential

communities has a much longer history

in Brazil, the

Dominican Republic

is

quickly catching up, especially during this period
of rapid economic growth and growing

economic

disparities.

and the very
the

common

Private schools, new'

condominiums with round

the clock guards,

figure of private security guards (with old rifles
on their laps) are

most recent demarcations where the poor and Afro-Dominicans
can pass as workers,

and not residents or consumers.

Of course,

as with
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most aspects of *r?ial and color

£
identification in the
...
n
Brazilians

However,

can go

some

to

this point is not
absolute
e

consumers

i
IS

consume

way in which

they are treated by
a relatively

citizenship and
consumption recalls the
union of the cultural

significance of citizenship
with con,empora
0 economic restructuring.

consume through

the liberalization

restrictions. Neo-liberals
stress

freedom from
ensure

tariffs,

civil rights

high levels.

.

The linkage between

individual to

at

considered somewhat
alien and marginal,
and

purchasing power
abridges the

mall staff18

Alr
Afro
D
°-Dominicans
and Afro'

'

exclusivee malls to
shop, and often

their presence
as

their relative

elitist

two countries,

economic

high taxes,

and

etc,

rights,

of markets and

the elimination
of

impon

such as the protection
of property, and

while cutting

to redistribute
wealth'’.

Neo-libemlU
lism

down

the State and

its

capacity to

This reinforces the idea
tha, citizenship

is

an economic value,
one that can be attained
through materia, success
and/or consumption.
This markelization of
citizenship has serious
repercussions for democracy
because as

Barber writes “Markets
are simply no, designed
to do the things
democratic
free civil societies
do.

consumers

Markets give us private, not
public, modes of discourse:
we pay as

in currencies

use this currency

of consumption

when we

to producers

of material goods, but

the divishe rhetoric of

(Barber, 1998: 73).

especially'

The

me

,

citizens invent the

cannot

72). Also, ‘‘[consumers

common

language of ‘we’”

neo-liberalization of Latin America,
particularly with

"
'Ills'

we

deal with one another as
citizens or neighbors about
the social

consequences of our private market
choices” (Barber. 1998:

P

politics or

EUr° Pe La ‘ in American

d

can usually
expecttolle^nored'or^pokeirdmvlno at'eveiniw
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its
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^

cuslomers

reformulation of state-society
relations, contributes to
an increase in individualism
and
reinforces the idea of the
primacy of private transactions,
as already noted, but
without
the notion of rights
central to traditional
Liberalism.

The

privatization of citizenship
entails an increased
sense of individualism
mixed

with the idea of citizenship
as a form of status.

When combined

with globalization and

the increase in access
to television, and other
media, the poor and marginal
begin to

view

citizenship as a status that can
be achieved only through
economic means. Following the
belief that justices, police
and citizens treat the wealthy
better than the poor (Duarte
1

996: 79; Carvalho.

markets

is

relatively

strategies.

997: 49), and the opportunities
afforded the liberalization of

decline in prices of imports),

(i.e.

viewing citizenship
classes

1

in

many

marginal citizens

feel vindicated in

tenns of consumption. The
capacity to consume

low

Livio Sansone has noticed that
frustrations

and

civil rights"

among

at

not being treated as

me

Afro-Brazilians (Sansone, 1997: 473).

observ ation in Rio de Janeiro and Santo
Domingo,

I

these

full citizens

pursuit of status.

From

participant

noticed that status, especially

poor Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans, was
evidenced by the
particularly in terms

among

vis-a-vis the wealthy and this
encourages specific spending

“increases the importance of conspicuous
consumption and leisure ni
dignity,

et al

ability to

among

consume,

of short-term, conspicuous consumption and the
importance of

material status symbols. Interestingly enough.
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, and
particularly youths in both countries but especially
in Brazil, are
is

"Black,"

A^ough,
>o

These

JI

from, or very heavily influenced by the

to be fair, neither state

was

US

consuming

culture

which

and the English speaking

particularly efficient at either of these tasks.

cultural products are generally limited to music,

present other products as well.
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dance and fashion, although movies are able

to

Caribbean. Sansone sees this
consumption of having the double
end of both a wish to
"belong" and to "protest."
However,

and Afro-Brazilians are not
alone

in

i,

is

important

point out that Afro-Dominicans

consuming reggae and other "Black"

cultural

products. These cultural products
are so ingrained into mainstream
popular culture that

Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians
consume them along similar nnes.
Also

consumption of "Black"

the

cultural products has yet to
develop a similarly widespread

notion of “Negro" political identity
and activity.

The poor and marginal,
citizens,

as has been suggested already,
are not recognized as

because they are often the antithesis of
a

citizenship

is

defined by

its

distinction

citizen.

This

is

full

precisely because

from the poor and marginal, and from

societal

discourses of poverty and criminality.
This understanding of citizenship strips the
poor

and marginal of their citizenship, as well
as

Dominican bateys

(plantations),

their very humanity.

Sam Martinez found

In

an investigation of

that batey laborers are not slaves,

however, their economic condition undermines Liberal
notions of freedom. He writes
that civil

and

political rights in

such conditions lose the relevance attached

wealthy democracies since “the third world poor tend

economic uncertainty as a more immediate

threat to

to

them

to see starvation, disease,

human

in

and

dignity than being deprived of

the right to vote freely or organize politically with
neighbors and coworkers” (Martinez,

1996: 17).

In

both countries, the State cannot, or will not, guarantee individual rights

to

many

sections of the population. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro writes “Brazil, like other Latin

American

countries,

(Pinheiro, 1996: 18).

is

a society based on exclusion

—

a

democracy without citizenship"

The dehumanization of the Haitian and Haitian-Dominicans
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•he citizen

is

for citizenship in
the

„

Ltcw

».« oT available

„k

p| , in

Dominican Republic and

the exception rather
than the rule, and an
individual

upon his or her value

seen

in a “relational

universe” (da Mat, a.

.

Braz.l

racial

few, those

others." In such
environments,

who

live in

demonized

(Vilas.

darker skin

who

same

,

in

elusive since

citizen based

987). Such an understand-,

where citizenship

is

illiterate,

and ethnic

the possession of the
very

poverty become dehumanized,
pathologized. and. often,

997).

live in

is

becomes a

excludes large portions of
the population, most
obviously the poor,

•he

B,«„

5.

The quest

and

o,

Dominican discourse dehumanizes
Haitians and those of

urban slums and

rural backlands. jus,
as Brazilian discourse

for street children,
Afro-Brazilians,

does

and fare,ados, who are often
the victims of

police and vigilantes.

Democracy has

many
This

no, been able to eliminate

many of these

prejudices. In fact, in

cases prejudice worsened during
democratization and economic
21
liberalization

may

be most clear

field research in

economic

in relation

between criminality and law enforcement.
During

Santo Domingo and Rio de Janeiro
many informants, across socio-

classes, revealed a sort

dictatorships.

.

In the

of nostalgia

Dominican Republic,

the dictatorship of Trujillo
“one could

still

it

for the order

was common

walk the

and

to

social peace

of prior

hear people say that during

streets at night.”

One

informant

in

B ra Z|

-O'
who

l

deC ared ,ha ‘ He WaS ‘'
against de
'

hard to realize
the people are

comments on
watched

“y"

because

i,

did no, work, and
because

who

‘the people’ are

who

‘should not have rights.’
Teresa Caldeira noted
similar

who make

‘walking the streets
impossible.’ and

the par, of middle and
lower middle class residents

their

in

Sao Paulo who

neighborhoods become increasingly
dangerous. She notes

was a high degree of support

for

human

rights during the dictatorsh.p

that

when

middle class dissenters, there
was a vety significant backlash
against human
democratization because

human

rights

i,

were understood as “rights

while there

victims were

rights during

for criminals”

(Caldeira, 1992).

Police violence

is

supported by the fact that the police
target the groups that

society considers to have a
‘proclivity,’ a priori, towards
crime, and by support
the poor majority for order
and security, even if

it

comes

at the cost

of limiting

among
liberties.

Police are able to consistently
violate the rights of the poor
Javelado and Afro-Brazil ian

populations because Brazilian society
does not see members of these croups
22
as citizens
Similarly, Haitians and dark-skinned

Dominicans have no recourse

regular police shake-downs and from
periodic deportations.
"lull

members,"

in the

They

to protection

from

also are not seen as

sense of Marshall's definition of citizenship,
and they are often

presented as not civilized, and somewhat less
human. Powerful discourses of inferiority

which

link racial identity

unemployment,

21

and poverty

to violence

to ghettos

and crime,

to

and shanties,

to migrants, to

drug use, to homeless children,

Ph' s s also due to the increase in drug trafficking.
This could probably be compared to “racial profiling”
*
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in

the United States.

etc, strip

them

Of the, r citizenship 23

se. es

to

.

These discourses of
inferiority construe,
a marginal space
which

dehumanize the people w
ho occupy

it.

This margin, space

discursive but also
geographic and physical
as slums and.
,

fa* are

is

not only

real

spaces which are

solated from the wealth
of the city, although they
are subject to the
abuses of
>n a sense, repression

of wha,

groups are legally citizens,
citizenship

is

police.

of the poor and marginal
protects what society
sees as the

citizen, while violating
the rights

marginalia. The citizen

its

i,

considers non-citizens.
Even though both

understood

is

in

opposition to poverty and

recognized through his or
her position of privilege
and the

possess, on of rights,
freedoms, and customs that
are unavailable to the
great majority of
the population.

Political activists, social

movements and Non-Governmental

Organizations often challenge
this notion of citizenship
by attempting
societal understanding

of who citizen

is to

comespond

that

resources.

can be mobilized

at

any time, as well as leaders and

politically "conscious-

institutions with stable

The conditions of relative and
absolute poverty make

contesting politics

means missing work,

broaden the

better with the legal notion.
Bu,

such contestation requires
high levels of participation,
a highly

group

to

this

very

difficult, since

losing time that could be spent
looking for a job.

upsetting an employer or local
bosses, and spending

some of the few

free hours that a

person might have away from his
or her family, friends and church.
In a sense, most

Dominicans and Brazilians, especially
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, cannot
aitord to maintain high levels of
civic activism,

which

is

necessary to

demand and

consolidate the rights and access necessary
for constructing citizenship.

C0Untry n0r eve " t0 La,,n America since it
seems to also happen in
Asia " C The difTere "« is probably the extern
10 which and the
frennene with
,h which the
frequency
rights of people considered “marginal"
can be violated
the

Unted

W* r
7-7

'

'
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The

Privatization of

Sen ices

Fmally, citizenship

is

'private' in the sense
that the

economies and governments
have been,

•wo*

Neo-liberal

restructure the

hegemony and

economy have

Dominican Republic and
of the other countries
rationalization

some

much

combat

inflation

and to

"leaner” states in Latin
America. Even the

which have privatized

to a

much

in the region (e.g.
Peru. Chile, Argentina),

lesser extent than

some

have accepted the

of national economies
encouraged by the Washington
consensus,

although political support
for such measures

weaken

extent, privatized in
the last decade or

efforts to cu, deficits,

lead to

Brazil,

to

Dominican and Brazilian

is still

weak, particularly because

i,

will

politicians capacity to give
out patronage.

Citizenship, traditionally
conceived, revolves around the
State, whether one

considers Marshall's notion of
expanding political, civil and social
rights within a welfare
state or the Latin

State

is

American “state-centered matrix”

that

Cavarozzi

(

1993 ) discusses. The

generally assumed to have certain
responsibilities and for providing
"public

goods,” which has included employment,

of citizens

rights, in

utilities,

welfare, health care, and the protection

varying degrees across the countries
in the region. Large public-

sector deficits and hyper-inflation
have been countered by massive privatizations
and

downsizing which have changed the notion of
public goods, as well as government
responsibilities to

its

citizens.

Public goods

maintenance of stable markets, low

become narrowly

defined, and the

inflation, as well as political
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and social order become

dominant. The change

who become

in public

goods

is

especially salient for
marginalized populations

the victims of the narrowing
concept of public goods because

primacy on order, which translates
into police violation of the
peoples

2

’.

They

further suffer since, even
though

the informal sector,

many

some were

rights

it

places

of marginalized

already disproportionately in

benefited from the State's underfunded
social projects and from

the existence of large
State-owned companies.

Social services are

among

the

first

areas to be sacrificed in

t0

appease

international creditors and investors
(Vellinga, 1998: 11). Services that
have traditionally

been provided by the federal government
have been decentralized

to either local

governments and/or specific Non-Governmental
26
Organizations.
Decentralization and
priv atization

of services have allowed

NGOs

communities through the promotion of direct
training, etc...

advocacy for

27

to

make

services, offering advocacy, education, job

The growth of NGOs has allowed

rights

many “marginal”

in-roads in

for

some simple and

limited efforts at

and community building. Said articulation of rights and
participation

This is less the case in the Dominican Republic, as Balaguer
almost invariably refused to give in to
international pressures to cut the state or to privatize. Fernandez,
on the other hand, has been able to

implement small-scale liberalization of the economy.
See chapter 4 for empirical examples.

‘

The

NGOs that am referring to here are non-governmental organizations that serve as “service
These NGOs are local organizations which tend to focus on one or more target populations,
1

providers.

provide direct and immediate services.

I

will not be looking at non-partisan research institutes

which constitute a good number of the NGOs in Latin America, unless they supplement
academic endeavors and policy research with programs that provide some sort of service (e.g.
tanks,

and

and think
their

free legal

counsel, protection for battered spouses, etc). Additionally, 1 will not be referring to
transgovemmental
groups and organizations, such as the Socialist International, which have representatives in Latin America,
unless, again, they provide direct services for communities. The focus on this section is how- NGOs
are
competing for the spaces that open up when the State reduces its social spending. As a result, the most

pressing concerns

is

how NGOs which offer
may affect

of those people, and whether this
particularly

between

whether

state

NGOs

services to marginal populations can meet the immediate needs
the

can replace the State

way in which democratic citizenship is conceived,
in some instances or serve as a sort of intermediary'

and society

NGOs differ in their size, scope, and the services they provide.
and then mention a few more specific examples.
Obviously,
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1

w ill speak

generally here,

n

politics

can be seen as a type of
citizenship, except for the

citizenship are not tied to
the state, and a
particular, targeted

common

collective

political

forms of

community, but

groups (Dagnino, 1994, 1998;
Spanakos, forthcoming

groups can serve as effective
pressure groups on specific

more general

fact .ha, these

b).

to

These

issues, although their role
in

decision-making and policy-making

is far

more

limited.

Additionally, these groups lack
reliable and consistent resources,
as well as the ability to

coordinate their activities with larger
entities ( Walzer.

As many

1

999; 63-4)

scholars have noted, neo-liberal
economic structural adjustment

programs tend to disproportionately

affect the poor

and the lower middle classes

(Vellinga, 1998: 13; Vilas, 1996;
Centeno, 1994). While these groups clearly
benefit

from measures

that halt inflation (Bolona,
1993: 191),

shock packages tend

unemployment, decrease the amount of services
provided by
people into the informal sector.
state

from areas

that has

been

Menno

that provide services to

filled increasingly

nongovernmental organizations

to increase

the State and force

many

Vellinga explains that “[t]he withdrawal by
the

meet basic needs has resulted

by grass-roots movements and the

(NGOs;)”

(Vellinga, 1998: 17).

been seen as constituting a crucial element

in

in a policy

activities

NGOs,

void

of

in general,

have

cushioning the shocks of economic

packages, and offering a legitimate space for public contestation
of rights.

The non-governmental organization
crucial roles:

one

is

service providers

examined here play two

the provision ot services to a community; the other

is

acting as

“experts” in the development of policies' on domestic and international levels. The
role

is

the one that

most

directly affects marginalized communities.

sweeping nature of social movements,

NGOs tend to
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As opposed

first

to the

be organizations which concentrate

on a specific issue or
to target

of issues within a specific
community. The efficiency of
NGOs

set

-problem areas"

in “at risk"

communities has won

which previously was reserved as
block grants
In chapter 5, both

briefly discussed.

NGOs

foreign financing,

to state administrators
for aid.

MUDHE in the Dominican Republic and GCAR in Brazil

The former

is

an

NGO,

were

consisting primarily of women of
Haitian

ancestry or Afro-Dominicans,
which provides direct services, in the
form of medical
attention, medicine, pre-school,

workers. The

and a somewhat subsidized market,

provides lessons, ranging from history to
theatre to musical

latter

instruction to capoeira, to residents

ol using this education,

means of increasing
favelados

of one ofth cfavelas

melded with an appreciation

in

Rio de Janeiro, with the aim

for Afro-Brazilian culture, as a

self-esteem. Plantation workers in the
Dominican Republic and

may

in Brazil

to plantation

be considered

among

the

most disadvantaged populations

in their

respective countries, and, unsurprisingly, these
populations are far darker than the more
privileged sections of society.

While
of the

State, if they

the State.

By

autonomy and
funding tor

the

social projects of earlier decades

women

were not already

were dependent upon the

part of a State initiative,

not being directly linked to the

state,

NGOs

NGOs are

direct assistance

separated from

have a certain amount of

are able to challenge institutional prejudices and arrangements. In fact,

NGOs

is

often contingent

ot Identidad in the

educating people about racism

upon

explicit non-partisan positions. For example,

Dominican Republic may spend
in the

Dominican Republic, despite

which deny the existence of racism, because they
funding. Similarly,

CEAP

quite a bit of time

official discourses

are not dependent

on the State

can serve as an advocacy group and bring the
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for

State, police

officers,

As

State.

line.

and other

In

a result,

officials to trial for

CEAP.

most countries

like

Idemidad, does not have

in Latin

generally of the Left. Brazil

is

crimes of racism, because

America

it

is

independent of the

follow any partisan or political

to

NGO workers tend to be non-partisan, although

a notable exception since there
are quite significant

ties

between the Worker's Party (PT)
and the Workers Democratic Party
(PDT) and various

NGOs

and

social activists

Autonomy has

(Lehman and Bebbington, 1998:

a price. Since

NGOs do

262).

not receive set funding from the
State,

they are dependent upon fickle
international financing. This means
that the
will receive

NGOs that

funding will be the ones that are best
organized, most capable of writing

grant applications, and of tapping
international resources. This severely
limits truly

popular

groups

who do

not have the assistance of university
professors or technocrats

(Alvarez, 1998: 306). Additionally,
although this subject
are olten wholly dependent

upon

preferences of their financiers’ 8

foci,

.

is

rarely discussed, since

NGOs

international financing, they often reflect the
policy

NGOs also

often change their funding sources, their

disappear or are swallowed up into a larger group.

Even

still,

NGOs

can play a

vital role in

providing community to otherwise

marginal individuals, and also as serving as “watch-dogs” of
government abuses.

Martinez notes that

governments

[t]

he tasks ol investigating abuses and putting

to guarantee

human

rights has instead fallen largely to

Organizations (NGOs), of which the best

Human

Rights Watch

known perhaps

are

r,rp ssure

Sam

on

Non-Governmental

Amnesty

International and

(Martinez, 1996: 18). The local investigative units of the above

organizations have played a critical role in documenting the systematic abuse of Haitians
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in the

Dominican Republic.
Human Ri«h,s Watch
w atch produces
nroH„

situation of

human

government

to

rights in Brazil
’

make what

i,

NGOs play a second

d moi
makeS C0nsis,ent "ffons
to pressure the
Brazil mn

considers necessary reforms.
role in Latin

America

liberalism and traditional
cultural practices

meld

liberalism has been
interpreted as the smaller
and

of service provision, the

better.

conference

in

a transition period.
The logic of neo....

more decentralized

in the

a,

1

conferences on local issues
for domestic and

American women's groups were

995 (Lehman and Bebbington.

Brazilian government, eager
to

make

its

recruit feminists to prepare
a statement

NGOs which targe, women
law against “interfamily"

v

the

NGO workers are

planning of national and
regional presentations

Beijing in

the State, in terms

non-govemmenta, service providers,

international organizations.
For example, Latin

involved

in

increasingly dependent
upon the expertise of NGOs.

regularly invited to attend
and speak

much

that is also very
important as neo-

Bu, as social services,
education, health, among
other

things, are decentralized
and left up to local

comes

regular reports of the

mark

a,

1

at the

very

Women’s

998). Alvarez reports that the

the Beijing conference,

wen, so

far as to

on behalfof the government
(Alvarez, 1998).

were very much involved

in the drafting

and lobbying

for the

iolence in the Dominican Republic
(Interviews. 1997).

•Femocrats” have also served as technical
advisors for government policies
relating

women, such

as the creation of women-only
police stations in Brazil, Nicaragua
and Peru

(Alvarez, 1998, 302).

international

NGOs also are legitimate representatives in the eyes of the

community. This provides

28

This

is

to

a polemic that

I

will not address here.

alternative voices to that of the State, and
issues

Of

women’s

rights, ethnic

and

racial pohttcs.
politics as well
well as

environmental politics
(Lehman

and Bebbington, 1998:
255).
But as hinted already
there are severe
limitations upon NGOs.
There
certainly appealing
about local people
organizing their

community and

something

is

protecting

themselves from state-sponsored
violence, bu, fragmented
and under-funded
organizations cannot replace
the State as the
pohtica, center of
citizenship. They can.
times, provide better

and more

efficient legal

specific communities,
however, they are
State.

and

This

is

a critical limitation
since

for all intents

advocacy

for individual

dependent upon the

still

and purposes, non-political.
Citizenship

public, and this limits

is

members of

legal apparatus

NGO success depends upon

i,

of the

being non-partisan,

explicitly political

NGO service providers to the role of charity,

a,

and

direct service

provision and offering a social
supplement to citizenship.
Additionally, because the
specificity

of their issue orientation,
lack of funding, and lack
of technological resources.

NGOs are often

incapable of forming long-standing
coalitions that will be capable
of

producing solidarity and large-scale
29
change

means

blurring the rest of the picture.

The

result

of focusing on a

When one organization

target area

provides information on

sexually transmitted diseases
for prostitutes, another
offers services to battered

and a third offers seminars on
self-esteem for
different neighborhoods,

leaders of these

29

T

it

is

racial

and ethnic "others,"

all in

women,

three

difficult to build politically
significant coalitions.

NGOs may be sympathetic to the others'

"

causes, mobilization

is

While the
another

65 [p ]0l tical struggle under neoliberalism
increasingly works from the basis of a civil
u
society paradigm, which
prioritizes difference over the kind of
imaginary- totalizing that national identity
presumed in the era of the popular" (Yudice, 1999:
54).
*
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issue.

Additionally,

NGOs

often contpete with each
other for activists, funding
and

consumers, and such competition
can be fierce and saturated
with ideological venom.
There

is

an additional caveat

that

need be issued about NGOs.
Even

emotive bonds between the
marginal individual and the

between the marginal individual
and the
considered to be citizenship.
There

perhaps post-modern, citizenship 3 "

is

State, this

something

NGOs can

NGO are stronger than those

does no, represent wha,

that

if the

is

generally

resembles a fragmentary form

of,

provide community, distribute
services,

contribute to the self-esteem
and the construction of identity
of an individual ora group.
^

hey can provide a

since

level

of governance, when they are
funded, on a very

NGO service providers target the most marginal

that strengthening the

local level.

communities ->ere

is

But

the possibility

bonds between marginals and NGOs,
without increased

government involvement, may serve

to further alienate a

group which

is

already so

alienated from politics.

NGOs are

generally funded through the charity
of Western European and

organizations and/or social science grant
experiments of (primarily)

^nds
the

to

are distributed through local activists

who

NGO community privileges transnational

bvpass or replace the State,

it

is

is

institutes.

These

are often very anti-State. Considering

and/or local levels of politics, and attempts

possible that the communities that are being

constructed, successfully or not, by

marginal. There

US

US

NGOs may only worsen

the alienation of the

a need to insure the distribution of direct services to
populations

without means, however, there
isolated than they are

now.

II

is

a danger of creating

communities

that are

even more

marginal communities become increasingly insular, they
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simultaneously become increasingly
excluded from state

NGO activity sufficient in these areas.
and for even

less support for

human,

This

civil

may

and

politics,

which may consider

lead to a further pull out by
the State.

political tights

of the residents

in

poor and

marginal areas.

The

privatization

of services has serious consequences

most significant elements of a state-centered
form of citizenship has been
services,

however minimal,

One of the

for citizenship.

provision of

its

particularly to the poor and destitute.
This has been a

of enfranchising the '•marginal.” Marshall
considered the development of social
and entitlements

to

be the most fundamental challenge for citizenship

in the

means

rights

twentieth

century, since only by lessening the socio-economic
differences and privileges between

people could citizenship become an effective and
democratic means of integrating people
into a society.

articulation of

Ironically, democratization in this

many

political

and

civil rights,

most recent wave, has allowed

for the

and yet has been concurrent with the most

significant period of austerity and downsizing.

Conclusion

These comments on the "privatization

in citizenship" are

very preliminary,

although they do tend to emphasize contemporary trends and obstacles

formation of a democratic form of citizenship
particularly for

in the

forms and

in the

Dominican Re r „blic and

Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.

in Brazil,

A “privatized” citizenship

is

not

considered preferable to either the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship outlined

In

Spanakos (1999b)

I

make

a theoretical defense of this form of citizenship. However.
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I

am

not as sure

in

chapter

1

.

However, unlike the Liberal and
Republican notions of citizenship,
a

"pen alized" form of citizenship
seems
political culture,

to

be nonnalized into Dominican
and Brazilian

behavior and expectations. This

despite

is

democratization and three decades
of liberalization

in the

two decades of

Dominican Republic and two

decades of liberalization and one
and a half decades of democratization

The Dominican Republic and

in Brazil.

Brazil are not alone in being
democracies that have

severe limitations on their ability
to institutionalize democratic
politics and norms. Other
countries in the region share a similar
difficulty in integrating a horizontal
type of

democratic government with hierarchical
economies and societies (O'Donnell. 1998).
particularly with the considerable
constraints placed

by debt, currency instability and economic

crisis.

upon Latin American governments

Although every gm'-mment

in Latin

America, with the possible exception of Cuba,
approaches the millenium with some form

of democratic government, an accomplishment
which should not be ignored, democratic

government does not mean democratic governance, nor
even democratic

politics.

Impressive as the transitions to democracy have been,
democratic politics have not been

normalized into

wrought by

political culture,

structural adjustment

The persistence

and

this

has been particularly worsened by the wreckage

programs and austerity plans.

oi non-democratic practices and values within political
culture

and society, particularly the hierarchization of value of its

citizens,

coupled with the

“logic" of free market capitalism has contributed to the construction of a
“privatized”

form ot citizenship across Latin America. The majority

America remain

it

is

fairly alienated

from the

as empirically possible and satisfying as

1

politics,

claim

and the

in this article
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ol the populations of Latin

I

political arena is especially

wrote two years ago.

inaccessible for them. This

coup attempt ,992,

may

explain the high popttiar
support for

his e.ec, ion in ,998.
and

Venezuelan constituent assembly

in

,999.

Alberto Fujimori's auto
go,Pe in Peru

in

90% of his

„

a, so

Hugo Chav/ez

s

supporters being elected to
the

explains the high levels
of support for

,992. and the decline of the
traditional pohtica,

party system in Peru.

Patrons

power

is

who dominate clientelistic networks
have

not institutionalized, and
that

new democratic

legitimacy and have vety limited
resources.
in

which politicos

(politicians)

One need

taken advantage of the

institutions

to subvert

demands upon

citizens

Again, citizenship

is

which

that distinguishes

still

Andean

is

society,

society. High-ranking

predominantly of European and not native descent.

Dominican Republic,

countries hardly provide a

the ethnic and racial diversity of their countries.

associations with

El Salvador have been able to

members of the same

members of that

loretgn service in the

Central American and

Colombia and

denied to the majority of the populations
as citizenship

political officials are

members of the

society has

citizens have been reasonably
powerless to resist.

rather than a shared status that unites
the

1 he

power across

democratic institutions. Or, recognizing
a different power

conceived of as a matter of privilege

Guatemalan

power and

from the Mexican ruling party
(PR1, coerce members of

source, drug dealers and insurgents
in Peru,

exact

lack

only consider the traditional
form

ttnions to vote along
party-lines to see that the inequality
of

allowed clientelism

still

fact that

power and with European

Rather,

Brazil, as well as in the

more representative sample of

it

reinforces the class

features, creating only marginal spaces for

“others.”
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Finally,

now

many of the sen ices

being offered

to

traditionally offered

members of targeted sub-groups by

of NGO service providers has been

critical for the

neighborhoods and communities, but
withdrawal of the

state

from social

which allows businesses

to

it

come

has

policies.

by government

to its citizens are

non-state actors.

The presence

sunival of many peoples,

at a

high cost, and that

is

the large-scale

Peru has recently shifted their labor
law

pay wages below the minimum wage

to

people under the age

of 24. These young workers are considered
“apprentices” and are not covered by
security.

Chile

s social

social

security system has been completely
privatized. While

governments are cutting spending and pulling out
of safety net programs,
has dropped precipitously, leaving the role
of support services in

many

US

foreign aid

instances to

poorly funded and very parochial Non-Governmental
Organizations.

Implications for Democratization

As democratization

studies continue to

move away from

the study of transitions

and towards issues of consolidation and “deepening” (Peceny, 1999; Diamond.
Hartlvn.
Linz, 1999) informal behavior and socio-economic and political hierarchies

become more

important. Electoral government predominates in Latin America and

other areas in

the world

where the

government

historical roots

in itsell is not

have some role
their interests,

in

and

of democracy are relatively shallow. While electoral

democracy,

it

does allow for citizens to express preferences,

choosing the leaders and organizations

it

provides a

many

that are

modicum of legitimacy and

theory). This represents a substantive difference
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from the

supposed

to represent

accountability (at least in

dictatorial

regimes

that

have

to

s.ained the history of
Latin America, and
other areas of the world,
regimes under which
political participation
has

and

parties

institutions

been quelled, voices of,
opposition annihilated, and

have

serv

political

ed as mere institutional
ornaments.

The hegemony of electoral
government

in Latin

America remains secure even

given the presence of
autocratic politicians such
as Alberto Fujimori in
Peru. Hugo

Chavez

Venezuela and Hugo Banzer

in

government must be considered
15

qU" C

make
in

3

the

bU

‘

eSS ,ha " that

'

Formal

government accessible

place in

all

to be

to

in Bolivia, to

name

a few. v„, electora|

no more than fonnal democracy,
and sometimes

it

institutions that intend to
enfranchise citizens, to
its

citizens,

and

to

allow for public accountability,
are

countries in Latin America,
including Cuba. But formal
democracy

is

undermined by informal behavior,
such as clientelism, by economic
conditions, and by
social

and

political hierarchies

which challenge the most fundamental
claims of

democracy.

Democracy makes

three very significant claims: that
citizens are equal,

particularly before the law; that
citizens are free; and that

government

agents are held accountable to each
other and to the public

These three claims are problematic
evidence to that

effect.

People

in Latin

in Latin

America, and

America

and

institutions

at large (see

O'Donnell. 1998)

this study has presented

are not equal before the

Law (in

the

courts or in the eyes of the police) or in terms
of access to resources and opportunities.

Massive

disparities in

luxury versus those

income

who

distribution engender divisions between those

pursue subsistence. Middle classes,

in

who

pursue

such situations, often

identify with the privilege of the upper class rather
than with the survival techniques of

the poor. People are also not free to act, participate
in politics, nor to create institutions
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that will be able «o
articulate

and defend their

interests.

Again, the poor and marginal

sections are often dependent
on outside organizations
and foreign funded

NGOs-whose

efficacy and legitimacy
varies greatly, to represent
their interests. Additionally,
there
the presence of local
bosses, politicians and
patrons

who

is

are able to press their
clients

into supporting certain
politicians, spending time
at particular rallies,
avoiding discussion

w ith
Place

This

other parties or politicians,
etc. Political options,
access and participation takes

among
is

the

narrow constraints

a significant

impingement on the

Finally, while there

of public accountability,
(O'Donnell,

1

998),

laid

seems

this

to

out by patrons, necessity
,.d economic hardship.
political

freedom of the individual.

be some improvement

in

some

countries in the area

remains a serious problem for Latin
American democracies

Government

institutions

and branches are often not accountable

each other, despite constitutional
and institutional structures which are
supposed
this.

The

to

to foster

Similarly, institutions and individuals
remain fairly unaccountable to the public.
inability

of the judiciary

to

check executive and legislative power,
on a macro-level.

and seems unwilling or incapable of defending
citizens whose

by the police or the

military,

on a micro-level,

is

a major

rights

problem

have been violated

for public

accountability (Becker, 1999).

The

hierarchical arrangement of society, the restrictions
on freedom and the lack

ot a legitimate and efficient

form of citizenship

income

disparities

form of accountability create conditions

that, in turn, reinforces

and

in

for a “privatized”

those three conditions. The increase in

unemployment which have followed

neo-liberal

programs, and the existence of a culture which allows democratic

economic

politics to coexist with

very hierarchical conceptions of citizenship further “consolidates” and “deepens"
the
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privatization of citizenship.
During the authoritarian
governments of the 1960s and
1

970s, civil society and
social

movements used

the private sphere to
force

abenura

(opening) in the public sphere
and, eventually, democratization.
During democratization,
the public sphere has
opened in

some

senses, however, the public
sphere has been

reconquered by clienteles,
patronage, and

political parties

who have

significantly

marginalized the -'new actors"
of the 1960s and 1970s.
Economic and social issues are

exemplary of this as the 1990s
witnessed the insulation of
economic policy-makers and
actors (technocrats) from
public space, and social issues

of actors (NGOs,

civil society)

who operated

engagement of the 1970s and 1980s has
been

became

increasingly the concern

within the private sphere. The
civic
largely defused despite the
presence of

polyarchic governments, and this
applies to general struggles of citizenship,
as well as for
the

more

specific

group

claims of identity politics

(e.g. racial, ethnic,

gender, labor

groups).

The

institutionalization of a privatized

been neither a reverse wave/ return

form of citizenship explains why

to overtly authoritarian

government (Huntington.

1991), nor a substantial improvement in the quality'
of democracy in

(Diamond. 1996). There may be an altogether

there has

many

countries

different pattern of relations that

approximates neither formal models of democracy nor
authoritarian government.
adjectives such as “democratic” and “authoritarian"
the

dynamics

that underlie third

may not

wave democracies, such

citizenship.”
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be helpful enough

in

as the “privatization of

In fact,

naming

1

There

a virtual ntorass in
between

is

democracy and authoritarian
government

which democratization theory
often does not address^

Examining

the forma, and

informal contexts of citizenship,
particularly as understood
for “marginal”
groups, allows
a valuable light to be
shed on the quality of
democracy. Such an
examination neither

exaggerates the

'

“democracies.”

political values,

democratic” aspects nor ignores
“authoritarian” elements of
new
It

also unearths the forms
of political exchange, the
system of social and

and the dynamics of power
which impose

restrictions

democratization.

3

O'Donnell’s “Delegative Democracy”

is

a notable exception (O'Donnell, 1994).
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